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Abstract 
ABSTRACT 
To study Saudi polity in relation to Shari'a has been the focus 
of the thesis and an attempt has been made to analyse the same 
and reach at objective conclusions. There has also been an 
endevour to look into the working of Saudi political system whether 
it functions according to the rule of Shari'a or not. The Seiudi royal 
family has consolidated a Saudi national identity by resorting to 
effective use of religion as an additional attribute for the legitimacy 
of the ruling dynasty. 
In Muslim history relations between state and reli^pon were 
introduced in two ways: (a) the resources and apparatus of the 
state were used to promote Islam as in the time of the Prophet and 
the first four Caliphs; (b) Islam was mobilized to protect the state. 
Saudi Arabia is a modem manifestation of the later 
Political participation in the secular Western sense, is mostly 
absent in the West Asian region and this is also true of Saudi 
Arabia. As far as the Saudi royal family and its rule is concerned 
religion has provided a major and almost exclusive source for 
legitimacy. At the secondary level it is the tribal allegiance to the 
royal family that has sustained it for almost eighty years. This has 
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also been ar^pjed that the promotion of national identity has been 
an official as well as a practical policy. It reflects the regimes 
endeavor to enhance its position and legitimacy. This sought out 
identity is based primarily on strict observance of Islam and, on 
loyalty to the House of Saud. 
In a study dealing with the rule of Shari'a (The Islamic law) in 
relation to Saudi political system, a brief discussion of the very 
concept of Shari'a becomes inevitable. Shari'a means God's given 
way of life. The authorities of Islam have enumerated that Shari'a 
covers all the affairs of human life, either it is personed, social, 
political, or international. Here, the discussion would focus on the 
political aspect of Shari'ain the context of the Saudi ruling system. 
The Shari'a accords a prime position to the Majlis ash-Shura 
(The consultative council) in the administration of the State. The 
concept of Shura (consultation) is rooted in Muslim political 
thought and is practiced in many different ways from the days of 
early Islam. 
The Saudi political s}'stem echoes the partnership between 
the religious and political elements of society. This system was 
established in the year 1744 by Muhammad ibn Saud, the amir in 
Al Dariyah near Riyad and Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, the 
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Shaykh who came to the area to preach the doctrine of the Oneness 
of God as the true Islam, based on the ideas of Ibn-Taymiyyah 
(1268-1328 ). Ibn-Taymiyyah reopened the doors of Ijtihad which 
had been considered as closed after the 10th century A. D. (3 rd c 
Hijra). Ibn-Taymiyyah's efforts led to a revival in Islamic thought. 
However the next four 100 years did not see any intellectual 
ferment until the appearance of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. 
At this stage we notice an emerging cooperation between Abd al-
Wahab and Muhammad Ibn Saud. As a resul t of this co-operation 
based on the strict Hanbali interpretation of Islamic law, political 
rule was the province of the House of Saud, Al-Saud who was also 
given the title of Imam, which in common par lance meant , head of 
the state. And religious authority was in the h a n d s of the Ash 
Shaykh (the f;amily of the shaykh, Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab). 
This arrangeraent, however, did not give unchecked political power 
to the ruler because in accordance with the precepts of Abd-al-
Wahhab, based on the political theory of Ibn Taimiya, secular 
authority mus t conform to divine law and produce civil order in 
order to be le^^timate. 
To unders tand the forces tha t have shaped the religion as 
politics of Saudi Arabia, one m u s t also consider the roles of 
geographic factors, tribal allegiance, a Bedouin life, the Al Saud, 
and the discovery of oil. Tribal affiliation h a s been the focus of 
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identity in the Arabian Peninsula, approximately 80 percent of 
which is occupied by Saudi Arabia. Well in the present century, 
several deserts, including the Rub al Khali, one of the largest in the 
world, cut tribal groups off from one another and isolate Najd, from 
other parts of the country. As a result, a high degree of cultural 
homogeneity developed among the inhabitants; the majority follows 
Sunni Wahhabi Islam and a patriarchal family system. Only about 
5 percent of the Saudi population adheres to the Shia sect. The 
Shia, in general, represent the lowest socio-economic group in the 
country, and their grievances over their status have led to protest 
demonstrations in the 1970s and again in 1979-80, that have 
resulted in government actions designed to better their lot. 
Saudi tribal allegiance and the Bedouin heritage have been 
weakened, however, since the mid 20th century by the increased 
role of a centralized state, urbanization and industrialization that 
has accompainied the finding of oil. At the same time, the impact of 
Islam on different elements of the population has varied. 
As Saudi Arabia entered the final years of the 20th century, 
there were signs, however, that the expression of public dissent, 
once unthinkable, was becoming more commonplace. Such dissent 
was usually couched within an Islamic framework, but nonetheless 
it represented a force with which the Al Saud had to reckon. King 
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Fahd had succeeded thus far in balancing the demands of 
modernists and traditionalists domestically and in pursuing a 
policy of moderation internationally. Some observers wondered, 
however, how long Fahd would be able to rule and how adaptable 
the more conservative crown Prince Abd Allah would be as Fahd's 
successor. 
Joseph Nevo in his article (published in Middle Eastern 
studies Quiarterly, vol:34, 'Religion and National Identity in Saudi 
Arabia' narrates the sayings of Madawi al-Rasheed that the royal 
family has come to realize that Islam applied to legitimize a political 
system is a double-edged sword . It invites opposition groups to 
debate the degree to which Islam has been incorporated into 
politics. The contemporary Islamic oppositions that contest the 
legitimacy of the monarchy are using the same rhetoric employed 
by the royal family to legitimize the monarchy shifting the focus 
from Islam as the source of legitimacy of the ruling family to Islam 
as the source of the uniqueness of the Saudi nation is tlie regime's 
line of defense against the aforementioned challenges. 
Saudi Arabia is a state but not a nation in the strict sense of 
the term. Islam being as its source of legitimacy, the nation is more 
outside the state boundaries of Saudi Arabia than inside it. This 
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concept that Saudi Arabia's collective identity is part of the nation 
is frequently and repeatedly underlined by the regime's spokesmen. 
Therefore religion (primarily the Wahhabi version of Sunni 
Islam) has played a prominent role not only in moulding the 
individual's private and collective identity but also in consolidating 
his national values. 
The Saudi constitution is the Qur'an, and the Shari'a is the 
source of its law. Even the Basic Law of Government {al-nizam al-
asasi li'l hukm), issued in 1992, stressed their supremacy. 
Moreover, in order to underline that there is no other mundane 
source of legislation, the use of terms such as qanun (law) and 
musharri' (legislator) are practically forbidden as they imply 
Westem-stj/^le statutory enactment. They are substituted by nizam 
(regulation) and marsum (decree), which are supposed to 
complement the Shari'anot to take its place. 
The House of Saud achieved substantial power owing to a 
bond with a religious harbinger. The supreme position the dynasty 
has enjoyed in the Arabian Peninsula for two and a half centuries 
arises from the facility acumen with which members of the Al Saud 
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family utilize religion as a unifying instrument and as a source of 
political leg;itimacy for their rule. 
The Wahhabi doctrine (derived from the Hanbali school of 
Sunni Islam) was first preached in Najd in central Arabia in the 
1740s by a native Muslim scholar Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab. 
The school he founded was later named after him. He Ccilled for the 
reinstatement of exactly the same religious, social and political 
customs that had been practised by Prophet Muhammad and his 
followers, namely adherence to the Qur'an and the Sunna as the 
only sources for religious conduct, and the rejection of any new 
element or concept introduced into Islam thereafter: those were 
branded as bida'. The most important Wahhabi tenet was tawhid, 
Ihe oneness of God. Not only God is omnipotent, he is the one and 
only who is such. No person or object possesses divine traits, so no 
one and nothing can or should mediate between a human being 
and God. The use of such an intermediary was considered shirk 
(pol3rtheism, idolatry) 
These were not merely theoretical theological rulings. They 
had considerable impact on daily life, because the cult of holy 
places (i.e., objects mediating between man and God) w£is common 
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and widespread then in central Arabia. Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab's call for the destruction of such places shook the 
prevailing religious and social order in Najd. 
Leaders of the local sedentary communities regarded him as a 
menace to peace and stability as well as a threat to their own 
authority. He was expelled from several places and his life was 
threatened. The cooperation between Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Saud yielded two interrelated 
occurrences: the establishment of the Al Saud dynasty as the 
political masters of most the Arabian Peninsula and the 
simultaneous spread of Wahhabism and its installation as the 
predominant Islamic school in those same territories. 
That bond between umara and ulama (statesmen and divines) 
marks the modem inception of the use of religion as an instrument 
for both consolidating a collective identity and legitimizing the 
ruling family. It served the interests of the two parties, in the spirit 
of the political writing of Ibn Taymiyya. This scholar, whose most 
stringent interpretation of the teachings of Ibn Hanbal (founder of 
the most orthodox of the four Islamic schools) was adopted by 
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, held that religion and state are 
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indissolubly linked. Without the coercive power of the state religion 
is in danger, and on the other hand, without the Shari'a the state 
becomes a tyrannical organization. 
Religion continued to serve as an instrument of expansion 
and control, nevertheless, the king's endeavors for modernization 
and nation building brought to the surface an imminent conflict 
between state and religion. The technical innovations he 
introduced, such as motor vehicles and communications, essential 
for consolidating his authority and implementing his political aims, 
were prescribed by religion as bida' 'Abd al-'Aziz had to mobilize his 
ulama to legalize them. These religious leaders who formerly had 
been responsible for encouraging and strengthening the Islamic 
faith in the spirit of the uncompromising Wahhabism, were now 
required to function as state appointees and to check 
manifestations of religious realism. They had to explain and justify 
secular reforms and changes, against which they used to preach 
constantly in Islamic terms. No wonder that some zealous Muslims, 
whose religious ardor until then had been fostered by the same 
ulama, questioned their religious authority and defied their rulings. 
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A rift between Islamic revivalism on the one hand and the 
institutionalized religion and the state on the other, was inevitable. 
More over towards understanding Saudi system of 
government in relation to Shari'a an understanding of the four 
schools of Islamic thought is pertinent. Hanbali School is being 
followed in Saudi Arabia in matters of government. Hence, the 
study of this school is a prerequisite to understand the political 
system in Saudi Arabia. This also forms the ideological plank of the 
government. 
Saudi Arabia is the most theocratic state in the 
contemporaryb Sunni Muslim wrrld. In Saudi Arabia the Basic law 
of Government was introduced by royal decree in 1992, at chapter-
1 Article-1 defined God's book and the Sunnah of his Prophet as 
the constitution of Saudi Arabia. 
Accordingly, "The supreme authority resides only with Allah" 
However religious power and authority continue to be 
exercised in Saudi Arabia by the Ulama along with political figures 
who together derived legitimacy as result of cooperation. 
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The government and state institutions are composed of the 
monarch , Council of Ministers, Consultative Council, and Judiciary 
and government local administration. Recently, coQstitutional 
reforms took place in Saudi Arabia in March 1992 through Royal 
decrees of the King. The nucleus of Saudi Arabia Government is the 
monarchy. The Basic law adopted in 1992 declared that Saudi 
Arabia is a monarchy by the sons and grandsons of King Abd al-
Aziz al-Saud, and that the Holy Qur'an is the constitution of the 
country, which is governed on the basis of Islamic law [Shari'a) 
There are no political parties or national elections. The Kings 
powers are limited because he mus t observe the Shari'a and other 
Saudi traditions. He also mus t retain a consensus of the Saudi 
royal family, religious leaders (Ulama) and other important 
e lements in Saudi society. 
In last official act, in October 1953, King Abd al-Aziz 
established a Council of Ministers to met the "obligations and the 
diversification's of Ministers to meet the "obligations and the 
diversification's of the responsibilities placed on the state." In the 
Saudi Kingdom a Council of Ministers through Royal Decree eaw 
established in October 1953. It dealt with five issues: (i) 
Organization of the council, (ii) Jurisdiction of the Council, (iii) The 
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council's procedures (iv) Jurisdiction of the president of Council 
and (v) Council's Cabinets. The Council's decisions .are strictly 
advisory. King Fahd announced his 60-man selection for the new 
Majlis al-Shura on August 20, 1993. 
The role of Ulama in Saudi political system an the consequent 
socio-political change during and after the Gulf War is another 
important aspect of the study. 
In Sunni slam, the Ulama as well as the fuqaha have 
traditional^ supported the political institutions in power and in 
Saudi Arabia this support was given to the House of Saud by 
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab'. 
Saudi Ulama now represents two streams of thought and 
action. Senior Ulama led by Shayykh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz uphold 
the traditional - puritanical Islam. They defend the ruling royal 
family through their efforts. But the young Ulama, like Safar al -
Hawaii with the support of university professors, students and 
other liberals stand for change in the system. 4^ Their language is 
an amalgam of puritanical Islam and modem political Islcim. 
The traditional unity of Ulama and Saudi political system is 
almost at stake. Both the intimacy of the monarchy with a group of 
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Ulama and hostility with another group of Ulama are prevailing 
simultaneously in the political system of Saudi Arabia with 
considerable differences between them 
Islamic law applied in Saudi Arabia and the courts and 
judges , who apply it in other words, the Islamic legal system of 
Saudi Arabia is little known or understood outside the Pangdom. At 
the same time, as everyone recognizes, the Kingdom's claim to 
uphold Iskmiic law is central to its constitution, law, religion, 
history, and society. 
Saudi Arabia is the most traditional Islamic legal system in 
the World today. Islamic law is constitutionally the law of land, the 
general jurisdiction held by traditionally trained judges who apply 
exclusively the Islamic law; and traditional Islamic legal learning is 
still good professional training for practice. Most Saudis consider 
Islamic law their indigenous law, natural and inevitsible. Saudi 
Arabia does broadly and effectively apply the rules of the old 
Islamic law,, probably to a degree greater than many Iskmiic s tates 
of the past . 
This is not to claim that Saudi Arabia's legal system is the 
ideal Islamic law or legal system. A community has the religious 
legal obligation to select a Muslim rule to uphold Shari'a ; if this is 
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impossible, the community must attempt to install its own qadi. In 
Saudi Arabia the ruler is the king {malik) In other Islamic legal 
System the ruler appellation might be Khalifa (successor, 
vicegerent), imaam (leader), amir al-mu'minin (commander of the 
faithful), sultan (power), amir (commander, prince), wali (governor), 
or wali al-amr (person in authority). The Saudi TJlamta' willingly 
recognize that the ruler possesses an extensive authority to make 
laws. They do so as part of the fundamental fiqh doctrine forged by 
'Ulama' to represent and control the ruler's constitutional powers 
under a constitution of Shari'a. This makes siyasa shar'iyya the 
virtual inverse of fiqh as a law-making method. The result is that 
today hundreds of nizams operate alongside the fiqh so that the law 
may confront modem conditions. Fiqh is also the residual law, 
filling gaps in the quite rudimentary nizams. This theory recognized 
that Muslim society needs, alongside fiqh, siyasa power and even 
siyasa laws and tribunals. 
On the Saudi legal system, the study shows how the system 
has achieved and maintains high degree of doctrinal consistency 
and justifiability, according to the fiqh conception endorsed by its 
'Ulama'. Many old habits and institutions have changed to suit 
modern conditions, without the 'Ulama' yet losing their balance. 
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Still, evolution in fiqh and 'Ulama' conceptions and institutions has 
not kept pace with extremely rapid economic and material change 
and with attendant less rapid but still breath-taking economic, 
social, cultural, and political shifts. Even after these events Saudi 
Arabia remains deeply patient, however, and postpones any 
deliberate change that has not gained wide consensus, particularly 
among the elder generation in every sphere. As our study showed 
several times, the country is willing to pay a, very high price in 
material terais for slowing even desperately needed reforms when 
these reforms implicate publicly or privately held values. Patience 
and consensus being such pervasive norms, it becomes difficult to 
discern where they are being unfairly exploited by elites to preserve 
their influence or privilege. 
Saudi Arabia, has been an Islamic absolute monarchy with a 
closed political set up since its inception in 1932. The institutions 
and processes of western liberal democracy show anathema to 
Saudi political establishment. The political process in Saudi Arabia 
has been a family enterprise and Saudi Kings have proved "total 
rulers". Saudi rulers have opposed calls for democratic change and 
have declared that Qur'an is the constitution and Shari'a must be 
the guiding principle of the state. On March 1, 1992, King Fahd 
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ordered a package of constitutional reforms, which showed major 
changes in the state's organic institutions. The package made up of 
three separate documents, and was enacted in three separate royal 
decrees: [1] a Basic System of Rules; [2] a statute covering the 
establishment of a Consultative Council within six months; [3] a 
statute requiring administrative devolution, with regional 
assemblies with one year. The package also possessed several 
permanently entrenched fundamental rights and freedom. Thus, a 
set of general guidelines outlining the powers and limits on the 
government and the sights and obligations of the citizens was 
issued for the first time. These three statutes were intended to 
reestablish the basis for government and regulate political 
participation through the establishment of consultative council and 
regional government. But the basic system of rule remains 
subordinate the official constitution of Saudi Arabia, the Shari'a 
despite the move towards political modernisation. 
Contentious politics in general and social movements with 
Islamist lineages in particular are a significant part of the 
landscape of the contemporary West Asian region. The Saudi case 
is especially interesting because Islamist movements, even under 
the constraints of an authoritarian political system, has been able 
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to forge effective, amorphous underground networks throughout 
the country. We have only begun to debate what political dissent 
inside Saudi Arabia might mean for the future of the country and 
its ruling fsunily, the al-Saud. A start is to understand the historical 
context' inner workings, and impact of the Islamist movement in 
Saudi Arabia. 
Contentious voices also resonate because the exclusionary 
structure of governance does not reflect the diversity of the 
population. Contrary to popular images, Saudi Arabia is not a 
homogeneous country in ethnicity, religion, or ideology. The variety 
of Muslim practices include Wahhabi orthodoxy, mainstream Sunni 
calls for reform or the state, minority Shia communities, Sufi 
practices titiroughout the Hejaz, and, most important, a Sunni 
Salafi opposition movement (the Salafi - believers who adhere to 
the ways of their pious ancestors, the companions of the prophet-
are the most powerful voice in Saudi Arabia today). In religious, 
political, social, and economic affgdrs, inclusion must be practiced. 
The sprawling religious bureaucracy must be reformed to 
incorporate the religious diversity of the country, rather than only 
the muwahhidun. Likewise, political positions, from the local to the 
Abstract 
national level, mus t allow for the inclusion of diverse ethnic 
identities, regions, and ideological voices. Reform of the political 
and religious insti tutions would promote greater tolerance in Saudi 
society. 
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Preface 
In this thesis entitled "The Rule of Shari'a and the 
Contemporary Saudi Political System", an attempt has been 
made to discuss and analyze the Saudi political system in the 
light of Shari'a, which is the edifice of any Islamic political 
enterprise. The political structure in Saudi Arabia is based on 
Shari'a as it is claimed by the establishment and a certain 
section of Ulama. 
The thesis has been divided into four chapters besides the 
Introduction and the Conclusion. 
Chapter I deals with Shari'a and its various aspects as a 
factor in the evolution of an ideology which forms the comer 
stone of religious and political alliance. 
Chapter II features the Saudi political system and the 
influence of the Ulama. Ulama as interpreters and authority over 
Shari'a constitute an important subject as far as Saudi political 
system in concerned. 
Chapter III discusses the Islamic jurisprudence as 
enshrined in Shari'a and its evolution and application in the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia and how it has been accommodated 
with the monarchical political dispensation. 
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Chapter IV focuses on the constitutional reforms as 
brought forth in Saudi Arabia. It deals with promises of reforms 
by the monarchy and the actual reforms demanded by the 
dissenting clergy and the groups from time to time. It is hoped 
that this study would contribute, in its own modest way, to the 
understanding of Saudi political system in the light of Shari'a. 
I am extremely grateful to my supervisor Prof. S. Shamir 
Hasan for his able guidance, at every stage of this study. He has 
spent a lot of time going through my material and holding long 
discussions with me regarding various aspects of the work. It 
would have been very difficult for me to complete this work 
without his kind help. 
I am indebted to Prof. T. Hussain Chairperson of the 
department for her constant encouragement and help. Special 
thank are due to Prof. Mahmoodul Haq for his valuable 
suggestion and help in preparing the thesis. Thanks in full 
measure are due to Dr. Masudur Rahman from university of 
Dhaka for going through the chapters. 
Valuable help was extended to me by the staff of the library of 
the center of West Asian Studies, Dept of Islamic Studies, Dept 
of History at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. I thank them 
profusely. 
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and relaxed during preparation of the thesis. 
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brothers Prof. Mizanur Rahman And Prof. Mustafizur P.ahman 
are all affection and encouragement for me during my trials and 
tribulations. 
Thanks are due to Mr. Shamim and Mr. Ashraf in the office of 
the Centre of West Asian Studies for their cooperation during my 
stay in the department. 
I am very grateful to my teachers in the department Dr. 
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Introduction of the Rule ofShari 'a and the Contemporary Saudi Political System 
Introduction 
In a study dealing with the rule of Shari'a (the Islmnic law) 
in relation to the Saudi political system, a brief discussion on the 
very concept of Shari'a becomes inevitable. Shari'a means 'God's 
given way of life.' The authorities of Islam have enumerated that 
Shari'a covers all the affairs of human life, whether it is 
personal, social, political, or international. Here, the discussion 
will focus on the political aspect of Shari'a in the context of the 
Saudi ruling system. 
The Shari'a accords a prime position to the Majlis Ash-
Shura (The Consultative Council) in the administration of the 
State. The concept of Shura ('consultation') is rooted in Muslim 
political thought and is practiced in many different ways from 
the days of early Islam. 
It is generally believed that Shura is based on the Quranic 
reference to "Amruhum Shura baynahum" ("those who conduct 
their affairs of government by mutual consultation"). It also 
states that the ruler should consult the men of knowledge and 
character in the conduct of the administration of the state. 
Shura is the genuine expression of the idea of goveiTiment 
limited by the consent of the people and the rule of law. 
Introduction of the Rule ofShari'a and the Contemporary Saudi Political System 
The Saudi political system echoes tiie partnership between 
the religious and political elements of society. This system was 
established in the year 1744 by Muhammad ibn Saud, 1iie amir 
in Al Dariyah near Riyad and Muhammad ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, 
the Shaykh who came to the area to preach the doctrine of the 
Oneness of God as the true Islam, based on the ideas of Ibn-
Taymiyyah (1268-1328 ). Ibn-Ta5nTiiyyah reopened the doors of 
Ijtihad which had been considered closed after the 10th century 
A. D. (3 rd c Hijra). Ibn-Taymiyyah's efforts led to a revival in 
Islamic thought. The next four hundred years, however, did not 
see any intellectual ferment until the appearance of Muhammad 
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. At this stage we notice an emerging 
cooperation between Abd al-Wahab and Muhammad Ibn Saud. 
As a result of this co-operation based on the strict Hanbali 
interpretation of Islamic law, political rule was governed by the 
House of Saud. Al-Saud who was also given the title of Imam, 
which in common parlance meant "head of the state." Religious 
authority was in the hands of the Ash Shaykh (the family of the 
shaykh, Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab). This arrang;ement, 
however, did not give unchecked political power to the ruler 
because in accordance with the precepts of Abd-al-Wahhab, 
based on the political theory of Ibn Taimiya, secular authority 
must conform to divine law and produce civil order in order to be 
legitimate. 
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The collaboration of the Al Saud and the Al ash Shaylch 
resulted in the Al Saud dominion in Najd, the central region of 
the Arabian Peninsula, for more than two centuries, except for 
the brief period from 1891 to 1902 when the Al Saud was exiled 
by the Al Rashid to Kuwait. Najd has exerted an unusually 
strong influence on the jurisdiction of the Al Saud. In addition, 
because the region lacked large cities and the strong leadership 
they could provide, an interdependent relationship developed 
among Najdi towns, which paid tribute to tribes that provided 
protection. Traditionally, Najdi political power would lay w\\h the 
tribal Shaykhs, who, when they became Amirs, or governors of a 
wider area, endeavored to dissociate themselves from their tribal 
rules because they were ruling a more diverse population. 
The prominence of Al Saud is reflected in the name Saudi 
Arabia, the only country to be named by the ruling family. The 
present kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its existence from the 
campaigns of its founder, Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar-Rahman Al 
Saud, who initially captured Riyadh with his Beduine followers 
in 1902. Thereafter, with the aid of the Ikhwan, or the 
brotherhood, a fervent group of Wahhabi beduine warriors, he 
recaptured the rest of Najd, defeating the Al Rashid forces at Hail 
in the North in 1921, and in 1924 conquering the Hijaz, 
including Mecca and Medina. Chosen as the king of the Hijaz 
and Najd in 1927, Abd al Aziz was obliged to defeat the Ikhwan 
militarily in 1929 because in their zeal the Ikhwan had 
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encroached on the borders of neighbouring states, thereby 
arousing the concern of Britain, in particular. In 1932 Abd al 
'Aziz proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which covered an 
area approximating the territory of the present state. The 
discovery of oil in 1938 ultimately transformed the kingdom and 
the lives of its inhabitants. During his reign, however, Abd al 
'Aziz sought to obtain "the iron of the West without its ideas," as 
the king phrased it. He sought to make use of Western 
technology, but at the same time he wished to maintain the 
traditional institutions associated with Islamic and Arab life. 
Upon Abd al 'Aziz's death in 1953, his son Saud ibn Abd al 
'Aziz Al-Saud succeeded to the throne. Saud proved to be an 
ineffective ruler and a spendthrift, whose luxurious lifestyle, 
together with that of the advisers with whom he surrounded 
himself, rapidly led to the depletion of the kingdom's treasury. Al 
Saud was obliged to give executive power to conduct foreign and 
domestic affairs to his brother. Crown Prince Faisal ibn Abd al 
'Aziz Al Saud in 1958, and again in 1962. In 1964 th.e royal 
family, with the consent of the Ulama, or religious leaders, 
deposed Saud and made Faisal the king, appointing Kh^ilid ibn 
Abd al 'Aziz Al Saud, another brother, as crown prince. 
Faisal sought to modernize the kingdom economically, 
educationally, and in defense, while simultaneously playing a 
key role in foreign policy. For instance, during the October 1973 
3 
Introduction of the Rule ofShari 'a anil the Contemporary Saudi Political System 
War between Israel and the Arab states, Faisal helped to initiate 
an oil embargo against those countries that supported Israel. 
The embargo led to the tripUng of oil prices. He supported the 
education of girls and the opening of government television 
stations to promote education. Faisal w a^s assassinated in 1975 
by his own nephew. 
Crown Prince Khalid ibn Abd al 'Aziz became the king (and 
de facto prime minister) immediately. His brother, Fahd ibn Abd 
al Aziz Al Saud, served as deputy prime minister, and another 
brother, Abd Allah ibn Abd al 'Aziz Al Saud, served as second 
deputy prime minister. Khalid dealt primarily with domestic 
affairs, stressing agricultural development. He also visited all the 
Gulf states, and took a keen interest in settling Saudi Arabia's 
outstanding boundary disputes, including that of the Al Buraymi 
Oasis with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1975. [The area 
near Al Buraymi disputed with Oman had been resolved in 
1971.] Fahd became the principal spokesman on foreign affairs 
and oil policy. 
King Khalid's reign was an eventful one. It saw the attempt 
of strict Islamists (also known as purists), who alleged the 
corrupting Western influence on Saudi royal family, in taking 
over the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, riots in the Eastern 
Province in 1979 and 1980, and the formation of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. 
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Upon Khalid's death in 1982, Fahd ascended the throne, 
with Abd Allah becoming crown prince. Fahd soon faced the 
impact on the kingdom because the fall in oil revenues, which 
ended in the 1986 oil price crash. Recognizing the need for a 
more united Arab front, particularly in view of the deteriorating 
economic situation, he reestablished diplomatic relations with 
Egypt in 1987 (relations had been broken in 1978 as a result of 
Anwar al-Sadat's signing of the Camp David Accords creating a 
separate peace between Egypt and Israel). Fahd also played a 
mediating role in the Lebanese civil war in 1989, bringing most 
of the members of the Lebanese National Assembly to At Taif to 
settle their differences. 
To understand the forces that have shaped the religion into 
the politics of Saudi Arabia, one must also consider the roles of 
geographic factors, tribal allegiance, the Bedouin life, the Al 
Saud, and the discovery of oil. Tribal affiliation has been the 
focus of identity in the Arabian Peninsula, approximately 80 
percent of which is occupied by Saudi Arabia. Well in the present 
century, several deserts, including the Rub al Khali, one of the 
largest in the world, cut tribal groups off from one another and 
isolate Najd, from other parts of the country. As a result, a high 
degree of cultural homogeneity developed among the inhabitants. 
The majority follows Suimi Wahhabi Islam and a patriarchal 
family system. Only about 5 percent of the Saudi population 
adheres to the Shia sect. The Shia, in general, represent the 
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lowest socio-economic group in the country, and their grievances 
over their status have led to protest demonstrations in the 1970s 
and again in 1979-80, that have resulted in government actions 
designed to better their lot. 
Saudi tribal allegiance and the Bedouin heritage have been 
weakened, however, since the mid-twentieth century by the 
increased role of a centralized state, urbanization, and 
industrialization that has accompanied the finding of oil. At the 
same time, the impact of Islam on different elements of the 
population has varied. 
Many of the educated younger technocrats have felt a need 
to adapt Islamic institutions to fit the demands of modem 
technology. Other young people, more conservatively inclined, as 
well as a number of their elders and those with a more 
traditional Bedouin lifestyle, have deplored the alienation from 
Muslim values and the corruption that they believe Western 
ways and the presence of foreigners have brought into the 
kingdom (according to 1992 census figures, there are 4.6 million 
foreigners, in contrast to an indigenous population of 12.3 
million). Their activist Islamism was reflected in the 1979 
attempt by extremists to take over the Grand Mosque in Mecca 
and by other aspects of the Islamic revival, such as the 
prominent wearing of the hijab, or long black cloak and veil by 
women, and the more active role of the Committees for the 
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Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice {mutamwiin) in 
enforcing standards of public morality. 
The government found itself caught between these two 
trends. On the one hand, it feared the extremism of some of the 
traditionalists, which could well undermine the economic, 
educational, and social development programs that the 
government had been implementing and which also constituted 
a threat to internal security. On the other hand, as guardian of 
the holy places of Islam, the sites of the annual pilgrimage for 
Muslims the world over, the government needed to legitimize 
itself as an "Islamic Government". 
The government therefore has sought to achieve political 
and social compromises. Repeated announcernents have been 
made regarding the royal family's intention to create a 
consultative council, first proposed by King Faisal in 1964. 
The Gulf War was, however, a watershed in the history of 
the desert Kingdom. It was the first opportunity for dissidents to 
come out in the open. The stationing of American troops in 
Saudi Arabia led to massive resentment amongst the Ulama. The 
younger generation vociferously protested against the stationing 
of foreign troops. Anti-state criticism thundered from the pulpits 
of the mosques, and the Kingdom witnessed an avalanche of 
cassettes, books, and pamphlets about the Saudi State. The 
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established clergy, however, rallied to; the defense of the state, 
and Saudi Arabia became an arena where pro and anti-regime 
forces debated both taking recourse to the Quran and the Hadith 
to defend their respective positions. 
The younger Ulama drew support from university 
professors, teachers, theology students, businessmen, etc. They 
were influenced by political Islam, which was the inspiration 
behind radical resurgent movements throughout the area. With 
the end of the war, the King was forced to confront the demand 
of the radical (revolutionary) Ulama. This led to his proclamation 
of a package of reforms in March 1, 1992. Most significant was 
the formation of the Majlis Ash-Shura, a demand that had been 
promised ever since the 1930s. 
As a means of giving a greater voice to the people, on 
August 20, 1993, Fahd announced the appointment of sixty men 
to the Consultative Council. Members of the Council were 
primarily religious and tribal leaders, government officials, 
businessmen, and retired military and police officers. An 
additional step was King Fahd's decree of March 1992, 
establishing a main, or basic, code of laws that regularizes 
succession to the throne (the king chooses the heir apparent 
from among the sons and grandsons of Abd al-'Aziz) and sets 
forth various administrative procedures concerning the state. 
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Fahd ailso issued a decree concerning the provinces, or regions, 
of the kingdom. Each region is to have an Amir, a deputy, and a 
consultative council composed of at least ten persons appointed 
by the Amir for a four-year term. The code does not, however, 
protect individual rights in the western sense, as many 
professionals and technocrats had desired. Rather, it says that 
"the state protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari'a." 
The Islamic law, the Shari'a, gives a very prominent 
position to the Majlis Ash-Shura in the administration of the 
State. The context of 'Shard (consultation) is rooted in Muslim 
political thought and practice harking back to the early days of 
Islam. It is based on the Qur'anic reference Amruhum Shura 
baynahum (who conduct their affairs of governance by mutual 
consultation). 1) It states that the ruler should consult the men 
of knowledge and character in the conduct of the administration 
of the state. The head of the state should rule with the consent 
of the people and the ruler should elicit support of the masses. 
2) Consultation is the very basis of political life. Shura is the 
genuine expression of the idea of government limited by the 
consent of the people and the rule of law. 3) Islam teaches that 
people's conduct in life should be determined by mutual 
consultation, and people should adhere to the decisions reached 
through consultation. 4) Thus, consultation is the key word of 
Ash ^hura, and it suggests the ideal way in which a good man 
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should conduct his affairs, so thiat he may not become too 
egotistical, and on the other hand, he may not lightly abandon 
the responsibilities which devolve on him as a personality whose 
development counts in the sight of Allah. 5) Majlis is the formal 
institution where the ruler consults with the men of knowledge, 
experience, and character in the administration of the state. This 
practice has been in existence even before the emergence of 
Islam in Arabia. With the advent of Islam and rule of the Prophet 
Muhammad (s: s:) in Madina, Majlis received renewed attention 
and political recognition. 
The Saudi concept of legitimacy of the government is akin 
to the beduin concept of tribal democracy in which the individual 
exchanges views with the tribal shaykh. Saudi rulers and most 
traditionalists reject Western participatory democracy, because 
the latter establishes the people as the source of decision rather 
than the will of God as found in the Shari'a and as interpreted 
by the Ulama. In their view, moreover, democracy lacks the 
stability that a Muslim form of government provides. Thinking 
this to be reason enough, the government has tended to repress 
dissent and jail dissidents. Such repression has been applied to 
students and religious figures belonging to such organizations as 
the Organization of Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula 
(active in January and February 1992 in criticizing the ruling 
family and the government). 
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Socially, the education of girls, although placed under the 
supervision of the religious authorities, has existed over the 
period of four decades. There are a considerable number of 
women graduates who are seeking employment in various 
sectors and who increasingly are making their presence felt. This 
trend has coincided at a time of rising unemployment for Saudi 
males, particularly for graduates in the field of religious studies, 
and posed a further potential source of dissidence. In addition, 
growing urbanization was tending to increase the number of 
nuclear as opposed to extended families, thereby breaking down 
traditional social structures. There were also indications that 
drug smuggling and drug use were rising; twenty of the forty 
executions that occurred between January 1 and May 1, 1993, 
were drug related. 
The Al Saud played the central role in achieving the needed 
compromises in the political, social, and foreign affairs, as well 
as in directing the economy with the support of the technocrats 
and the merchants. 
The crown prince was also considered closer, than the king 
to the religious establishment, or the Ulama. Thirty to forty of 
the most influential Ulama, mainly members of the Al ash 
Shaykh, constituted the Council of Senior Ulama, seven of whose 
members were dismissed by the king in December 1992 on the 
pretext of "poor health." The actual reason for their dismissal 
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was their failure to condemn July criticisms (published in 
September) of the government by a group of religious scholars 
who called themselves the 'Committee for the Defense of Rights 
under the Shari'a'. The king named ten younger and more 
progressive Ulama to replace them. 
In a move in July 1993, the king named Shaykh Abd al-
'Aziz ibn Baz general mufti of the kingdom with the rank of 
minister and president of the Administration of Scientific 
Research and Fatwa. 'Abd al Aziz ibn Baz was also appointed to 
preside over the new eighteen-member Higher Ulama Council. 
Based on Abd al 'Aziz ibn Baz's advice, instead of the Ministry of 
Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts, the king created two new 
ministries: the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call, 
and Guidance; and the Ministry of Pilgrimage. This action gave 
the religious sector an additional voice in the Council of 
Ministers. 
Saudi Arabia had taken the lead in 1970 in establishing 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference to bring together all 
Muslim countries. In addition, the kingdom followed a policy of 
supporting Islamic countries in Africa and Asia and providing 
military aid to Muslim groups opposing secular governments in 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and, formerly, in the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen. 
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The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1938 was 
the major catalyst that transformed various aspects of the 
kingdom. The huge revenues from the sale of oil and the 
payments received from foreign companies involved in developing 
concessions in the country enabled the government to launch 
large-scale development programs by the early 1970s. Such 
programs initially focussed on creation of infrastructure in the 
areas of transportation, telecommunications, electric power, and 
water. The programs also addressed the fields of education, 
health, and social welfare; the expansion and equipping of the 
armed forces; and the creation of petroleum-based industries. 
From this beginning, the government expanded its programs to 
drill more deep wells to tap underground aquifers and to 
construct desalination plants. These water sources, in turn, 
enabled ventures to make the country more nearly self-sufficient 
agriculturally. In many instances, however, such undertakings 
seriously depleted groundwater. 
In pursuit of industrial diversification, the government 
created the industrial cities of Al Jubayl in the Eastern Province 
and Yanbu al Bahr (known as Yanbu) on the Red Sea. The 
government also encouraged the establishment of non oil-related 
industries, anticipating the day when Saudi Arabia's oil and gas 
resources would be depleted. Furthermore, the kingdom also has 
some promising copper, lead, zinc, silver, and gold deposits that 
have received little exploitation. 
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The kingdom's economic plans, including t±ie Fifth 
Development Plan (1990-95), continued to emphasize training 
the indigenous labour force to handle technologically advanced 
processes and hence to enable Saudi Arabia to reduce the 
number of its foreign workers. The plan also encouraged the 
creation of joint industrial enterprises with GCC member states 
and other Arab and Islamic countries and the development of 
industrial relations with foreign countries in order to attract 
foreign capital and transfer technology. 
The major event affecting Saudi Arabia and other Gulf 
States in the early 1990s was clearly the Persian Gulf War. The 
effect of that war on the kingdom is yet to be assessed. 
More difficult to measure, however, has been the social 
impact of the war. Many foreign observers had speculated that 
the arrival in the kingdom of more than 600,000 foreign military 
personnel, including women in uniform, would bring about 
significant changes in Saudi society. Military personnel, 
however, tended to be assigned to remote border areas of the 
country and were little seen by the population as a whole. The 
net effect of their presence was therefore minimal in the opinion 
of a number of knowledgeable Saudis. 
As Saudi Arabia entered the final years of the twentieth 
century, there were signs, however, that the expression of public 
dissent, once unthinkable, was becoming more commonplace. 
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Such dissent was usually couched within an Islamic framework, 
but nonetheless it represented a force with which the Al Saud 
had to reckon. King Fahd had succeeded thus far in balancing 
the demands of modernists and traditionalists domestically and 
in pursuing a policy of moderation internationally. Some 
observers wondered, however, how long Fahd would be able to 
rule and how adaptable the more conservative crown Prince Abd 
Allah would be as Fahd's successor. 
The Gulf War could prove to be the harbinger of many 
changes in the policies of Saudi Arabia internally or externally. 
The reform introduced by King Fahd in the early 1990s might 
well become the first step towards gradual change in the 
Kingdom's political system. 
Joseph Nevo in his article (published in Middle Eastern 
studies Quarterly, vol:34, 'Religion and National Identity in 
Saudi Arabia' narrates the sayings of Madawi al-Rasheed that 
the royal family has come to realize that Islam applied to 
legitimdze a political system is a double-edged sword. It invites 
opposition groups to debate the degree to which Islam has been 
incorporated into politics. The contemporary Islamic oppositions 
that contest the legitimacy of the monarchy are using the same 
rhetoric employed by the royal family to legitimize the monarchy, 
shifting the focus from Islam as the source of legitimacy of the 
ruling family to Islam as the source of the uniqueness of the 
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Saudi nation, is the regime's line of defense against the 
aforementioned challenges. 
While introducing the theme Shari'a as the Saudi political 
system the above discussion would be a prelude to the 
succeeding chapters. 
17 

Chapter - / The Ideological Background 
The Ideological Background 
Shari'a is the basic of the ideological study in relation to Saudi 
political system. In a literal sense Shari'a means "the road to the 
watering place." As a technical term, it means the canon law of 
Islam. In Islamic jurisprudence Shari'a is used as a technical 
term in relation to the Pi'ophet as the preacher of the rules of the 
conduct of a Muslim, but more frequently it is applied to Allah as 
the lawgiver. 1 
According to Tabari the Shari'a comprises the law of 
inheritance {fara'id), the hard-punishment, the commandments 
and prohibitions. It means totality of Allah's commandments 
relating to the activities of men, apart from those relating to 
etfiics (akhlak) which are treated separately. Fiqh is the science 
of the Shari'a, and the usul-al-fiqh is also called Usul-as-shafa. 
According to the orthodox view, the Shari'a is the basis for the 
judgment of actions as good or bad, which accordingly can only 
come from Allah.2 
Within Muslim discourse, Shari'a designates the rules and 
regulations governing the lives of Muslims, derived in principal 
from the Qur'an and the Sunna. in this sense, the word is closelv 
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associated with fiqh, which signifies academic discussion of 
divine law.3 
The Shari'a contained in God's revelation [Qur'an and 
Hadith), is explained and elaborated by the interpretative activity 
of scholars, masters of fiqh, the fixqaha.' Since this is in practice 
the only access to the law, the two words are sometimes used 
synonymously, though Shari'a retains the connotation of divine, 
temporal. Since the late 19^^ century, Al-Qanun al-Islami 
(Islamic law) has become a part of Muslim discourse and carries 
with it connotations of the legal system, as in modem states.^ 
The Qur'an, from which the basic norms of the Muslim 
legal system were deduced or derived, did not provide details of 
the law. It leaves to the interpreter the task of building up, on its 
foundation. The superstructure of a comprehensive code, since 
the Prophet remained, during his lifetime, the sole interpreter of 
the Qur'an, his speech, actions and tacit approvals, termed 
together as Surma (Tradition). The Traditions were regarded as 
the second basic source of Islamic law, after the Qur'an. The 
Prophet did not, however, during the short span of his prophetic 
career (spread over about twenty-three years), complete the 
required code. Further work was to be done on it, for which he 
had left some guidelines. 
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After the Prophet's demise in the first quarter of the 
seventh century A. D., the task of developing details of the law, 
and thereby completing the Muslim code, fell on the jurist-
theologians of the age, who had to interpret and apply the 
Qur'an and the Sunna, (Tradition). While performing the task of 
interpreting and applying these fundamental sources of Islamic 
law, the jurist-theologians developed two more sources of the 
law, namely, Consensus and Analogy. 
Consensus [ijma') was the agreement of Muslim jurists on 
any particular principle of law. Such an agreement could be 
based by the jurists on the Qur'anic texts the Sunna (traditions) 
reason or general practice i'urf). ^ A principle found in the Qur'an 
or the Sunna (Traditions) or settled by ijma' (consensus), 
applicable to a particular case, could be extended by the jurists 
to another similar case, or its opposite applied in contrary 
conditions. This source of legislation was called the Qiyas 
(analogical deduction). 
The method of analogy [Qiyas], when applied to divergent 
cases by several jurists, gave rise to three other principles of 
legislation. The first of these was Istihsan (juristic preference), 
permitted the setting aside of analogy in favour of a principle 
based on the Qur'an or the Sunna or settled by juristic 
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consensus (ijma). The second, al-masalih al-mursala, was 
tantamount to the modem doctrine of public interest, and the 
third, Isdidlal. It stood for the application of logic in the 
formulation of legal principles.^ 
The early stage scale and systematic expressions of the law 
are found in a bundle of texts attributed to scholars of the 2^^ 
and early S^ d centuries, notably Malik b. Anas (d. 179/795), al-
Shafi'i ( d.204/820) al-Shaybani ( d. 189/805), and Abu-yousuf 
(d. 182/798). The last two are pupils of Abu-Hanifa (d. 15o/767), 
who, together with Malik, al-Shafi'i and later, Ahmad b. Hanbal 
(d. 2 4 1 / 855) gave his name to a broad tradition or school 
[madhhab] of juristic thinking. These four schools have been 
dominating the Sunni community.^ 
Modem jurists emphasize the importance of law for 
understanding the character and ethos of a people. "Law," says a 
modem jurist, "streams from the soul of a people like national 
poetry." It is as holy as the national religious, ethical, and 
poetical elements that contribute to its vital force; it is "the 
distilled essence of the civilization of a people; it reflects the 
people's soul more clearly than any other organism." This is true 
of Islam more than of any other faith. 
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The Shari'a is the central core of Islam; for understanding 
its civilization, understanding its social history or its political 
system is not possible without a knowledge and appreciation of 
its legal system. 
Shari'a is the totality of Allah's commandments. Each one 
of such commandments is called hukm (pi. ahkam). The law of 
Allah and its inner meaning is not easy to grasp; and Shari'a 
embraces all human actions. For this reason it is not law' in the 
modem sense; it contains an infallible guide to ethics. It is 
fundamentally a doctrine of duties, a code of obligations. Legal 
considerations and individual rights have a secondary place in it; 
above all, the tendency towards a religious evaluation of all the 
affairs of life is supreme. 
A man may be learned, 'Alim (pi 'Ulama), but to be a faqih 
(pi. fuqaha% he must possess the quality of independent 
judgement, the capacity to discern between the 'correct' and 
binding rule of law, and the Veak' or unsupported opinion of a 
classical author. The terms fiqh and fuqaha' may also have been 
suggested by the Latin terms jurisprudentia and jurisprudentes; 
for a study of fiqh reveals that the traces of Roman, Jewish and 
Persian laws that have been incorporated in it.^ 
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All actions of human life are classified by tJie Shari'a under 
one of the following five categories {al-ahkam al-khamsa): 1) 
"duty"(/ard) or "obligatory"(ifo/ib), i.e. action, performance of 
which is rewarded and omission punished [of the further 
divisions o[ fard {wajih), the most important is that into fard'ain 
and fard kifaya, a similar division being made in the following 
category]; 2) "meritorious" (Sunna) or "the usual custom" [Sunna 
in this meaning is not to be confused with the "Sunna of the 
Prophet", one of the usul al-fiqh]; 3) "recommended" {mandub); 4) 
"desirable"{mustahabb); and 5) "voluntary meritorious action" 
(nafil or nafild). the performance of such is called tatwivu'.'^ 
The Shari'a then, by virtue of its character as the 
expression of God's will, and by the common acceptance of its 
prescriptions and their implications on the part of all Muslims, 
supplies the authority, sanctions, and moral basis for the unity 
and constitution of the Umma as a political entity; however, 
neither in the Qur'an nor in the Sunna of the Prophet can there 
to be found precise instructions as to the forms and institutions 
by which the unity of the Umma, a political organization, should 
be expressed and maintained. On the Prophet's death (A. D. 
632), therefore, the community itself by the first and most 
decisive exercise of Ijmd (consensus of the community), took the 
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step of electing Abu-Bakar as its temporal head or imam, with 
the designation of "successor [caliph, or khalifa) of the Prophet of 
God.''io 
After the death of the Prophet, his successor, the first 
caliph, although taking over quite naturally his role as the 
supreme judge of the Muslim community, could not pretend to 
continue his activity as the transmitter of divine revelation. As to 
the Sunnis, during the first generation of Islam after the 
Prophet, the authority for deciding how the law should be and 
the authority for enforcing it were vested in the same person. 
The regulations of the Qur'an and the other prescription of the 
Prophet were of course complied with, and the new decisions 
were to be made according to his intention; but the legal 
institutions as found in the recently conquered territories were 
freely adopted. 
The Shari'a has always been a considerable educational 
force and is still ardently studied; it is still regarded in vwde 
circles of Islam as the principle subject of true learning. ^ 
One should, however, not draw too sharp a line between 
the doctrine of the Shari'a and the law as enforced by the state. 
This is particularly evident in the office of the qadi, the religious 
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judge who is at the same time a state official. The Muslim 
princes have never coercively appointed qadis or granted them 
the necessary organs for enforcing their decisions. The early 
qadis rendered their judgments according to their own 
discretion, basing themselves, besides on the prescriptions of the 
Qur'an and the directives of the caliphs, on equity and on 
customary law with more or less stress laid on religious points of 
view. 
During the period of classical Islam, the administration of 
justice had made the most important contribution to the 
development of the Skari'a. But once this had arrived in its 
definite form-a fact which roughly coincided with the coming to 
power of the Wbbassids, the qadis remained exclusively bound 
by this authoritative doctrine, in complete independence of the 
government. This is the theory; in practice, the qadis could not 
but take notice of the wishes of the authority by which they were 
appointed and dismissed, and on which they depended for the 
execution of judgments. The hearing of certain claims, moreover, 
could be withheld from the qadis competence, so as to make 
prescriptions of the law inapplicable. Although under the 
Ummaiyads occasional attempts at direct interference by the 
s^ 
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political authorities were mostly rejected, this completely 
changed, in spite of the theory, early under the 'Abbasides. 
The Shari'a has hardly been in practice as regards to the 
constitution of the Muslim state, international relation, and war. 
To the jurisdiction of the qadi there was finally left only public 
worship and purely religious obligations. Nevertheless, the law 
regarding marriage, family and inheritance, in part also pious 
foundations (waktj, and in all fields which in the popular mind 
are more closely connected with religion, Shari'a has prevailed. 
It was during the flourishing period of the Ottoman empire 
in the 16th and 17th centuries that the Shari'a reached at last, 
under the auspices of "pious" rulers, the peak of its practical 
application, even in the fields of civil and commercial law. 
Uniformity of jurisdiction all over the territory was achieved, and 
the qadis were organized in a kind of hierarchy. The supreme 
mufti, the Shaikh al-Islam had to superintend the proper 
application of the Shari'a, but even then the criminal, financial 
and landed property law was ruled by the temporal legislation of 
the so-called kanun-namas, which actually were, although they 
pretended not to be, contrary to the Shari'a. 
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The reform movement starting in the 19^^ century brought 
about the introduction of the codes conceived on European lines, 
at first for the commercial. Still as late as 1876, the civil law of 
the Shari'a was codified in the majalla. This, however, being a 
code quite apart from the modifications contained in it, did not 
correspond to the strict requirements of the doctrine, and was 
not to be used by the Shari'a tribunals themselves, but by 
secular courts. The last step was taken in 1926 by the 
introduction of the Swiss civil (and the Italian penal) code which 
replaced the Shari'a even for the law of marriage, family and 
inheritance, followed in 1928 by the omission of the last mention 
of the Shari'a from the constitution and the radical 
secularization of the State. 
Albania has so far been the only Islamic country to follow 
the example of Turkey by completely abandoning the Shari'a. In 
Egypt, the adoption of codes after the European model for the 
field abandoned by the Shari'a in practice, began only in 1883. 
Some modification of the doctrine regarding procedure, 
comparable to those contained in the majalla but binding the 
Shari'a tribunals themselves, were first introduced in 1910. 
Lastly, the material rules regarding some points of family law 
have been modified, cautiously at first in 1920, and more boldly 
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in 1929 and 1931 (here also Turkey had taken the lead in 
1917).12 
Towards understanding Saudi system of government in 
relation to Shari'a, an understanding of the four schools of 
Islamic thought is pertinent. With the emergence of the 'Abbasid 
state in the 8^ ^ century, the science of jurisprudence flourished 
and attained its golden age, for in that period the four Sunni 
schools (Hanafite, Shafi'ite, Malikite, Hanbaiite) of law became 
widespread, traditions were collected, commentaries of the 
Qur'an were written, and the science of sources was compiled. 
The schools each name themselves after one of the four 
great early scholars Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767), Malik (d. 
179/795), al-Shafi'i (d. 204/ 820), and Ibn Hanbal (d. 241/855). 
Often, though not always, over time the scholars of each school 
came to agreement about which ruling on any significant issue 
was the best, and this became identified as the view of that 
school on that issue. In later eras, lower-level scholars 
considered themselves ordinarily bound to follow the standard 
view of the school to which they belonged. 
Though these schools in theory are purely intellectual 
groupings, they came to occupy largely separate geographical 
28 
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zones. The Hanafi school, begun in Iraq, became widespread in 
Iraq and Syria and spread eastward through Central Asia. Thus 
the majority of Sunni Muslims from the Levant to China follow 
the Hanafis. The Maliki school, arising in Medina and developing 
in Egypt and elsewhere in the East, spread early to the Muslim 
West in Africa and Spain. 
The Shafi'i school arose in Egypt, and was widely followed 
in Iraq, Persia, and Central Asia, long competing successfully 
with the Hanafi school. It spread to East Africa and the western 
and southern regions of the Arabian Peninsula, including the 
Hijaz (the region of Mecca and Medina), and then moved through 
coastal trading routes further east, becoming eventually the 
predominant school in Southeast Asia. 
The last of the four schools to arise, the Hanbali, was 
adopted by populations in Baghdad, Damascus, and the Arabian 
Peninsula. The school enjoyed an influence disproportionate to 
the number of its adherents, however, since it was the chief 
advocate of a powerful theological movement influential in 
Baghdad from the ninth through thirteenth centuries and 
thereafter in Damascus. 
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Hanbali School; The Imam and his pupils: The Hanbali school 
is being followed in Saudi Arabia in matters of government. 
Hence, a study of this school is prerequisite to understand the 
political system in Saudi Arabia. This also forms the ideological 
basis of the government 
The founder of the fourth Sunni school is the Imam Abu" 
Abdullah Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who was bom in Baghdad in the 
year 164 A.H. (780 A. D.) and died in the same city in 241 A.H. 
(855 A. D.). Ibn Hanbal was a traveler whose journeys in the 
quest of knowledge and traditions took him to Syria, Hijaz, 
Yemen, Qufa and Basra. He compiled a major work consisting of 
a large collection of traditions entitled Musnad ah Imam Ahmad, 
which comprises six volumes containing more than 40,000 
traditions. 
Ibn Hanbal was renowned for his aversion to opinion (Ra'y) 
and for his adherence to the strict text of the Qur'an and the 
traditions. This was true to such an extent that some prefer to 
include him among the traditionalists (Muhaddithun) rather than 
among those jurists qualified to use independent reasoning 
{mujtahid). Among those who considered him so was Ibn al-
Nadim, who classified Ibn Hanbal along with al-Bukhari, 
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Muslim, and other traditionalists in the section of his work, Al-
Fihrist, devoted to those learned in the traditions. 
Ibn Abd al-Bir does not mention the biography of this 
imam in his book Al-Intiqa' fi Fada'il al-A'immah al- fuquha' 
(Selections in the Virtues of the Imams of Jurisprudence). 
Similarly, al-Tabari in his Book Ikhtilaf al-Fuqaha' (The 
Disagreements of the Jurists), does not mention Ibn Hanbal or 
his school of law. This opinion should, without doubt, be 
rejected since the Hanbali school is considered among the four 
original Sunni schools of jurisprudence, having an independent 
system of its own as well as characteristic principles in the 
science of the origins and the branches of the law. 
Indeed, Ibn Hanbal was one of the most distinguished of 
the students of ash-ShaJl'i, and he later founded an independent 
school based on five main sources: the texts of the Qur'an and 
the Sunna, the fatwas of the companions (if there was nothing to 
contradict them, the sayings of certain companions when these 
were consistent with the Qur'an and the Sunna), da'if and 
mursal traditions (the former type having a weak chain of 
transmission, while the latter lacks the name of some of the 
transmitters), and finally, reasoning by analogy [qiyas) whenever 
necessary, i^  
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Ibn Hanbal was noted for being unbending in his religion, 
and very firm in his faith. It was no wonder then that he rejected 
the theory of the creation of the Qur'an when he was called upon 
to accept it in the days of the caliph al-wathiq. For his 
uncompromising attitude on this issue he was persecuted, 
beaten, and imprisoned. He was not, however, the only one to 
suffer this fate. History is full of episodes of intellectual 
persecution endured by those learned in the Shari'a. Al-Buwayti, 
a companion of Ash-Shafi'i, was imprisoned for the same 
reasons as Ibn Hanbal and died in the prison of Baghdad. We 
have already seen how Abu-Hanifah was imprisoned and how 
Malik was beaten for well-known political reasons. 
It was said that al-Sarakhsi started dictating his book air 
Mabsyt while in prison, and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah and his 
teacher, Taqiy al-Din ibn Taymiyah, were likewise both 
imprisoned in the citadel of Damascus. It was there that the 
latter died. In the old Roman Days, moreover, the Emperor 
Coracle ordered the execution of Opinion, who was of Syrian 
origin and the undisputed dean of all Roman jurists because of 
his refusal to issue a legal ruling sanctioning the murder of Geta, 
brother of the Emperor. These and other examples indicate that 
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genuine integrity and true faith do not yield to force and tyranny, 
and do not fear sacrifice, whatever the price. 
Included among the followers of Ahmad ibn Hanbal are: 
Muwaffaq al-Din ibn Qudamah (d: 620 A.H.), the author of one of 
the greatest books on Islamic jurisprudence, al-Mughni; shams 
al-Din ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisi (d.682 A.H.), the author of al-
sharh al-kabir, a commentary on the Muqni'; Taqiy al-Din Ahmad 
ibn Taymiyah works; and Abu 'Abdullah ibn Bakr al-Zar', the 
Damascene, better known as Ibn Qay>dm al-Jawziyah (d. 
751A.H.), who was also the author of veiy well known books 
(Note: The author also mentions several other followers of Ibn 
Hanbal, and their works, many of which are almost as well 
known as those listed above), i^  
Concept of a Constitution in Islam 
In Saudi Arabia, the basic law of government was introduced by 
royal decree in 1992, as chapter-1 article-1 defined God's book 
and the Sunna of his Prophet as the constitution of Saudi 
Arabia. In this context it is necessaiy to discuss the concept of a 
constitution in Islam. 
The constitution of any country is the base over which the 
whole system of the government is built. The building and 
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development, prosperity, security and comfort of citizens, are all 
dependent on this. 
The constitution is actually a set of those principles, by the 
practice of which, the government is run. In these documents, it 
is decided what would be the basic aims and development 
policies of a state; the rights of the citizens, what freedoms will 
be given to them and under what limits would they exercise 
them; what would be the method of developing the country; 
according to which method will the assembly be elected, what 
would be the requirements for the head of state, ministers, and 
members of the assembly, who would be given the authority to 
dismiss or keep them; who^ would be given the authority to 
change the laws and to what extent; on what system would the 
courts work, and to what extent would they be independent of 
the government; on what basis the government employees would 
be appointed, removed and divided in different sections; of what 
type would the budget be and on what basis would it be 
prepared, and what would be the principles in applying them to 
the public, in the time of emergency especially at the time of war; 
and to what extent would the system of the state be changed, 
and at these times what special authority would the state be able 
to exercise. 
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All these t±iings are decided in the constitution, and then 
the whole machinery of the government works accordingly. Only 
those steps of the government can be challenged in the coiirt, 
which are against the constitution. ^ ^ 
What is meant by an Islamic constitution? What are the 
qualities on the basis of which any constitution qualifies to be 
called an Islamic constitution? 
Some such principal and basic laws are given in the light of 
which all the parts of the constitution can be decided. In the 
case of a constitution, some basic instructions are bestowed. In 
these basic instructions, no person is allowed to make any 
modifications or changes, even if the whole community 
collectively wants to change or modify these instructions. Only 
under these basic instructions, other subsidiary matters can be 
decided collectively by consultation {mashwara) of the 
community. In these other subsidiary matters, if the community 
decides something by consultation, Islam does not objects to 
that. 
In the matters which come under discussion in the 
constitution of a country, many are of such a kind that whatever 
is decided by collective consultation under the basic principles 
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are acceptable from the Islamic point of view. What shall be the 
official language of a country, how many provinces shall be there 
in the country, what shall be the kind of interaction of these 
provinces (keeping in mind the union of the country), how many 
members shall there be in the parliament and in the assembly, 
what methods shall be applied for the better assessment of 
finance (accounts). Instead of giving specific instructions, Islam 
has left such matters on the collective consultation of the 
community. Therefore, in such matters, whatever the public 
decides is correct and can be followed. ^^  
But, in some basic matters, instructions are given in which 
no person is permitted to make changes or modifications. Not 
only the decisions of the assembly, but even some referenda of 
the public cannot lead to a change in them. If any constitution is 
does not take account of these principles, it cannot be called an 
Islamic constitution. These basic instructions are as follows: 
(1) "The supreme authority resides only with Allah" i^  
This article of Islamic constitution differentiates it from 
non-Islamic democracies. In non-Islamic democracies, the power 
and authority is ultimately resides in the public, therefore if the 
opinion of the majority is against Allah's order, they can go for it. 
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But m Islam the actual right of authority lies with no one but 
Allah, and man gets the right to rule as the caliph. 
"We are going to make a caliph on earth" i^  
So, man has no right to make decision against Allah's 
orders. 
(2) Any law against Quran and Hadith would neither be passed 
nor will it be sustained. No such law of the system can be given. 
"And if someone does not rule on the instructions given by Allah, 
such people are the infidels"!^ 
(3) The basic purpose of the government will be to establish a 
system of justice and equality, eliminate internal and external 
violence, take care of offering prayers for Muslims, motivate the 
people for good, and to stop them from evil. 
"They are those to whom if we give power on earth, they will 
establish namaaz, give zakat, order for good deeds, and stop 
from evil."20 
"And when you decide amongst people (Allah orders) you 
decide with equality"2i 
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"And if (by establishing governance like t±iis) Allah had not 
stopped some people to oppress against others, violence would 
have taken birth on earth''22 
(4) The country's parts and treasury are amanat {faith) in the 
hands of ruler; therefore it is the responsibility of the 
government to take amanat to its destiny without any doubt. 
Allah orders you to deliver the amana to their bearers. 23 
(5) The attitude oi government should be authoritative but 
consultative, and entire important affairs would a result of 
public consultations. 
"And their affairs are decided by each other's consultations''^^ 
(6) Unity would be the base of community, that would be 
necessary for the country to eliminate the geographical, tribal, 
Arial, lingual and communal feelings, work for unity and 
strength of the Muslim community, and establish solid equality 
between all Muslims. 
"Without any doubt all Muslims are brothers of each other." 25 
"We m.ade you different groups and tribes so that you may 
recognize each other, doubtlessly the more respected is that 
person who possesses {taqwa)." 
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(7) The ruler of the country must necessarily be Muslim, honest 
and must be having the quality of knowledge and practice. 
"The tyrant would not get our promise " 26 
The Prophet said, "Surely Allah has chosen him (Talut) over you, 
and has increased him in knowledge and physique." 27 
(8) All the citizens would be guaranteed their basic fundamental 
rights under which organizations shall be established for 
security of life, money, dignity (clothes), and religion; and 
freedom from criticism shall be provided. . "And do not kill 
anyone whom Allah has forbidden except by right." 28 
"And do not devour your riches among yourselves in vanity." 29 
"O you who believe! Let not one group scoff at another group." o^ 
"No compulsion is there in religion." 3i 
"And let there be among you a community calling others to 
good."32 
"You are the best community ever sent forth to mankind; you 
enjoin good and forbid e\dl. 3^ 
(9) No person would be given penalty for a crime without 
evidence. 
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"If a mischief-maker came to you with a report, then make strict 
inquiry, lest you may hurt a people unwittingly and thereafter 
repent of what you have done." 3"* 
(10) To give justice with equality, it would be free from any 
pressure, and no interference shall be acceptable except by the 
laws of Shari'a. "Be you maintainer of equity and bearers of 
testimony for Allah's sake though if be against yourselves or your 
parents or kindred." 35 
"So judge thou between them according to what Allah has sent 
down, and do not follow their desires" 3^  
(11) Complete arrangements would be made for the helpless, 
handicapped, and rejected. The common treasury should be 
justly divided amongst all, not only the rich. 
"Whiat Allah has bestowed on His Messenger (and taken Away) 
from the people of the townships,- belongs to Allah,-to His 
Messenger, and to kindred and orphans, the needy and the 
wayfarer; in order that it may not (merely) make a circuit between 
the wealthy among you." 3^  
(12) Private property attained legally shall not be taken unjustly 
from the owners. 
40 
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"And do not devour your riches among yourselves in vanity." 8^ 
(13) No such tax would be levied on the public, which they may 
not endure; also no such orders would be issued which may be 
beyond their capabilities. 
"Relieve them of their burdens and the shackles which have 
been upon them." 9^ 
"On no soul doth Allah place a burden greater than it can bear.""^^ 
(14) Education and training would be provided to all Muslims so 
that they may become aware of the Quran and the basics of 
Islam and may lead an Islamic life; also, professional education 
would be given to them so that they may make the country 
independent of foreign help. 
"And (Prophet's) duty vidll teach them Qur'an and wisdom." 4i 
(15) Non-Muslim citizens (not apostates) too would be given the 
same rights as the Muslim citizens. 
"If he (who killed by mischance) be of a people between whom 
and you is a compact them the blood-wit to be delivered to his 
family" 2^ 
"O ye who believe! Fulfill (all) obligations."'^^ 
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(16) Compulsory jehad would be brought in practice according to 
the Islamic law. 
"And strive (jihad) in His cause as ye ought to strive, (uAth 
sincerity and under discipline)." * * 
"Allah does not forbid you to deal benevolently and equitably 
with those who did not fight against you on account of religion 
nor drove you out from homes; verily Allah loves the equitable.""^s 
(17) Treaties with other countries which are legal according to 
Shari'a would be followed, and only those treaties would be 
broken which are not legal according to Shari'a. 
"Except those of the associates with whom you covenanted 
and they have not failed you in aught, nor have they baked up 
any one against you; so fulfill to them covenant till their Jull 
period. 
(18) No such posts would be given to non-Muslims, which may 
be related to the secrets of the countty. 
"Take not into your intimacy those outside your ranks. They will 
not fail to corrupt you." 6^ 
(19) Those elements of the constitution shall not be changed 
anyhow which are directly related to the Qur'an or traditions. 
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"Perfected is the word of the Lord in veracity and justice; and 
none can change His words." •*'^  
These are the basic points of the Islamic constitution 
without the incorporation of which a constitution cannot be 
called an Islamic constitution. I have just mentioned the verses 
of Qur'an for the sake of briefing. 
These points are mentioned in hadith (traditions and 
sayings of the Prophet) with description. The first constitution 
was systematically written by the Prophet (s.a.w.) after the 
establishment of the state of Medina, and pointed out the rights 
of Muslims and non-Muslims of Medina. These documents are 
incorporated in 52 articles. The famous writer Ibn Hi'sham has 
compiled these in his book on Seerat. "^^ 
Saudi Arabia is the most theocratic state in the 
contemporary Sunni Muslim world. By definition, a non-Muslim 
cannot be a Saudi citizen. The idea of religious pluralism has 
neither meaning nor support in many segments oi population, 
and religious norms and practices are encouraged, promoted, 
and even enforced by the state. 
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The Fundamental Principles of the Islamic Government 
In the royal decree of 1992, according to Article-1 "Saudi 
Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state." In this regard we need to 
know what the fundamental principles of the Islamic government 
are. 
The explanation of the following mentioned principles is 
important in the constitution of an Islamic government. 
1. The original head of the state is Allah. 
2. The foundation of the laws of the state will be in the context of 
the Quran and Sunna (Hadith). The laws, which are against the 
Quran and Sunna, can neither be formed nor implemented in the 
state. 
3 . The government will not be based on the geography, race, 
language or any other picture, but it will be based on those 
principles and objectives which wiU be in accordance to Islamic 
laws. 
4. It is the duty of Islamic govemm.ent to establish the teachings of 
the Quran and Sunna, to demolish the acts of infidels, to promote 
Islamic customs and to arrange the Islamic education for the 
superior and acceptable Islamic tribes/classes {maslak). 
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5. It is the duty of an Islamic government to build a stronger 
relationship of unity' and brotherhood between all the Muslims of 
the world and stop the tribunes and ignorance based on race, 
language, area, geography and other factors. This includes 
making arrangements to protect and build a stronger unity 
among the Islamic nations. 
6. Without difference in race, religion and so on, the government 
is responsible to provide the necessary needs such as food, 
clothing, shelter, and education to the needy persons who are 
not able to earn or whose earnings would be insufficient to meet 
their food and other necessary needs because of illness and 
other reasons. 
7. The inhabitants of the state should be given all those rights 
which the Islamic Sharz'a has bestowed to them, i.e., protection 
of property within the limits of law, freedom of religion and 
maslak, freedom of worship, freedom of cast, freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement, freedom of earnings and so 
on. Equal opportunities for progress should be provided, 
including the right of benefits from institutions. 
8. From the above given rights no right can be snatched from the 
citizen of the state without the authentic certificate of the Islamic 
45 
-16 
Chapter -I The ItJeological Bach^rountl 
law. The court cannot impose punishment on a criminal without 
providing the time to him for the clarification of the charge. 
9. The accepted Islamic group {maslak) has the complete right of 
the maslak within the limits of the laws, and they have the rights 
to teach their followers. With the right of their own perception, 
they can extend their maslak. The judgements of their individual 
matters can be according to their own fiqahi maslak. It will be 
best if the judges are of their own maslak. 
10. The non-Muslim citizens of the state within the government 
have the complete rights of religion, worship, civilization, culture 
and religious education. They have the right to judge their 
individual matters according to their oWn religious law or custom 
and tradition. 
11. The non-Muslim citizens of the state are bound to follow 
those rules and agreements within the laws of Shari'a. The non-
Muslim citizens of the state equally share those rights, which 
have been mentioned in number 7. 
12. The head of the state should be a Muslim man, whose 
honesty, ability and decision making power can be trusted by 
the people or their elected person. 
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13. The head of the state is actually responsible for the functions 
of the government. But he can hand over some parts of his 
authority to any person or group. 
14. The head of the state cannot rule the state independently, 
but with consultation, i.e., he has to take the advice from 
members of his government and the elected members of the 
people to perform his duties. 
15. The head of the state has no right to suspend the 
constitution or its parts, and rule the state without the Shura. 
16. The group which has the power to elect the government can 
also dismiss it by the large number of votes. 
17. In the public right, the head of the state will be similar as 
that of the common people, and he will not be above law. 
18. There will be the same laws for the members of the 
government and the common people. The common courts can 
impose these laws on them. 
19. The judiciary department will be separated and independent 
from the department of the management, so that the courts can 
perform their duties without any pressure from the department 
of management. 
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20. The propagation of thoughts and ideas contrary to the rules 
and principles of the Islamic government will be banned. 
2 1 . The different provinces of the country will be mere 
administrative units. They will have no individual racial, tribal or 
linguistic identity. They will not have a right to secede from tJie 
federal government. 
22.The interpretation of the constitution will not be reliable/ 
trustworthy if the same is against the Quran and Sunna. 
Twenty-three ulmas approved the above mentioned 22 
points, which have been accepted almost by all of the acceptable 
Islamic^r/cos (groups). "^^ 
The creation of the first Saudi State on this basis was not 
unprecedented. Ss Michael Cook puts it, in a classical pattern of 
state formation in Arabian history, "one takes a religious 
doctrine of a politically activist kind; one mobilizes a tribal 
population, which may or may not be nomadic; and one fuses 
them into a state - of sorts." 
The Muwahhidun 
As a rejuvenator of the Hanbali school, Abd al-Wahhab was 
second only to Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim in advocating a 
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return to the religious spirit of the forefathers who, for the basic 
principles of their religion, referred to the Qur'an and the 
authentic Surma of the Prophet, and who fought against the 
blind imitation that had retorted the thinking of Islamic people 
thought...and the spirit of independence. He was a bitter 
antagonist of those who held on to the excuse, "we found our 
fathers so doing." Commentaries, texts, opinions and whims 
containing any of these elements were repudiated. Likewise, he 
opposed all religious deviations such as the sanctification of 
domed buildings, the worship of tombs, the performances of the 
drummers, flute players and dervish dancers who made a 
mockery of God's saying, as well as all similar activities which 
were according to him incompatible with the true spirit of Islam 
and which were akin to the paganism oi the pre-Islamic era. 
In modem times Arabia, after centuries as a backwater 
country, has once again asserted itself. The first factor in this 
phenomenon was the birth in the middle of the eighteenth 
century of another Arabian religious movement, the puritanical 
reassertion of fundamental Islamic propositions knovnn as the 
"Wahhabism". so 
The followers of Muhammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab, preferred 
to call themselves Muivahhidun (Unitarians). This name, 
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however, is not often used, and is associated with, other 
completely different sects that ai-e extant and defunct. 
Wahhabism is a steadfastly puritanical interpretation of 
Islam in the tradition of Ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali 
school of law, and the theologian Ibn Tajnniyyah. The is often 
said that the Wahhabis belong to the Hanbali School of law 
(madhhab), but strictly speaking, like the Ahl al-Hadith (the 
peopled Tradition), tiiey are ghayr muqallidin (non-adherents) 
and do not see themselves as belonging to any school, anymore 
than the first Muslim generations did. Wahhabism is noted for 
its policy of compelling its own followers and other Muslims 
strictly to observe the religious duties of Islam, such as the five 
prayers, under pain of flogging at one time, and for the 
enforcement of public morality to a degree not found elsewhere.si 
According to Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's teachings, a 
Muslim must present a hayah or oath of allegiance, to a Muslim 
ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after death. 
The ruler conversely is owed unquestioned allegiance from his 
people so long as he leads the community according to the law of 
God. 52 
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The Al-Saud by 1803 had expanded tiieir dominion across 
the peninsula from Mecca to Bahrain, installing teachers, 
schools, and the apparels of state power. So successful was the 
alliance between the Ash Shaykh and the Al-Sa'ud that even 
after the Ottoman sultan had crushed the Wahhabi political 
authority and had destroyed the Wahhabi capital of Ad Dariyah 
in 1818, the reformed religion remained firmly planted in the 
settled districts of southern Najd and of Jabal Shammar in the 
north. It would become the unifying ideology in the peninsula 
when the al Saud rose to power again in the next century. 53 
Muhammad b. Abd Al-Wahhab: Early Life: Hanbali, theologian 
and founder of Wahhabism, was bom in 1115/1703, in the 
center of the Najd at al-Uyana, an oasis which at that time was 
enjoying some prosperity. There had already been several 
representatives of Hanbalism in the Najd and the young 
Muhammad belonged to a family, which had produced several 
scholars of the school. His grandfather, Sulayman bin 
Muhammad, had been mufti of the Najd. His father 'Abd al-
Wahhab was kxizl at IJyayna during the emirate of 'Abd Allah bin 
Muhammad bin Mu'ammar; he taught kadith and fikh in 
mosques of the town and left several works of Hanbali 
inspiration, which in part survive. 
5) 
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Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab's education began under 
his father's guidance. He learned the Qur'an by heart and first 
studied Hanbali doctrine in the works of Shaykh Muwaffak al-
Din bin Kudama (d.620/1223) and in the particular in the 
'Umda, which according to Shaykh Ibn Bishr was regarded in the 
Najd at that period as having great authority over this author 
and on the Umda.^"^ 
The young theologian soon left 'Uyayna in circumstances 
which are not very well known. It may be that he had already 
begun his teachings against the cult of saints and paganism, 
which was rife among the bedouin, and that the amir showed 
little inclination to follow him in this matter. It is also likely that, 
as the oasis of 'Uyayna offered relatively few intellectual 
resources, the young Shaykh felt the need to go and complete 
his education in other centers. 
Little is known of the chronology of his journeys "in search 
of learning." He performed Haj, thus going first to Mecca, where 
he found the teaching of Islam disappointing. The stay which he 
made after this at Medina was decisive in shaping the later 
direction of his thoughts. At Medina, he met a Hanbali 
theologian who was to have a decisive influence on him, Shaykh 
'Abd Allah bin Ibrahim al-Najdi, who had become a supporter of 
52 
Chapter - / The Ideological Background 
the neo-Hanbailism of Ibn Taymiyya and who had himself been 
the pupil of Shaykh 'Abd al-Baki al-Hanbali (d. 1071/1661). 'Abd 
al-Baki, a native of Balabakk, had himself studied under al-
Bahuti and al-Mar'i; he taught for a long period at Medina and 
then returned to Damascus, where he continued teaching at the 
Umayyad mosque.55 
In 1157 /1744, the amir and the theologian swore an oath 
of mutual loyalty (bay'a) to strive, by force if necessary, to make 
the kingdom of God prevail. This pact, which was always 
faithfully adhered to, marked the true beginning of the Wahhabi 
state, which transformed a small bedouin principality into a 
legally instituted theocracy. Henceforth it was impossible to 
separate the destiny of the Shaykh from that of the Sa'udi 
dynasty. 56 
Several of the sons or the descendants of Muhammad bin 
'Abd al Wahhab carried on his work. His son Abdallah 
accompanied Sa'ud bin 'Abd al-'Aziz (1803-14) on his conquest of 
the Hijaz in 1805-6. 
Sulayman bin 'Abd al-Wahhab, the grandson of Shaykh 
Muhammad who was also greatly devoted to the principle of 
reform, was kazi of Darlyya. He was violently hostile to the 
53 
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Ottomans and forbade all relations with them. He was sentenced 
to death by Ibrahim Pasha after the capture of Dar'iyya in 
1233/1818, while his brother 'Ali was pursued by the Egyptians 
and killed at Kharzi. Sulayman wrote a work studying the 
relationship of Wahhabism with 'Iraq, the K. al-Tawdih an 
taivhid al khallakfi djawab ahl al-'Iraq (Cairo, 1319). 7^ 
The doctrine of Muham.mad b. Abd al-Wahhab was very 
strongly influenced by that of Ion Taymiyya (d. 728/1328) and, 
to a lesser degree, by that of Ibn Kayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 
751/1350), but, beyond these two writers, it is still more closely 
linked to the formulation of Hanbalism as found in the works of 
earlier writers, such as the Shnykh 'Abd Allah (d. 290/903) or 
Abu Bakr al-Khallal (d. 311/924). Very hostile to the sects which 
had always been denounced by the Hanbalis as incompatible 
with Sunnism (shi'a, Mutazila, Kliawriji etc.), Muhammad bin 
Abd al-Walihab criticized, even within Sunnism, all the forms of 
kalam or of Sufism which tended to introduce into the dogma or 
the law of Islam, innovations [hid'd) considered to be heretical or 
schismatic. He denounced no less violently the survival, 
particularly among the Bedouin, of practices going back even to 
the period of the Djahiliyya. Aitiiough Muhammad bin Abd al-
Wahhaba's doctrine \^'as condemned or rejected by an important 
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section of Muslim opinion;-it Was nevertheless able to make a 
powerful contribution not only to a more profound Islamization 
of Arabia, but also to a general renewal of the Islamic conscience 
immediately before the modem period of intrusion from the 
W e s t . 58 
The popular misconception of Tasawwuf had completely 
overshadowed the purely Islamic Tauheed. The mosques were 
desolate and ignorant people ran away from them and were in 
the clutches of Fakeers and Godmen who cheated them with 
amulets and magic. They went to the graves of saints who were 
worshipped as intermediaries between man and God since they 
thought that due to the greatness of God, He cannot be 
worshipped directly. Not only were Qur'anic teachings put 
behind, they were also disobeyed. Even the holy places of 
Makkah and Madinah became centers of misdeeds, and hajj, 
which was ordained upon every Muslim by the Prophet of Islam 
(SAW), had become trivial due to Bidaah. In short, Islam had lost 
its soul; if the Prophet (SAW) would have come again in the 
world, he would have declared his followers infidels. 59 
In the 18th century the Muslim enthusiasm was at its 
lowest ebb. The so-called caliph had cost his esteem. His rule did 
not extend much beyond a small area. Yemen had thrown this 
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yoke off, a century ago. The nobles of Makkah were more united 
in opposing the local lords than Christians. The unity, which we 
see now, was nowhere to be seen, and the spiritual centre of 
Makkah had turned into a centre of materialistic luxury and 
lavishness, and there was tolerance there for everything except 
virtue, o^ 
Arabian Background to Wahhabism: Two aspects of the 
historical background to the Wahhabi movement should be 
stressed. One is well enough known, but the other has until 
recently received less attention. The better-known aspect is the 
low state to which religion had sunk in the Arabian Peninsula by 
beginning of the eighteenth century. Religious observance was 
slack and much weight was given to the power of "holy' trees and 
the tombs of saints, even the tomb of prophet Muhammad and to 
various other superstitions and talismans. Orthodox Islam 
regards such practices as shirk (Polytheism) or bid'a (heresy), 
and it is clear that the precepts of the Shri'a were in many 
respects ignored. In Wahhabi parlance, the period is condemned 
as that of jahiliya (ignorance), that is, a state equivalent to the 
lack of religion before the preaching of Muhammad. 
The other aspect concerns the continuation of the tradition 
of religious learning in the towns of the peninsula. The political 
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system in Arabia in the eighteenth century was not conducive to 
a strong religious supervision. A number of petty rulers 
controlled various towns and their surroundings, and there were 
incessant inter-urban and inter-tribal feuds. The ottoman writ 
ran mainly in the Hijaz in Yemen and on the eastern coast. 
Central Najd was outside of such control. In the towns of the 
peninsula, however, the tradition of religious learning had not 
been allowed to die despite the political vicissitudes. Medina, 
Damascus, and Cairo were the centers to which scholars 
traveled from Najd and elsewhere, and where they received, at 
the hands of the ulama, the training which they took back and 
attempted to put into practice in their home towns. Many such 
scholars became qadis to local amirs and usually held office at 
their pleasure, ^ i 
They assured a tradition of religious learning in central 
Arabia. Through this stream of scholars, contact was maintained 
between Najd and the main currents of Islamic learning, usually 
but not exclusively Hanbali and Gibb's picture of original 
Wahhabism, as "a solitary protest in a corrupt world that should 
now be modified." The jahiliya which existed was not among the 
ulama but among the tribes and the urban populace. Qadis of 
some repute held office in a number of towns in Najd, notably 
57 
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Ushaiqir, 'Uyaina, Dar'iya and al-Riyadh. They were scholars 
trained in the school of Ibn Qudama (representing the 
conservative Hanbali tradition in low) and of Ibn Taimiya and Ibn 
al-Qaiyim who were more radical. One or two in the seventeenth 
century are known to been have moved to condemn in writing 
the corruption they witnessed around them. It seems, though, 
that qadis were dependent for their position on the amir who 
was, in turn, subject to political pressures and public opinion 
and therefore limited in his ability to support the 'ulama when 
they expressed dissatisfaction with the moral and religious 
practices of the people.<^^ 
Doctrines of Muhammad b. *Abd al- Wahhab: His general 
aim was to do away with all innovations (bida), which were later 
than the third centuty of Islam; thus the communities are able 
to acknowledge the authority of the four Sunni law schools, and 
the six books of tradition. His written polemic and that of his 
followers is almost entirely aimed at the cult of saints, as 
exhibited in the building of mausoleums, their employment as 
mosques, and their visitation. The following list, which is taken 
from the Lam seems to agree with what is known of Whahabi 
practice. 
(1) All objects of worship other than Allah are false. 
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(2) The bulk o[ mankind is not monotheistic, since they 
endeavor to win God's favour by visiting the tombs of saints; 
their practice therefore resembles what is recorded in the Qur'an 
of the Meccan mushrikin. 
(3) It is polytheism {shirk) to introduce the name of a prophet, 
saint, or angel, into a prayer. 
(4) It is (shirk) to seek intercession from any but Allah. 
(5) It is [shirk) to make vows to any other being. 
(6) It involves unbelief [kufr) to profess knowledge not based on 
the Qur'an, the Sunna, or the necessary inferences of reason. 
(7) It involves heresy (ilhad) to deny Kadar in all acts. 
(8) It involves unbelief to interpret the Qur'an by a ta'unl. 
His system is said to have departed from that of Ibn Hanbal 
in the following matters: 
1. Attendance at public salat is obligatory. 
2. Smoking of tobacco is forbidden and punished with stripes 
not exceeding forty; the shaving of the beard and the use of 
abusive language are to be punished at the qadi's discretion 
59 
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3. Alms {zakat) are to be paid on secret profits, such as those 
of trading, whereas Ibn Hanbal exacted them only from manifest 
produce. 
4. The mere utterance of the Islamic creed is not sufficient to 
make a man a believer, so that animals slaughtered by him are 
fit for food. Further inquiry must be made into his character. 
The list given by S. Zwemer in The Mohammedan World of Today 
(New York-1906, p. 106.) does not differ materially from the 
above, but contains the following item which may be noticed: 
They forbid the use of the rosary, and count the names of God 
and their prayers on the knuckles of the hand instead. ^^  
Wahhabi mosques are built with the greatest simplicity, 
and no minarets or ornaments are allowed. 
The Rawdat al Afkar devotes a long section to a list of the 
practices savoring of paganism current in Arabia in Muhammad 
bin Abd al Wahhab's time. Besides the visitation of tombs, 
reverence was paid to sacred trees, and gifts of food were placed 
on graves. It is clear that the two were not "innovations," but 
survivals of pre-Islamic usage Charges brought against him of 
burning the logical works of on a great scale are treated both by 
himself and his followers as calumnies, the latter admit the 
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burning of the work Rawa al-Rayahin, but not (apparently) that 
of the Dala'il al Khairat. The charge of rejection of the Sunna 
altogether (repeated by Nolde) is certainly erroneous. On the 
other hand, the destruction of tombs on a great scale was 
practiced both by Muhmmad bin 'Abd al- Wahhab and his 
followers. The former destroyed that of Zaid bin al-Khattab a t -
Djubaila, and it has recently been carried on a great scale at a l -
Baki' of Medina, as a comparison of the photographs in Rifat 
pasha's Mir'at-al Haramain (1925) with Eldon Rutter's Holy 
Cities of Arabia (1928) shows. ^'^ 
Various minor points of ritual, in which they claim to have 
abolished innovations, are enumerated in al- Hadiya al-Sunniya, 
such as: raising the voice in places of Adhan with matter other 
than the Adhan, reciting the tradition of Abu Huarira before the 
Friday sermon, and special gatherings to hear the Sirat al- Nabi 
recited etc. 
It would appear that under the Banu Rashid, the founder's 
precepts were followed less rigorously than under the Banu 
Sa'ud; yet Philby in confining the name Wahhabi to the followers 
of the latter differs from the other travelers, who regarded Ha'il 
as for time the metropolis of the community. As has been seen, 
the community does not itself recognize the appellation. 5^ 
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Until his death in 1206/1792, Muhammad bin Abd al-
Wahhab continued his activities in the religious as well as 
political field. He taught at the mosque in Dar'iyya, wrote 
theological works and sent out numerous letters to win his cause 
and gain new supporters in the Nadjd and the neighboring 
regions. He also remained the political counsellor of Muhammad 
bin Sa'ud (1178/1765) and, to a lesser degree it seems, of his 
successor ' Abd, al-'Aziz (1765-1801). 
Muhammad bin Abd al-Whahab's literary and doctrinal 
works, which have appeared in many editions for the use of 
Wahhabi missionary activities, are important. Most of his writing 
is fairly short, full of quotations from the Qur'an and Hadiths. 
The Kitab at- Tawhid, his main work, often reprinted and the 
subject of many commentaries, sets out his teaching in the line 
of the strictest Hanbali doctrine. 
His Kitab al-Usul al- Thalatha, written at the request of the 
ruler Abd al-Aziz is a type of official catechism, is still esteemed. 
His Kitab Kashfu ash-Shubukat, more polemical in presentation, 
condemns Muslims who do not practice the true tawhid. 
The Madjmuat al-Hadith al-Nadjdiya (Cairo, 1346) mentions 
several other short treatises by the Shaykh defining his 
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conception of faith {Iman) and of Islam {Usui al Iman; Fadl al-
Islam; al Kaba'ir; Nasihat al-Muslimin). 66 
The creed of Wahhabism centered upon the principle called 
tawhid, the assertion of Divine Oneness. Wahhabis, moreover, 
do not take into doctrinal consideration any opinions other than 
those expressed by the generation of the Prophet and his 
Companions and those of the generation immediately following. 
Therefore Wahhabism precludes the principle of ijma' 
("consensus") as a basis of Shari'a ("Islamic law"). 
The legal approach of Wahhabism is in many respects 
unique, but it coincides most closely with the school of Ibn 
Hanbal, a n d ' may be considered a kind of Hanbalism. The 
Wahhabis would, however, denj^ this or any other affiliation. The 
sign of changing times in Saudi Arabia is that the exigencies of 
the modem world and pragmatism have opened the door to 
accepting the legal precedents of the other schools. 
The Wahhabis consider, or previously considered, many of 
the practices of the generations which succeeded the 
companions as bid'ah ("objectionable innovation"). These 
included the building of minarets (today accepted) and the use of 
funeral markers. The cemeteries of Mecca and, above all, 
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Medina, were once filled with colorful sepulchral markers which 
were all removed at the Wahhabi conquest, leaving bare fields. 
Even the tomb of the Prophet was almost destroyed by Wahhabi 
zealots; it was left untouched through the forbearance of King 
'Abd al-'Aziz, protests by the diplomatic representatives of 
various Islamic countries, and the bad aim of Beduin gunners. 
When Medina was conquered, the perhaps groundless-rumour 
spread rapidly to the effect that the desert tribesmen had turned 
Turkish cannons captured in Medina on the Prophet's tomb, its 
presence being a scandal in their eyes because of the Prophet's 
saying: Do not make of my grave a place of pilgrimage as the 
Christians make of theirs." 
Wahhabism vigorously denies all forms of mysticism, and 
rejects the idea of saints, including the visiting of saints ' tombs 
or any tomb or grave, exception being made only to the pressure 
of universal customs as regards to visiting the tomb of the 
Prophet. 
To call upon saints for aid or protection and even to 
entertain the notion of borakah ("blessing") rouses indignation in 
Wahhabi breasts as being nothing less than polytheism {Shirk). 
They also reject all notions of the holiness or sacredness of 
objects or places as detracting from the exclusive holiness of God 
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and as infringing on Divine Unity. Compared to traditional Islam, 
the Wahhabi view seems to reduce religion to a set of rules. 
Tjrpical of Wahhabi Islam are the mutaumn'un ("enforcers of 
obedience"), who are, in effect, religious police. In som.e 
countries, for a Muslim to eat in public during Ramadan is 
legally public scandal or disorderly conduct, but among the 
Wahhabis, private non-observance too can be a matter for 
sanction. In Saudi Arabia the mutawuA\in patrol the streets to 
punish those who do not perform the prayer or to enforce 
prompt closing of shops at prayer time. They keep a close eye on 
what elsewhere would be matters of private conscience and not 
public morality. In old Riyadh, if the enforcers of public morality 
smelled tobacco, they did not hesitate to enter private house to 
beat the offender. Today the shisha cafe, where water pipes are 
smoked, is found almost everywhere. 
Wahhabi Islam has now become much milder than it was 
on the day that it sprang out of the Najd desert. Attitudes 
prevalent in other Muslin countries have crept in, so that the 
stringent denunciations made by the founder, Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab, are now explained as having been a reaction co an 
improbable lapse into idolatry on the part of some tribes in 
Arabia two centuries ago. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's descendants are 
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today known as the Ash-Shykh family. Their fortunes naturally 
followed those of the Sa'ud, half of the original "alliance" made in 
Diriyyah at the end of the 18* century between Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Sa'ud.^^ 
Ideology, Message and Organization: The ideology of 
Wahhabism and its roots have probably become obvious in the 
foregoing sections. Most Islamic revivalist movements have had 
the same message, although different aspects have been stressed 
usually depending on the milieu in which they were preached. 
Some movements have been more extreme than others, with 
apocalyptic and messianic elements. Wahhabism was strictly 
orthodox, with Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab making no special claims for 
himself. His message was that Islam had been corrupted and 
that a return to pristine conditions of the early days of the 
Islamic community was necessary. 
His religious ideas came either directly from Ibn Hanbal, or 
indirectly from the same source as interpreted by later scholars, 
especially Ibn Qudama and Ibn Taimiya. For all these men, 
doctrine was entirely dominated by ethical considerations, by the 
conviction that the end of all actions is to serve God. Faith is not 
just a simple body of rites. It is a whole system of moral 
convictions based on absolute sincerity in the service of God 
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(ibada). Faith includes the feelings on which this service is 
based, the formulae in which it is expressed, and the actions 
through which it is practiced. 
In his tract, Al-Usul al-Thalatha, Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab laid 
out the requirements of the true Muslim. Four things are 
necessary: a knowledge and understanding of God, the Prophet 
and faith; action thereon; the profession of faith; and patience in 
affliction in carrying out the faith. The greatest thing that God 
has commanded is the assertion of his Oneness (tawhid); the 
greatest thing He has forbidden is idolatry {shirk). The 
understanding of faith comprises confession and obedience and 
has three stages: salvation, belief, and finally, gratitude. What is 
striking in Ibn 'Abd al Wahhab's message is the insistence on 
service to God and the close relationship that this implies. 
Much has been made of the prohibitions and restrictions of 
Wahhabism, yet Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab insisted that social 
obligations stem solely from the religious practices which God 
has explicitly prescribed, and only in the form prescribed (thus 
outlawing Sufi and other practices). Nothing can lawfully be 
forbidden other than practices forbidden by God in the Qur'an 
and Sunna. 
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Everything considered innovative (bid'a) was prohibited on 
this ground, including music, silk, tobacco, wine, and the 
worship of trees, stones and saints' tombs. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab 
added nothing to and took nothing away from the teaching of the 
Prophet while stressing certain aspects as necessery for 
obedience to God, of prayer (he quoted with approval the hadith. 
prayer is the essence of worship), and of a continual jihad (of self 
tongue and the sword). He emphasized the promise of paradise: 
"The elect will see God in paradise as one sees full moon." 
From Ibn Taimiyya he took the notion that religion and 
state are indissolubly linked. Without the coercive power of the 
state, religion is in danger, and without discipline of revealed 
law, the state becomes a tyrannical organization. The duty of the 
state is to bring about the rule of tawhid and prepare for the 
coming of a society devoted to the service of God. The mission of 
the imam is to build and instill respect for systems of order and 
prohibition, which govern the various areas of the life of the 
community. The imam must also bring about and ensure the 
solidarity of the community in the face of opposition from 
outside. 
This was basically the simple message that Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab preached in his attempt to recreate in Arabia a society 
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similar to that of the earliest days of Islam. Those who followed 
him were promised paradise. Those who did not were threatened 
with damnation. There is one final factor to be mentioned 
regarding the success of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's da'wa. 
The Saudis derived legitimacy from Wahhabism as nnams 
of the only truly religious community in Islam, while Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab needed Saudi political power. The movement which 
developed from the pact was not simply a religious undertaking 
aimed at convincing those Muslims in Najd who were dissaiisfied 
with the state of Islam. The Wahhabi message was henceforward 
linked with the political fortunes of the d3niasty, which, to 
promote the da'wa, engaged on a campaign of expansion that 
eventually threatened the power of other rulers in Arabia. Thus 
the religious message of Wahhabism was perpetuated in a state-
committed to uphold its principles. 8^ 
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Saudi Political System and the Ulama 
Religious power and authority continue to be exercised in Saudi 
Arabia by the Ulama along with political figures who together 
derive legitimacy as result of this cooperation. 
This 'religio-political cooperation' has been in existence 
since 1744 following the alliance between Muhammad Ibn Abd al 
Wahhab and Muhammad ibn Saud. Two hundred years of 
mutual support have created a flexible mechanism 
characterizing the Saudi political system and the role of the 
Ulama. 1 This prolonged relationship has created a degree of 
sensitivity in the PCingdom and a flexible mechanism. 
In Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
and his disciples made much use of the works of Ibn Taymayya 
while gaining a certain influence within the Hambali school.2 
Despite tensions between religious and established state 
authorities, the latter continued to rely on the advice and 
support of the ulama in times of peace as well as crisis. This 
relationship has worked and survived till today. 
Saudi Arabia, a Ki.ngdom without a constitution, political 
parties, or trade unions, represents the traditional patronage 
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system in its rigid and absolute aspects. The government and 
state institutions are composed of the Monarch, Council of 
Ministers, Consultative Council, Judiciary and local government 
administrators. Above all the Shariah remains supreme over the 
civil law. The QuYan and the Sunna are the primary source of all 
legislation. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy 
characterized by the exceptionally important role of the royal 
family, the House of Sa'ud. Members of the dynasty fill most key 
positions and maintain a near monopoly over political activity in 
the country. 3 
Many of the Saudi state's unusual features can be 
explained by its relative newness. While some parts of the 
Arabian peninsula, such as the Yemen or the cities of the Hijaz 
on the west coast of the peninsula, have long been governed by 
constituted governments, the rest of the area has been 
dominated by tribes which lack even the most elementary forms 
of state authority (a police force, a fixed capital, written records). 
Only when their energies were harnessed to a religious cause 
have the tribes formed an3^ing more enduring than transient 
coalitions of warriors. This happened twice, first in the seventh 
century under Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, and second 
when the religious leader Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, 
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founder of the Wahhabi movement, jomeo-iiafEiee'^th the tribal 
chief Muhammad ibn Sa'ud. From the time of this alliance, the 
Sa'udi family has always led a cause with a grander purpose 
than mere camel raiding or protecting water wells. Religious 
ideology inspired Sa'udi soldiers to conquer many of the 
territories of today's Saudi Arabia before the kingdom fell to 
outside forces in 1818. It was resurrected on a smaller scale 
between 1820 and 1891, before falling again. '^ 
Thus, the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance was already 150 years 
old when Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd ar-Rahman ibn Faisal as-Sa'ud 
began to piece the present state together in 1902 in the name of 
Islamic purification as preached in Wahhabi doctrine. Starting 
with the recapture of his ancestral home, Riyadh, he expanded 
his rule to other parts of central Arabia, then to the east and 
west coasts of the peninsula. These conquests continued over a 
period of thirty-two years, until his territories reached 
approximately their present extent in 1934. His achievement, 
bringing al-Hasa (East Coast), Najd (inland), and Hijaz an Asir 
(Southwest) under a single rule was without precedent. ^ 
Abd al-Aziz relied on an ancient method for consolidating 
his kingdom: marrying the widows and daughters of his defeated 
enemies. Exploiting the right of a Muslim man to four wives at 
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once and easy terms of divorce, he wed some three hundred 
women and had forty-five recognized sons by at least twenty-two 
mothers. These sons whose birth dates range from 1900 to 1952, 
have constituted the dominant political force in the kingdom 
since Abd al-Aziz's death in 1953 and assuming the regime stays 
in power, they will remain in charge for decades to come. Full 
brothers tend to form groupings against half-brothers; and 
because of their mother's origins, these disputes have direct 
tribal and regional implications. Until now, this discord has not 
created irreconcilable rifts.^ 
The Shnri'a which has its origin in Qur'an and the Hadith, 
is the supreme law in Saudi Arabia, "It is the fundamental 
assumption of the polity of Saudi Arabia that the Holy Qur'an 
implemented is more suitable correctly for Saudi Muslims than 
any secular constitution."'' The Holy Qur'an, as the constitution 
of Saudi Arabia, is supposed to be the fountainhead of the 
system. "The sanctity of the Shariah is such in Saudi Arabia that 
every attempt to modify or even codify the legal material in the 
Shari'a has so far been successfully resisted. If some portions of 
the Shariah are impossible to enforce in the present 
circumstances, they are simply set aside rather than altered or 
deleted. In this context, "the Shari'a is the most powerful 
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constitution in the world as it is not liable to aniendment."^ King 
Faisal, the former King declared in 1964 that: "Our constitution 
is the Qur'an and our law is Shariah of Mohammed (God's peace 
and blessings be upon him). Our system of government is based 
on the interest of the country, Saudi Arabia, where such interest 
does not conflict with the principles of our religion and the 
Shariah". 9 
Beside the Qur'an, Sunnah also constitutes one of the 
sources of the polity of Saudi Arabia. It encompasses the 
tradition of the Prophet, his deeds, utterances, and unspoken 
approval and disapproval in different situations. While in theory 
the law in Saudi Arabia is simply the eternal Shariah, it does not 
mean that in practice enacting legislation to meet the particular 
needs of the time is impossible. Since the 1950s, a number of 
codes have been issued by royal decrees, regulating different 
areas of life which for one reason or another did not receive 
detailed attention in traditional Islamic Jurisprudence. 
Commerce (1954), Nationality (1954), Forgery (1961), Bribety 
(1962), Mining (1963), Labor and Workmen (1970), Social 
Insurance (1970), and the Civil service (1971) can be cited, for 
instance. All this is not seen as adding to or modifying the 
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Shariah, but simply as implementing it by appropriate 
administrative action, i^  
The Monarchy 
George A. Lipsky states that "Saudi Arabia is an 
independent monarchy under the predominant religious 
influence of the Sunnite wahhabi sect of Islam."^ In Saudi 
Arabia, Kingship is nothing but absolute monarchy. The PCing 
happens to be the head of state and chief executive of the 
government. 
Abd al-Aziz captured Riyadh in January 1902, and 
acquired a twin title: imam (religious leader) of the Wahhabis 
and Prince (emir) of Najd. He became King of Hijaz after 
conquering that province in January 1926, and shortly 
thereafter, elevated his title to "King of Najd and its 
Dependencies." For five years he retained this cumbersome 
double Kingship; then, on September 22, 1932, he announced 
that he had taken a new title. King of Saudi Arabia. Abd al-Aziz 
died in November 1953, and four of his sons have succeeded him 
to this position: Sa'ud (1953-64), Faisal (1964-75), Khalid (1975-
82), and Fahd (1982 to present). 
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The title of king has several attributes, dynastic, tribal, and 
religious. It is as head of the House of Sa'ud that the King 
derives his power, for the royal family's support determines who 
rules. Sovereignty resides in the family; whoever leads it, is head 
of state. The selection of an heir-apparent takes place in 
advance, a tradition established by Abd al-Aziz, and is a key 
decision. Selecting the crown prince is perhaps the single most 
critical and ticklish issue in Saudi politics. Although it arises 
only occasionally, it touches on all actions of the royal family. 
Abdallah is the current crown prince. 
The Saudi family has no written rule of succession nor 
even an informal hierarchy. Muslim civilization has never 
decided whether succession should go by birthright or according 
to ability. As a result, it often led to disastrous succession crises. 
The house of Sa'ud has transferred power nineteen times since 
the eighteenth century: nine times to a brother, seven to a son, 
and three to a cousin. Selection of a new crown prince involves 
such factors as seniority, education, ability, temperament, 
popularity. 12 So far as can be discerned, the Royal Council takes 
the actual decision on matters of succession. 
As the religious leader {imam) of his people, the king is 
bound to carry out Islamic law, to defend the borders from 
81 
Chapter-2 Saudi Political System and the Vlama 
unbelievers, and to personally set a righteous example for his 
subjects. Saudi sponsorship of Wahhabi doctrines gives the king 
an unusually close connection to religion for a Muslim leader. 
Even more important is his role as "protector of the two Holy 
Cities" (Mecca and Medina).i^ Executive, legislative, and judicial 
powers are derived from his role as Malik (King), Imam of 
Believers, and Shaykh of Shayukhs. 
According to the tribal traditions, "As a tribal Sheikh, the 
Saudi King was the patriarch of his people. He was also 
responsible for social harmony among them. He was easily 
accessible to his people for redressing a grievance, solving a 
problem, or even mediating in a personal dispute".i^ 
The influential religious leaders, in concurrence of the 
collective leadership of the Saudi family, determine the rule of 
succession to power and removal from office. Recently, 
constitutional reforms took place in Saudi Arabia in March 1992 
through Royal decrees of the King. The succession clause of this 
Basic law implies that the crown prince will be chosen on the 
basis of his qualifications, rather than seniority. The criteria of 
the selection of this posting were on the basis of seniority. These 
changes signify the traditional succession procedures, which 
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were most probably made to dispel the ambition of numerous 
Saudi princes. 15 
Article 44 of the Basic law proclaims: 
**The authorities of the state consist of the following: the 
judicial authority, the executive authority, and the regulatory 
authority. These authorities cooperate with each other in the 
performance of their duties, in accordance with this and other 
laws. The King shall be the point of reference for all these 
authorities." 16 
The nucleus of Saudi Arabian government is the monarchy. 
The Basic law adopted in 1992 declared that Saudi Arabia is a 
monarchy ruled by the sons and grandsons of King 'Abd al-'Aziz 
Al Saud, and that the Holy Qur'an is the constitution of the 
country, which is governed on the basis of Islamic law (Shariah). 
There are no political parties or national elections. The Kings 
powers are limited because he must observe the Shari'a and 
other Saudi traditions. He also must retain a consensus of the 
Saudi royal family, religious leaders (Ulama), and other 
important elements in Saudi society. The leading members of the 
royal family choose the King from amongst themselves with the 
subsequent approval of the Ulama. i^  
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Council of Ministers (Majlis al-Wuzura) 
Abd al-Aziz did not have ministers through the first 
decades of his rule. As a tribal leader with no administrative 
responsibilities, he waged war, distributed revenues, and 
adjudicated disputes. Around 1925, when his conquest of the 
Hijaz virtually ended the wars of expansion and opened a new 
era of consolidation and bureaucratization, this began to change. 
Abd al-Aziz kept some of the Hajaz's more developed political 
institutions (such as its directorates and consultative council), 
later using some of these as a basis for government institutions 
for the kingdom. Nonetheless, his rule remained patrimonial; 
Abd al-Aziz's son Faisal became the first minister in 1930, taking 
the foreign affaire portfolio. Abdallah as-Sulaman, the king's 
accountant, became finance minister two years later. Other 
ministers followed in due time, particularly in the 1950s and 
1970s, marking the increasing size and complexity of the 
government. From the beginning, ministers have been both royal 
and non-royal. 
As the bureaucracy grew, ministers also gained in 
importance. Although always responsible to the king, they have 
in fact carved out a good deal of autonomy as the complexity of 
their offices has increased. With time, functional division has 
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become more pronounced: princes still hold the most sensitive 
posts (defense, interior, national guard, foreign affairs), with 
commoners taking the more technical positions (finance, oil, 
planning). Religious authorities, usually of the Shaykh family, 
predominate in matters connected to religion, justice, and 
education, is 
In his last official act, in October 1953, King Abd al-Aziz 
established a Council of Ministers to meet the "obligations and 
the diversification's of the responsibilities placed on the state." 
But the Council had no prescribed functions or effective role 
until a Royal Decree of May 1958 (inspired by Crown Prince 
Faisal) specified its policymaking and policy-executing duties. 
Like its predecessor, a Council of Deputies, the Council of 
Ministers has the authority to consider all questions arising in 
the kingdom, including the budget, treaties, contracts 
administrative appointments, and court cases involving the 
government. Unlike the Council of Deputies, however, this new 
body has to refer its decisions, to the king for approval. Its 
decision, therefore, are recommendations only, which may be 
ignored or enacted by the administration, as the king directs. A 
quorum requires two-thirds of the members, decisions are 
probably reached by consensus, and the king may veto a Council 
85 
X6 
Chapter-2 Saudi Political System and the Ulama 
decision wit±iin thirty days. The Council functions, in part, as a 
legislature by formulating most government decrees. ^ ^ 
In the Saudi Kingdom a Council of Ministers through a 
Royal Decree was established in October 1953. It dealt with five 
issues: (i) organization of the council, (ii) jurisdiction of the 
Council, (iii) the Council's procedures, (iv) jurisdiction of the 
president of the Council, and (iv) Council's cabinets. 20 
Article one and two of part one'. Article seven of part two, 
and Article eight of part three of the constitution of the council of 
ministers marked the council's main recommendations. 
Article 1: A Council of Ministers shall be formed under our 
presidency and, in our absence, under the presidency of our 
Viceroy and Crown Prince. 
Article 2: the Council of Ministers shall consist of his 
Majesties active Ministers. The King's Advisers and these, whose 
attendance at the Council of Ministers is desired by his Majesty, 
the King. 
Article 7: The Council of Ministers shall supervise the state 
policy within the country and abroad. 
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Article 8: A meeting of the Council shall not be considered 
as effective except in the presence of two-third of its members 
and its decision shall be valid when issued by a majority of those 
present.21 
The Council of Ministers met for the first time on March 7, 
1954, in Riyadh. Ministers of the Interior, Education, 
Agriculture, Health, Industry and Commerce, and Information 
were added to Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. Rivalries 
between ministers as well as inexperience caused numerous 
problems. The Ministry of Economy was created in 1953, but 
closed in the very next year. 
King Fay sal's administrative reforms were significant and 
they portray his dynamic personality. He succeeded in giving an 
organizational framework for the government. A royal decree 
clarifying the duties of the Council of Ministers was issued on 
May 1958. This status was regarded as the beginning of the 
"Constitutional regime". According to this document, the council 
is responsible for the budget and internal affairs. 22 
The Council of Ministers functions as the formulators and 
implementers of the overall state policy, internal and external, 
financial, economic, cultural and defense-related. The Council 
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has autJiority to establish or abolish adtninistrative departments 
and create working committees to study, plan, or investigate the 
activities of certain public or private institutions. 
The members of the royal family could only be inducted in 
the early stages into the council of ministry. King Faysal was, 
however, aware of the merits and the functional capacities of the 
ministry. So he picked up efficient and educated persons from 
different walks of life, irrespective of their clan or family. Thus 
the efficiency of the ministry was enhanced through these 
qualified and capable ministers. Ahmed Zaki Al-yamani, former 
Petroleum Minister, and Ghazi Al-Algosaibi, then Minister of 
Industry were examples of this change. 
The recent constitutional modifications were all-
encompassing. They did not spare the Council of Ministers from 
defining the duties and functions of the ministry. 
"Treaties and international agreements are not considered 
effective until approved by the Council. The decisions of the 
Council of Ministers are authorized to legislature for the state 
and all international agreements, treaties and regulations or 
concessions may not be promulgated or amended except the 
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regulations to be issued in accordance with royal decrees 
prepared with the approval of the Council of Ministers." 23 
One major impact of the reforms will be on the functions of 
the Council of Ministers in relation to the Consultative Council. 
Whether the reforms will reduce the power of the Ministry in 
relation to the Majlis-al Shura (Consultative Council) remains to 
be seen. The status of the Council of Ministers, anyhow, is not 
below any other bodies of the state polity. 
The Saudi royalty has gradually developed a central 
government. Since 1953, the Council of Ministers, appointed by 
and responsible to the King, has advised on the formulation of 
general policy and directed the activities of the growing 
bureaucracy. This council consists of a Prime Minister, the First 
and Second Deputy Prime Ministers, 20 ministers (of whom the 
Minister of Defense is also the Second Deputy Prime Minister), 
two Ministers of State, and a small number of advisers and 
heads of major autonomous organizations.24 
King Fahd issued additional reform decrees in September 
1993. He appointed the members of the national Consultative 
Council and spelled out procedures for the new council's 
operations. He announced reforms regarding the Council of 
89 
Chapter-2 Saudi Political System and the Ulama 
Ministers, including term limitations of 4 years and regulations 
to prohibit conflict of interest for ministers and other high-level 
officials. The members of 13th provincial councils and the 
councils operating regulations were also announced in 
September 1993.25 
Majlis al-Shura (The Consultative Council) 
The Holy Qur'an is the fountainhead of the principle of 
Shura to guide the community's decision-making process. The 
Qur'an designates the believers "as those who (conduct) their 
affairs by mutual consultation".26 
The Hijaz had a consultative council {majlis ash-Shura), a 
representative body which can have some legislative functions) 
at the time of its conquest, but it was disbanded in all but name 
in 1928, when King Abd al-Aziz proclaimed his intent to replace 
it with a single consultative council for the whole kingdom. 
Nothing more was heard of this until years after Abd al-Aziz's 
death, when in 1960 prince Talal, leader of a group called the 
"free princes," announced at a press conference that a "national 
council" was under consideration by the Council of Ministers. 
The government quickly denied his statement, but Talal had 
raised an issue, which since then refused to go away. 27 
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King Saud promised a Consultative Council again almost 
three decades later in 1960. There was an internal power 
struggle between Muhammad ibn Saud and Faysal and that was 
the basic reason to announce the consultative council. Two years 
later his successor, Faysal, again revived the idea of forming a 
Shura through a 10-point reform program, but even Faysal, who 
otherwise earned a good name for being an able administrator 
and a successful popular king, did not keep his word. After 
Faysal's assassination in 1975, Khaiid took over the throne. He 
piously declared to follow in the footstep of his predecessor, 
specifically on the question of establishing the consultative 
council. But very soon it became clear that his policy statements 
also were yet another ritualistic reaffirmation of the decade old 
promise. 8^ 
The process went on without materializing the promises 
mainly because of "the conservative princes, the religious 
leaders, the heads of tribes who are concerned not only at the 
reduction of their own power but also with the possibility that 
political reforms may pose perceptible demands for the kind of 
social liberalization which they disapprove." 29 
The revolution in Iran overthrew the dictatorial regime of 
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi by a popular Islamic movement led by 
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Khomini in February 1979. This alarmed the Saudi royal family. 
The takeover of Islam's holiest shrine, the mosque in Mecca by 
four hundred well armed Islamic militants, the Ikhwans under 
the leadership oi Juhaiman Ibn Saif al Utaiba, had worsened the 
political situation in Saudi Arabia. Once again the King took out 
the same strategy which he had successfully played during the 
crisis period. After Faysal's assassination in 1975, Prince Fahd 
announced that a consultative assembly and a constitution 
would be set up, and in January 1980, after the Mecca incident, 
he promised that the consultative assembly (Majlis al-Shura) 
would be formed within two months. 
A nine-man committee was formed two months later and 
was chaired by the Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayif ibn 
Abdul Aziz, to draw the statute of the assembly and make 
recommendations on its final form. This was taken by many 
qualified observers to mean that something was really going to 
happen, and that the royal family was at least taking the need 
for reform seriously; but more than a year later, in April 1981, 
Prince Nayif announced that "the King would soon start 
consideration of the committee's suggestions." 3o it was another 
scene of the same drama in which nothing materialized. Then 
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came the Gulf crisis, which proved to be a catalyst for the Saudi 
political system in many ways. ^^  
"In the wake of the Gulf war of 1991, the issue of political 
liberalization and democracy reemerged in the Middle East and 
in Western diplomacy." 2^ Different groups raised the demands 
for the total change in the political system of the Kingdom very 
openly. These open and explicit demands for reforms were the 
first of its kind in the history of Saudi Arabia. The monarchy was 
compelled to come out with a reform package in March 1992. 
The establishment of the Consultative Council was one of 
the two major laws issued by the Kingdom, known as the 
Consultative Council Law. The constitution prescribes the 
function of the consultative coi.mcil as being able to debate 
government policies and to propose draft regulations to the King. 
The functions of the Council can be described as the follov^ng: 
A. Discuss the general plans of economic and social 
development and express opinions on it. 
B. Study international laws, charters, treaties and 
agreements, and concessions and make appropriate suggestions 
regarding them (Article 15). 
C. Interpret the regulations. 
9J 
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D. Discuss annual reports submitted by ministers and 
other government bodies, and make appropriate suggestion 
regarding them (Article 15). 
E. Question the ministers and other government 
officials.33 The king has the exclusive right to choose the 
chairman and all sixty council members. The Council members 
must be male Saudi nationals, over thirty years old, residing in 
Saudi Arabia and known to be good and competent. According to 
the law, the King shall have the power to appoint and dismiss 
the council chairman, his deputy, and the secretary-general, but 
the King has no right to dismiss council members before their 
term is completed. The official term is four years. The King has 
the power to veto the council's by-laws, and the Council's budget 
is entirely controlled by the King.-^ -^  
The Council's decisions are strictly advisory. Article 67, 
states, "The regulatory authority (consultative council) lays down 
regulations and motions to meet the interests of tlie state or 
remove what is bad in its affairs, in accordance with the Islamic 
Sharia." 35 
The constitution of the council states that it is to include 
selected people from amongst scholars and men of knowledge 
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and expertise. The capital city of Riyadh was chosen to be the 
headquarters of the Council. 
An analysis of the consultative laws in its totality, projects 
a vivid picture that there is an unprecedented increase in the 
powers of the King today than was the case in the past. 
Persistent demand and outcry for reforms in reducing the 
powers of the King were made for decades. After the Gulf war, a 
law for setting up of a consultation council was reluctantly 
proclaimed by the King in fulfillment of the repeated promises of 
the kings who went before him. Despite tremendous pressure, 
the King nominated a speaker and waited for another long year 
before actually setting up the council in 1993. This not only 
demonstrates the lack of enthusiasm by the king in the whole 
matter, but also his un\^illingness to part with the dictatorial 
powers. 
King Fahd announced his 60-man selection for the new 
Mcylis al-Shura on August 20, 1993. Its memhers are selected 
and sacked by the King, who must approve any decisions they 
take, though they are entitled to make recommendations on 
areas of government policy.36 Shaykh Muhammad bin Ibrahim 
bin Jubair, a former Justice Minister, was appointed as the 
President of the Majlis al-Shura. The Educational, Cultural and 
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Information Affairs committee, which is being selected from the 
Shura has ten members headed by Abdul Rahman bin al-Fayed 
al-Ansari and Fahd al-Orabi al-Atarthi, as the Vice-Chairman. 
The Health and Social Affairs Committee has seven members 
headed by Ahmed bin Hamad. The Foreign Affairs committee, 
Security Affairs committee has seven members each. The other 
committees are the Organization and Administration Committee, 
Islamic Affairs Committee, and the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Committee.^^^ Each member of the council shall be 
members of any one of the Ad-hoc committees. 
The media had highlighted the experience and high 
educational qualifications of the 60 members, half of whom hold 
Ph.Ds. But Saudi reformists, who despite reservations, have 
welcomed the idea as a small step in the right direction. 
In March 1992, King Fahad issued several decrees 
outlining the basic statutes of government and codiiying for the 
first time procedures concerning the royal succession. The King's 
political reform program also provided for the establishment of a 
national Consultative Council, with appointed members having 
advisory powers to review and give advice on issues of public 
interest. It also outlined a framework for councils at the 
provincial or emirate level.^^ 
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In 1997, the membership of the Consultative Council was 
expanded from 60 to 90 members, and again in May 2001, from 
90 to 120 members. Membership has changed significantly 
during expansions of the council, as many members have not 
been reappointed. The role of the council is gradually expanding 
as it gains experience. 39 
Besides that, other factors such as regional and local 
government, military, labor and radical organizations have also 
influenced the political system of Saudi Arabia. 
The role of the Ulama in the Saudi political system and the 
consequent socio-political change during and after the Gulf War 
will be the focus of the discussion. 
The Ulama 
The absence of a clergy in Islam, however, should not lead 
one to overlook a category of the religiously inclined persons 
who study Islamic law with great care and with a well-
established methodology of interpretation and with due 
prudence. This is to say that these individuals seek to shed light 
on their capacity to understand, interpret, and compare their 
findings with others who are similarly inclined. These are the 
fuqaka, (singular, Faqih) and the Ulama, (singular, Alim). 
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The Fuqaha, or legal scholars study Islamic jurisprudence 
(fiqh) which includes ritual practices as well as legal treatises. 
The Ulama, on the other hand, study the unanimous doctrine 
and opinion of religious authorities through consensus [ijma). 
They are the guardians of the Shari'a, particularly its "five 
pillars" (profession of faith, prayer, fasting, Zakat and pilgrimage 
to Mecca) and its hudud (punishment specified in the Qur'an for 
crimes like murder, adultery, and theft, among others). o^ 
The ulama seldom constituted, at least historically, a 
distinct social class with special rights and privileges. In crisis 
situations they did function as a group to reckon with, and it is 
clear that the advisory roles of the ulama cannot, indeed were 
not, ignored by political leaders throughout history. 
The ulama study the Qur'an and the Sunna, as well as the 
life of the Prophet from whom they draw inspiration in 
interpreting and resolving particular legal maters. In Sunni 
Islam, the ulama as well as the fuqaha have traditionally 
supported the political institutions in power, and in Saudi 
Arabia this support was given to the House of Saud by 
Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab'. 
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The ulama and tiieir movements have been aptly 
categorized by a Saudi scholar Abubaker A. Bagader ^'^ into six 
different groups: (a) Spiritualists (b) Ritualists (c) Radicals (d) 
Brotherhood (Ikhwanis) (e) Intellectuals and (f) Traditionalists. 
According to Bagader, the Saudi Ulama comes into the category 
of ritualists. Bagader enumerates the characteristics of the 
ritualists who emphasize 'Islamic appearances or what is termed 
as Sunna.' They lay emphasis on moral issues as well as social 
conduct. They are not concerned with political or economic 
issues. They stress teaching of Tawheed. The Saudi ulama are 
generally concerned with preaching and sermonizing. 
The Saudi *Ulama 
The ulama in Saudi Arabia can be categorized into two 
groups: Najdis and Hijazis. Najdis are present in urban centres, 
small towns, and villages as well as in Beduin settlements. They 
are the followers of classical period. Najdi ulama were mainly 
concerned with the learning and teaching the principles of 
Wahhabism and Hambali fiqh.'^i The descendants of the Shaykh 
Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab belonged to this group and 
always supported Saudi rule, and were known as Najdi Ulama. 
They were also known as al-Shaykhs.42 This group provided 
legitimacy to the system. They wrote pamphlets and texts that 
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emphasised Wahhabi doctrines. They also acted as judges and 
administrators in the Kingdom. 
The ulama of Hijaz had different social, educational 
backgrounds and nurturing. The Hijazi Ulama were urbane and 
quite familiar with the politics of the state. Since Mecca, Madina, 
and Jedda were the main centres of the region of Hejaz, the 
region was prone to external influences. Consequently the Hejazi 
Ulama were less rigid in their social outlook and less austere in 
their daily lives than were their counterparts in Najd. 
Nevertheless, with the changing times, the Ulama, the 
world over and specially in Saudi Arabia, have changed their 
outlook. There are instances of numerous attempts on the part 
of Ulama in Saudi Arabia to bridge the traditional with the 
modem. 
The Ulama have come to terms with the status quo which 
ensures the Wahhabi domination and their privileged position in 
the Kingdom. Their real power and influence, however, were to 
be dependent on the sweet will of the King. They are supposed to 
be the junior partners of the Sauds and have prestige and 
privileges. With the passage of time, as the government and 
administration grew, their control of religious institutions also 
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grew. The Ulama have a powerful say in tlie judicial system, 
implementations of rules of the Islamic shariah, religious 
guidance, education, jurisprudence, preaching of Islam, 
supervision of girls' education, supervision and administration of 
all mosques, and scientific and Islamic research.'^^ J-Q QW these 
aspects of state administration, the Saudi Arabian Ulama 
undoubtedly enjoyed an altogether different position. The revolt 
of 1929, by the Ikhwans, led to the deterioration of the status of 
Ulama in Saudi Arabia. The Kings tried to reconcile the religious 
tradition with the process of modernization. In the 1930s, Abdul 
Aziz was being denounced by the Ulama over the introduction of 
the telephone till he demonstrated its utility in spreading the 
word of God. In tJie 1940s, the ulama again objected to oil 
concession being given to American companies. They were of the 
opinion that Muslims were being sold into bondage to non-
believers. The Kings defense was simple, Tiad not the prophets 
employed non-believers'. "^ 
The rise of King Faysal further eroded the position of the 
Ulama. Faysal frequently ignored objection to his accelerated 
modernization process. ^ 5 
The challenge of modernity posed problems for the peculiar 
Saudi arrangement of collaboration between the state and the 
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Ulania. Many traditionalists understandably opposed it, but the 
state and a large number of Ulama suggested a distinction 
between modernity as an ideology, and modernity as lifestyle. 
For them, there was no question of embracing the ideology of 
modernity that meant the adoption of secularism, liberalism (of 
western brand) and democracy etc., but certain aspects of 
modernity as a lifestyle, specially the use of scientific and 
technological inventions in making life comfortable, were 
gradually adopted. The Ulama provided legitim.acy to the state 
whenever it adopted such components of modernity and 
implemented them in the Kingdom. Over the years the Kingdom 
has changed to a considerable extent. The religious-political 
collaboration, however, continues unabated.'*^ 
Much of the time they are relatively unconcerned with 
political and economic issues. Some of these groups stress the 
need to teach only the basic doctrines of Tawheed^'^ The Saudi 
Ulama were less political in their activities like preaching and 
sermons. Most of the Ulama were trained in Madrassas which 
had functioned in different mosques before the establishment of 
Arabic colleges with a systematic curriculum. Despite the 
absence of a hierarchical organization, Najdi Ulama were 
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differentiated according to their scholarship. The knowledge 
structure of Islam was vast in its different disciplines. 
Apart from the Qur'an and the Hadith, jurisprudence 
(Fiqh), Qur'anic exegesis (Tafsir), Arabic grammar (Nahuv), 
syntax, logic (Manthiq), philosophy (Falsafa), history (Thareekh), 
and traditional Islamic sciences were the major disciplines, 
taught in madrassas of the Muslim World. The Najdi Ulama had 
concentrated both in learning and teaching the principles of 
Wahhabism and Hambali Fiqh, with little interest in grammar, 
syntax or other subjects of Islamic knowledge.'^s T^g Najdis 
trained their students with special attention on Tazkiyah 
(chastity). According to them, "knowledge alone cannot liberate a 
man from his prejudices and passion, for his knowledge can 
always be manipulated to serve his passion and prejudices." ^"^ A 
disciplined and ritualistic life style was hence the main 
distinctive aspect of their character. The descendants of Shaykh 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the group which always 
supported Saudi rule, were the part of the Najdi Ulama known 
as al-Shaykhs. They justified the policies of Al-Saud rulers by 
authoring pamphlets and texts that amplified Wahhabi 
doctrines, by acting as judges and administrators in the 
Kingdom. 
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The Ulama of Hijaz differed from their Najdi counterparts 
in social background, education and outlook. Naturally it had 
always been subject to the influence of cultures external to the 
peninsula. Makkah, Madina, and Jidda were the min centers of 
Hijaz region; so the acquaintance of the people with pilgrims to 
the holy shrines brought the minimum contact with the outside 
world and culture. Because of this social and cultural 
interaction, "Hijazis, including their Ulama, were less rigid in 
their social outlook and less austere in their daily lives than were 
their counterparts in Najd."5o 
The Hijazi Ulama's realm of knowledge was much wider 
than Najdis. They specialized in Fiqh, Qur'anic exegesis, 
tradition, Arabic grammar, syntax, prosody, logic, and 
philosophy.51 The difference in educational background between 
the Najdi and Hijazi Ulama made the former more fanatical and 
literal in their understanding and application of religion. The 
educational centers [Madrassas] were wide spread in Hijaz 
because historically Makkah and Madina were the centers of 
learning right from the time of Prophet Muhammad. Thus the 
Ulama were ready to accommodate non-Wahhabi ideas and 
principles. 
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A drastic change has occurred, however, in the character of 
the Ulama in entire world. Saudi Arabia is not an anomaly to 
this process. These Ulama had to gradually emerge into the 
mainstream of the world. They are traditional but are aware of 
the modem world. As far as the Ulama and other traditional, 
spiritual authorities are concerned, it has already been shown 
that they usually do not possess a profound knowledge of the 
modem world nor its problems and complexities. They are 
usually criticized by the modernists for not knowing European 
philosophy and science or the intricacies of modem economics 
and the like. This criticism is no longer valid. Those who 
possessed financial and political power in the Islamic world 
during the past century, rarely allowed the Madrassas to develop 
in the direction of making it possible for the Ulama to gain a 
better knowledge of the modem world on the pretext that they 
would TDecome corrupted by it.' Now attempts were made to 
modify the Madrassas curriculum. 52 pew attempts have been 
made by Saudi Ulama in the last three decades to create 
institutions which would provide a bridge between traditional 
Madrassas and modern educational institutions. Now tlie 
Madrassas themselves have been developed into full-fledged 
universities. With this professional approach, the Saudi Ulama 
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share the new platform of knowledge structure and related 
developments along with modem Islamic schools. 
Recent Crisis of Saudi Political System 
The Gulf crisis of 1990 and its aftermath prompted 
unprecedented rumbling of discontent and public debates in the 
Kingdom on political reforms and issues of religious orthodoxy.ss 
Unlike many decolonized Muslim countries where the debate 
continues whether there should be an Islamic or secular state, 
the place of Islam in Saudi Arabia was never a matter of 
controversy. In the past two decades, however, social institutions 
and physical infrastructure have undergone a great deal of 
modernization, yet secularization seems to have affected only the 
top of society. In a large society, there seems to have quietly 
emerged, over tlie years, an Islamic movement which can no 
longer be ignored. 
The Saudi Ulama now represent two streams of thought 
and action. Senior Ulama led by Shaykh Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz 
uphold the traditional, puritanical Islam. They defend the ruling 
royal family through their efforts, but the young Ulama, like 
Safar al-Hawali, with the support of university professors, 
students, and other liberals, stand for change in the system. 4^ 
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Their language is an amalgam of puritanical Islam and modem 
political Islam. 
Taha Jobir al Ulwani, an Arab thinker and writer observes 
that the Muslim students of the Arab World, who attain Islamic 
education after overcoming so much opposition within the 
society, have been considered as outcasts and face social 
discrimination on that account. Both in the work place and civil 
society, they are subjected to social discrimination, and this 
affects their personality and destroys their self-confidence. Their 
numbers and standards have been reduced on this account. 
Various day-to-day problems faced by them in non-curricular 
field have also started affecting them. Their dignity and identity 
are often being questioned in a place where their services are no 
longer required. In such a situation, they are forced to render 
their services at the theological institutions run by the state and 
become part of the system. The common man has also started 
losing his faith in the integrity of these Ulama. At the same time 
those who fight against the existing regimes and states are not 
worried about their future lives; jihad (Holy War) as interpreted 
by modem Islamic scholars inspire them . s^  
According to a pamphlet released by organization of 
Islamic Revolution in the Arabian peninsula (CIP?AP); 56 
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"There is no constitution, parliament, or judicial system. The Al-
Saud family controls everything, for instance, most of the ministers 
are princes. Moreover, any ministry without a prince- minister has a 
higher council headed by a prince who has more authority than the 
minister himself ... In accordance with the teaching of Islam, our 
nation has begun its struggle against the infidels, Al-Saud and 
western super powers. Our nation has decided to break the chain of 
slavery and to send the Al-Saud clan to hell, not fearing the Saudi 
SAVAK, prisons, torture or martyrdom." 
The religious radicals appeared on the political scene of 
Saudi Arabia to achieve a society based ,on Islamic order. 
According to them revival of the Islamic society is to be achieved 
through Mahdi ^'^, which would end the tyrannical kingship and 
would restore governing with justice and compassion. They 
accused the Saudi family for religious and moral bankruptcy and 
pleaded for the resurrection of the seventh century Islamic 
government. The members of the movement contemplated the 
existing culture as unsatisfactory and strove to innovate or 
revitalize a new or old cultural system, which is appropriate for 
their conditions. 
After the uprising, the state tightened the security 
measures, and the mukhabarat (secret police) network was 
established to monitor the activities of the people. Hundreds of 
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suspected political opponents have been arrested and detained 
without trial. Most have been Muslims from the Eastern 
province. According to one report, at least 100 such detainees 
were held in 1989 alone. In 1982, Amnesty International learned 
about the cases of over 120 political detainees who were not 
tried. Among those detained were Fawzia al-Bakr, lecturer of the 
sociology department of the University of Riyadh, Salih al-Azzaz, 
Editor-in-Chief of al-Yawn newspaper, as well as a number of 
journalists, teachers, and students. 
During 1983 Amnesty International published the names 
of over 120 political detainees who were not tried. In 1984, 
between August and December, 62 people were detained in 
connection Vvdth an attempt to organize a political party. During 
1985, over 100 alleged political opponents of the government 
were arrested and held in detention without trial, ss 
The dependence of Saudi Arabia on foreign infidels for 
protection caused bitter queries both among the Ulama, 
especially the younger generation, and the new liberal elite. The 
pro-established of the Ulama were greatly disturbed by the 
activities of the younger Ulama because, unlike the older 
generation, the younger Ulama had an agenda to transform 
social conduct and sthe ystem by their modem methods. They 
10'-) 
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were acquainted with the programmers and strategies of other 
Islamic movements of West Asia through the Brotherhood 
activists of Saudi Arabia. So many leading Muslim Brothers 
including Muhammad Qutb, had been given asylum in Saudi 
Arabia. They set up an Institution, the Islamic University of 
Madina. ^^  
The house of Saud has always relied on foreign troops for 
protection. The younger Ulama again raised the Qur'an, saying 
that the Qur'an clearly prohibited Muslims from taking Jews and 
Christians as protecting friends (H.Q. 5:51). It has further 
commanded Muslims not to choose friends those who received 
the scripture before you and of the nonbelievers {kafirun), as 
make a jest and spurt of your religion (H.Q. 5: 57).' Because 
Allah says in the Qur'an: They surely disbelieve who say: "Allah 
is Christ, the son of Mary". The Messiah (himself) said O children 
of Israel, worship Allah, my lord and your Lord. 'Lo! Who 
ascribes pastors unto Allah, for him Allah has forbidden 
paradise. His abode is the fire. For evildoers there will be no 
helpers. They surely disbelieve who say: Lo! Allah is the third of 
the three: when there is no God save the one God (H.Q. 5:72-
73).' 
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By quoting the above Qur'anic verses, the Ulama argued 
that those who associate partners with Allah are committing 
shirk and hence are among the disbelievers. Most people today 
who call themselves Jews or Christians would fall into this 
category. They associate partners vAih Allah. They make fun of 
Allah's din (Islam), are rebellious against Allah's commands, and 
are extremely antagonistic to Muslims. So King Fahad aligned 
with the forces of Kufr (infidel) and was working for the enemies 
of Allah. 60 
Hence forth, the younger Ulama called for an Islamic-Arab 
solution to the crisis rather than allowing the non-believers to 
protect the Holy land of Islam to fight the Iraqis to liberate 
Kuwait. For them the presence of "infidels" in Arabia was 
anathema. 
Insensitive American Journalists and television networks 
made Fahd's tasks more difficult by writing about or displaying 
footage of entertainers performing before American troops, and 
women dancing in-front of US soldiers in Dhahran. IRAQI TV 
taped those performances and broadcasted them in Bhagdad, 
and copies of the tapes gained wide circulation in the Kingdom.^i 
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This again infuriated the neo-fundamentalist Ulama and a 
number of Imams of Masjids. These prayer leaders have become 
famous throughout the kingdom for their anti-Saud family 
speeches circulated by audiocassettes in the country. Saudi 
observers say that "the list of names suggests a new unity 
between liberal figures of the Islamic movement and its more 
extreme thinkers." The Ulama parched their ideas and protested 
through these audio cassettes throughout the country. The 
speeches of Shaykh Hamdan, al-Hamdan's (the leader of the 
Friday prayers) speeches were also recorded and circulated by 
the students of the University. The pro-established Ulama were 
greatly disturbed. 2^ 
The supreme Ulama council immediately convened a 
meeting and came forward to defend the government's position. 
Shaykh Abdul 'Aziz ibn Baz issued a fatwa "that even though the 
Americans, in the conservative religious view, equivalent to non-
believers as they are not Muslims, deserve support because they 
are here to defend Islam".^3 This fatwa was a partial recognition 
of the position of younger Ulama by the supreme body of the 
senior Ulama, because they failed to answer to the questions 
which had been raised by the younger Ulama on the basis of the 
fundamental sources of Islam. The wording of the fatwa was a 
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clear indication of the acceptance of the argument of the young 
Ulama in principle. But the Ulama council gave legitimization to 
the stationing of 'infidel' forces, considering only the security of 
the state. 
In the view of the ongoing debate among Muslim 
theologians on whether Muslims are allowed to use 'infidel's 
support in battle, Fahd invited 350 Islamic leaders and scholars 
to Makkah to discuss the theological justification for calling in 
non-Muslim troops to defend their Kingdom.'^^ 
Even though the state propaganda machinery worked hard 
to counter the criticism against the regime and its policies by the 
opposition groups, it failed to overcome the Ulama and their 
allies because their platform was much wider and more effective. 
The lectures in Islamic universities, theology faculties and other 
institutions, and in Friday sermons at different mosques in 
Riyadh, in Najd's lesser tov^ms and villages, and to some degree, 
in Asir, served their purpose. Their most effective weapons were 
pamphlets and Islamic cassettes.'65 Shaykh Salman al-Odah, a 
Najdi alim spearheaded the cassette revolution in the Kingdom. 
According to one report 100,000 copies of an anti-American 
book, published at the beginning of 1991, were sold within a 
month. This is the clear evidence of the anti-American and anti-
1!3 
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regime feeling, which prevails, in Saudi society. The activities of 
these university-educated junior Ulama, professors of Islamic 
studies, and other liberals led to the submission of 
memorandum to the king demanding the total change within the 
Saudi social and Political system. 
Requires for Socio-Political Change 
Relying on the immense studies on the stability of Saudi Arabia 
produced by Western scholars during the period of the Gulf War, 
an American scholar observes with optimism that, "Despite the 
possibility that Saudi Arabia could go through a period of 
political instability after the Kuwait crisis, there appears to be an 
even greater likelihood that the Kingdom will remain politically 
stable well into the 1990s and beyond." 66 
The irony of this kind of observation is that the stability of 
Saudi Arabia means the stability of the regime, but not the 
stability of the state and people. When "Operation Desert Storm" 
settled down, the simmering discontent and demand for change 
from both the opposite forces came to the fore. King Fahd was 
thus trapped between Islam and liberalism. 
In February 1991, the liberal group led by Muhammad al-
Yemeni, a former Information Minister, submitted a 
in 
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memorandum signed by 43 intellectuals to the King. It 
demanded for citizen rights, equal status for women, 
modernization of the judicial system, and above all the creation 
of a consultative council. To quote from the petition: ^ '^  
While the noblest vocation of the Muslim woman is the raising of her 
children, she should not be excluded from having a public voice and 
enjoying the basic legal and social rights afforded to all citizens as 
long as this is within an Islamic context. 
This demand was in the context of the wake of 40 women, 
who in November 1990, drove across Riyad in a convoy to 
protest the ban on v/omen driving in Arabia. In response to this 
memorandum King Fahd proclmmed in the Council of Ministers 
that "we have almost completed the final revision of the 
regulations concerning the proposed shurcf ^^. At the same time, 
the Monarch appointed a moderate alim Shaikh Abd al Rahman 
al Said to head the Morality Police (muttaiwwan) with strict 
regulation for better relations with the people as per the demand 
of the liberals. 69 
The liberal intelligentsia's petition followed by King Fahd's 
declaration of the planned reforms in April instigated the Ulama 
to follow the same path. They came out with their own 
memorandum for Islamic Reforms. The younger Ulama 
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succeeded in canvassing the support of t±ie Shaykh ibn Baz. On 
18 May, a memorandum signed by 400 Ulama led by Ibn Baz 
was presented to the king. ^^  The memorandum demanded the 
implementation of twelve necessary reforms [Islah] such as: 
[1] Creation of an independent consultative council with 
actual power to determine both domestic and foreign policy of 
the kingdom. 
[2] Elimination of all political, administrative and economic 
laws and regulations that contradict the shariah (religious law). 
[3] A code of conduct should be implemented for all state 
officials and representatives both within and outside the country 
on the basis of Islamic principles. 
[4] Realization of justice and equality among all members of 
society in fully attaining their rights and duties regardless of 
one's high or low status. 
[5] Supervision and strict accountability of all officials 
without exception; cleaning of the state apparatus of corrupt 
individuals. 
[6] Equitable distribution of wealth among all members of 
the nation, cancellation of all taxes and reduction of fees; lifting 
i!6 
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of restrictions on Islamic banks and purification of public and 
private financial institutions from usury [ribd). 
[7J Fundamental reform of the army, through the creation 
of a modem strong and independent Islamic army. This army's 
goal has to protect the country and its holy places. 
[8] Total reform of the press, the creation of a strong 
Muslim media to reflect the ethics of society, elevating its 
culture, with a guarantee of its freedom to spread awareness 
through accurate news and constructive criticism within the 
limits of Islamic principle. 
[9] Development of foreign policy to protect the interest of 
the Ummah (Muslim conmiunity); complete reform of the 
Kingdom's embassies abroad to bring them into line with the 
laws and interests of Islam. 
[10] Improvement of the countries religious institutions, 
granting them more funds and other facilities. 
[11] Radical reforms of the judicial system, granting them 
total and actual independence; creation of a supreme judiciary 
council to implement Islamic laws. 
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[12] Guaranteeing the rights of the individual and society 
and eliminating all traces of harassment of the people's will and 
right; complete protection of all basic human rights, i^ 
This was the most dramatic challenge to the authority of 
the Saudi regime and to its Islamic legitimacy, ever made by the 
religious establishment in that country. As a result of the 
pressure from the monarch, the council of the assembly of senior 
Ulama, the apex body of the Saudi Ulama, convened an 
immediate meeting and strongly denounced the petition of 400 
Alims, and especially of its being public. It emphasized the fact 
that although a Muslim has a right to counsel his leader in 
private, such advice must not be made public nor used to incite 
others.^^2 Shaykh ibn Baz and Muhammad ibn Uthaymin, the 
signatories of the memorandum went back from their earlier 
position and apologized to the King. These two Ulama came 
under scathing criticism from the younger Islamists. 
In June 1991, the government's Higher Judicial Council 
issued a statement warning the signatories of the consequences 
of issuing any further criticism against the King. The creation of 
the Higher Judicial council, within the Ministry of Justice, is 
considered to be an institutional challenge to the judicial powers 
of the Ulama in Saudi Arabia. The petitions illustrated growing 
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assertiveness of Islamists in the domestic debate on the political 
future of the country. 
At the end of January 1992, there were widespread reports 
of repression, of Islamists in the previous two months. On 29 
January, it was reported that the Shaykh Abd al-Ubaykan, the 
president of Riyadh's main court, was deposed by an order of the 
Ministry of Justice. He had criticized government policies in his 
Friday sermons and opposed the deplo3rment of US troops in 
Saudi Arabia. 3^ The senior Ulama exhorted the people of Saudi 
Arabia to ignore the "smear campaign" against the government 
and praised the 'determination' of the King to implement the 
Shwiah. 
Against this backdrop of controversy, in 1992, in an 
interview with the Kuwait newspaper Al-Siyassa, King Fahd 
stated that the "providing a democratic system" was unsuited to 
the Gulf region, and that Islam favored the consultative system 
and openness between a ruler and his subjects, rather than free 
elections.74 The Government Higher Judicial Council's ban on 
raising any criticism did not work well. In September 1992, over 
one hundred prominent Islamists drawn from all walks of life, 
presented another memorandum to the king, albeit through 
Shaykh ibn Baz. Unlike the previous one, which had confined 
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itself to simply pointing out the areas of policy and 
administration that were in urgent need of reform, it was daring 
and detailed 45-page document that provided both a critique and 
agenda for reform. It charged the authorities with violating the 
rights of the people and denying them their freedom, and dwelt 
upon economic and social chaos in the country, corruption, 
inefficiency, racial discrimination, and the poor and powerless 
machinery of justice, s^ 
Ibn Baz once again came forward to defend the regime from 
the vociferous attack of the reforms of Ulama. In response, three 
leading Islamists wrote an "open letter" to Ibn Baz accusing him 
of being an agent of the enemies of Islam. This open debate gave 
the Islamists a partial victory because the traditional Ulama 
failed to prove their arguments in the light of Islamic Shari'a. 
The Fatwa of the "High Committee of the Senior Ulama' 
[Haiat Kibar al Ulama) clearly stated that the memorandum 
contained falsehood and its authors have in this manner worked 
to propagate the causes of division, and it also said that the 
method of preparation and dissemination of the memorandum 
was also in conflict with the Islamic method of rendering 
advice.'^6 
120 
Chapter-2 Saudi Political System and the Ulama 
This debate resulted in the withdrawal of seven of the 
eighteen senior Ulama of the Council from signing the Fatwa, 
denouncing the Islamists. Following this incident in November 
1992, a major reorganization of the 18 member supreme council 
of the Ulama was instigated by royal decree. 
The Ulama opined that a closer look at the proposed 
constitution reveals that hopes for a truly Islamic system in the 
Kingdom are unrealistic. This document protects only the power 
of the monarchy. It lashed out at the claim of Fahd that the new 
rules have been established after a thorough study of Kingdom's 
Islamic tradition. According to them, the document leaves the 
King's powers intact, "it is democracy for one and Islam for 
none!" This was one of the comments. The reformists viewed that 
these are not reforms but "codification of the existing structure," 
because the members of the body are to be appointed by the 
King himself. They are for a four-year term, but their decisions 
are not binding on the government. 7^ 
Shaikh Hassan al-Saffar, the leader of the Saudi opposition 
party, severely criticized the reform package of King Fahd. He 
even questioned the authenticity of the law in compliance with 
the Holy Qur'anJ^ The Islamists published many books that 
contain severe criticism of the regime's reforms package, judging 
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it as only a tactical move of the regime J^ Some of the liberal 
intellectuals also expressed their anguish at these reforms. A 
secular Saudi exile, Tawiiq al-Shaykh, told the Independent that 
he did not think they would provide additional protection for the 
Saudi Arabian citizen. 
"I do not think it will perfect individual liberty, because 
there is no system to protect people, no free press, no 
parliament, no independent Judiciary. The reform is a timid 
attempt to satisfy traditionalists who are alarmed by the 
encroachment of western lifestyles." o^ 
Fred Halidy, professor of the London School of Economics, 
opined that nothing in the history of the Kingdorri held out any 
hope that what little reforms Fahd had introduced would be built 
on in the future. He suggested that permission of political 
freedom, simultaneously with imposing a ban on political 
organizations based on religion, would serve as a solution.^i The 
applicability of Halide's proposition in a society where religion is 
intrinsically political is contested. This would further lead only to 
the preservation of the existing monarchy, for the scope of 
secular organization is nil. 
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The Ulama not only acclaimed t±ie reform moves of the 
King, but also all of their efforts to 'educate' the masses about it. 
Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ibuchi al Jubair, the Chairman of 
Consultative Committee, said in first of the Council stated: 
"Today we witness the beginning of a significant historical 
phase that the respectable King has set in motion. In fact he is 
the pioneer of modem renaissance in this country, with his 
experiences, perspicacity, aad prudence we have the outdoors 
wide open between the ruler and ruled. 2^ 
The King assigned some senior Ulama to counter the 
arguments of the critics, and Thaufiq ibn Abdul 'Aziz al-Sudairi 
is one of them. He put forth his arguments very systematically 
and explained the glittering aspects of the reform. Al-Sudairi 
categorically declared that Saudi Arabia is an Islamic State, and 
its system consists of three cardinal points: 
1. The Qur'anic and prophetic version forms the 
constitutional system in the Islamic country. 
2. The established constitutional conventions are drawn 
from those facts. These conventions are also drawn from 
constitutional events that took place in the Islamic state, during 
the prophetic rule, orthodox Caliphate, and successive regimes. 
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3. Codified constitutional documents either in the form 
of agreements, commitments and regulations on specific issues 
or in any other form that suits the description of 
constitutionality. 3^ 
Theorizing the character of an Islamic state, he reiterated 
that Saudi Arabia is the only pure Islamic State in the Muslim 
world; so most activities against the Saudi State is anti-Islamic. 
King Fahd echoed the same thing in a different way saying, "the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is an Arab Islamic country. Whoever 
concerns the Arabs and the Muslim will concern it also. It strives 
for their solidarity and for the unification of their slogan and it 
would contribute them everything it has at its disposal."^4 
The monarchy and the senior Ulama confronted the critics 
by projecting Saudi Arabia's Islamic character and symbols, but 
it is doubtful whether they could diffuse the arguments of 
Islamists against the Kingdom and its activities. 
Modernists recall that traditional Islam "was shaped by 
scholars who were concerned to deduce an Islamic way of life 
which would fit the conditions of their time.''85 Furthermore, 
modernists understand the Shari'a to be the "result of a long 
process of jurisprudence" and not a "fixed repository of 
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commands and prohibitions.''86 This does not seem to be the 
perspective opted for by the Saudi Ulama, who conceptualize 
Islamic jurisprudence as requiring a more fundamentalist 
approach. Modernists, on the other hand, conceptualize Islamic 
jurisprudence, especially maslaha and ijtikad, as the best 
methods available for codifying modem Islamic legislation. The 
1979 fatwa, issued subsequent to the Mecca Mosque takeover, 
may thus be interpreted as a ruling which relied heavily on the 
"modernist" approach, clearly demonstrating the power of the 
King as well as the support of the public, what was perceived to 
be in the best interests of the country. Despite this "cooperation" 
with the King, it was clear that subsequent change by way of 
public demotions and appointments did reinforce the position of 
the ulama. 
In Saudi Arabia, the ulama continue to accept the 
legitimacy of the government because the Sa'ud's rule according 
to the Shari'a and consult regularly with the recognized 
interpreters of the Shari'a, namely the ulama. We must ask, 
however, whether the Kingdom will be successful in "codifying" 
the "legal materials in the Shari'a on the basis of the doctrines in 
it which conform most rigidly to the Qur'an and the example of 
the Prophet."87 
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The ulama objected first to King 'Abd al-Aziz in 1927 when 
he proposed such "codifications," for fear that codification could 
lead to tampering and selection of certain texts at the expense of 
others, thus reflecting the Hanbli school's particular emphasis 
on the conservative approach. It is equally possible that most 
ulama would object today if similar proposals were made by King 
Fahd, perhaps the monarch whose views are most identical to 
those of most modernists. 
King Fahd, in fact, has suggested that Muslim fuqaha and 
ulama, presumably from different countries, ought to reconsider 
the practice of ijtihad as a useful approach in "reconciling 
Islamic Law with modem life-''^^ Addressing Islamic scholars at a 
meeting of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), the King 
reflected on the issue and stated that "the problems are 
enormous and the responsibility we have before God is bigger 
than any one man's ijtihad of the events of life, unless that 
ijtihad is acceptable to the ulama who have thoroughly 
researched and examined old and new Islamic jurisprudence.''89 
Historic evidence suggests, furthermore, that "the incidents 
and the authority of ijma' had been laid down to classical 
Muslim jurisprudence and not by any unequivocal dictate of 
divine revelation, so that it might well appear that a self-
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constituted human authority had arrogated a legal sovereignty 
which belonged to God.''^^ Thus, conceivably, the ulama today 
could share their common wisdom in addressing, within the 
legal framework, some of these pertinent issues which their 
predecessors did not face. This bold message from the King will 
no doubt be hotly debated among the ulama, and it is unclear 
whether such an examination of this point will drastically alter 
the role of the ulama in Saudi political life. 
The above discussion outlined the fundamentals of the 
philosophy of Ulama vis-a-vis Saudi Political System. It has been 
noticed that despite its foundations and principles with Quranic 
views, the Saudi political system has earned considerable 
criticism at least since the 1980s. The main focus of the criticism 
is the system of monarchy available in Saudi Arabia. As a 
person. King Faisal faced most of the criticism due to his 
association and friendship with the USA. The recent role of the 
USA in course of aggression against some Gulf countries 
aggravated the image of the monarchy of Saudi Arabia. The 
traditional unity of the ulama and the Saudi political system is 
almost at stake. The monarchy is not indifferent to the situation 
either. A group of ulama with the patronage of the monarchy has 
come forward with a view that the friendship with the USA is 
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warranted to save Islam. Clearly, this deserves attention. Both 
the intimacy of the monarchy with a group of Ulama and 
hostility with another group of Ulama is prevailing 
simultaneously in the political system of Saudi Arabia with 
considerable differences between them. In the consequence of 
developments of world politics, of late, the differences are 
growing fast. One of the effects of these is that the traditional 
purity and authenticity of the ulama is facing a real test. 
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Judiciary System of Saudi Arabia 
Law, in classical Islamic theory, is the revealed will of God, a 
divinely ordained system. The typical form of Islamic law is the 
Shari'a law as expounded by the classical jurists and 
administered by the courts. The classical theory of Shari'a law 
was the outcome of a complex historical process spanning a 
period of some three centuries. Further development of this 
thesis by Western scholarship has shown how closely the growth 
of Islamic law is linked to current social, political and economic 
conditions. 
The Saudi Judicial System 
Islamic law as applied in Saudi Arabia, the courts and by 
the judges who apply it, i.e. the Islamic legal system of Saudi 
Arabia, is little known or understood outside the Kingdom. Even 
within the Kingdom, little information about the system is 
available except to the officials and practitioners who work 
within it. At the same time, as everyone recognizes, the 
Kingdom's claim to uphold Islamic law is central to its 
constitution, law, religion, history, and society. ^  
Saudi Arabia is the most traditionalist Islamic legal system 
in the World today.2 Islamic law is constitutionally the law of the 
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land, and the general jurisdiction is held by traditionally trained 
judges who exclusively apply the Islamic law. Traditional Islamic 
legal learning is still good professional training for practice. The 
majority of the Saudi people highly values their religion and 
intends to preserve its force in their legal and social life. Most 
Saudis consider Islamic law their indigenous law, natural and 
inevitable. Chief among the justifications for the present regime 
and the cause to which it commonly ascribes its historical 
successes is its zeal in upholding the legal code of God. Saudi 
Arabia does broadly and effectively apply the rules of the old 
Islamic law, probably to a degree greater than many Islamic 
states of the past. 
This is not to claim that Saudi Arabia's legal system is the 
ideal Islamic law or legal system. Saudi Arabia no doubt does not 
perfectly apply Islamic law. It is indisputable, however, that it 
does apply at least a traditionalist Islamic law in many spheres. 
It does this, again, with certain notable successes relative to 
Islamic antecedents. Even the most forward-looking Muslim 
cannot disown entirely the past to which Saudi Arabia is heir. 
This is also not to deny that Saudi Arabia's Islamic legal 
system is in many ways unique. Unanimously Muslim, and 
overwhelmingly Sunni, Saudi Arabia is religiously homogeneous. 
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In public life at least, it strenuously adheres to one trend of 
Sunni thought and practice, deriving from the teachings of 
Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1206 AH/1791 CE)3, and 
before him Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728/1328), whose teachings figure 
prominently in what follows. The political and religious 
movement founded by Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab has dominated the 
history of the Arabian Peninsula for almost a quarter of a 
millennium. It is well known and treated in many works."^ 
The religious ideas of WahhabismS are perfectly orthodox, 
even centrist, but at the same time so strenuous as never to 
claim more than a minority following. The Wahhabis strove to 
regain the pure practice of the salaf, the pious forebeares, and 
shake off the cultural accretions of intervening centuries. They 
were not content with pious wishes or memories of an idealized 
past but insisted on making Islam a living reality. They sought 
this by means of a rigorous legalist approach to the revealed 
scriptures, the material texts of the revelation through the 
Prophet Muhammad. Their religiosity is uniquely founded on 
purist, even puritanical, adherence to Islamic law. For example, 
customary law, which elsewhere in the Muslim world often 
overrules Islamic law, have harshly been suppressed wherever it 
contends with Islamic legal tenets.^ In religion the Wahhabis 
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banished any trace of the theosophical or mystical. These 
characteristics, and many more like them, distinguish 
observations in Saudi Arabia from those that might be made 
elsewhere. 
Ijtihad as Law 
Sovereignty {al-hukm) rests with God alone, and He has 
ordained that you should worship naught but Him. . . . 
-TheQur'an[12-A0Y 
Article 1. The religion (of Saudi Arabia] is Islam, its 
constitution is the Book of God Most High and the Sunna of His 
Prophet; may God bless him and give him peace. 
Article 7. Rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia draws its 
authority from the Book of God Most High and the Sunna of His 
prophet. These two are sovereign {hakiman) over this regulation 
and all regulations [nizam) of the state. 
Article 48. The courts shall apply in cases brought before 
them the rules (ahkam) of the Islamic shari'a in agreement with 
the indications [or proofs] in the Book and the Sunna and the 
regulations issued by the ruler [wall al-amr) that do not 
contradict the Book or the Sunna. 
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—Basic Regulation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, J992 ^ 
Here we make judgments only for this world. In the 
Hereafter all those whom we judged here will confront us and 
demand an accounting or reckoning. 
—Shaykh Sulayman al-Musa, Saudi commercial court 
Judge.^ 
The law of Saudi Arabia is the Islamic shari'a, meaning 
divine law. To the Saudis and to believing Muslims everywhere, 
God revealed His final law to govern all aspects of human life to 
the Prophet Muhammad between 610 and 632 CE. The 
revelation took form as the Qur'an. 
Because the Qur'an also commands mankind to obey the 
Prophet, the example of the Prophet's lifetime—both his words 
and his exemplary actions—become a secondary revelation, 
known as the Sunnah, The Sunnah is known by the 
transmission from generation to generation of reports about the 
Prophet. Each report, accompanied by a list of the persons who 
narrated it, one to the other down through history, is called a 
hadith. Together the hadith become a scripture alongside the 
Qur'an, although of lesser status, since they do not represent the 
literal words of God, nor are they taken as unquestionably 
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authentic. From these two scriptures—the Qur'an and the 
Sunnah—mankind may learn all that God intended to reveal of 
the Shari'a. 
The Qur'an announces that it lays down a law for 
mankind. Unto every [community] of you have We appointed a 
law [Shari'a] and way of life.... [5:48]7. 
O David! Behold We have made thee a prophet and thus 
Our vicegerent on earth; judge [uhkum lo), then, between men 
with the truth {al-haqq}, and do not follow vain desire (hawa) lest 
it lead thee astray from the path of God..[ 38:26 ] 
But for people [ofj certainty, who could be a better law-
giver than God (ahsanu min allahi hukman)? [5:50] 
Today have I perfected your religious law [din i^) for you, 
and have bestowed upon you the full measure of My blessings, 
and willed that self-surrender {al-Islam) unto Me shall be your 
religion {din). [5:3] 
The law is perfect, but humans are not. Mankind struggles 
to learn the Shari'a from the Qur'an and Sunnah. The process by 
which scholars find law by interpretation of the revealed texts is 
ijtihad, literally "striving." The human understanding of the 
divine law is termed fiqh, literally "understanding." Fiqh consists 
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of the opinions of scholars who by their piety and learning have 
become qualified to interpret the scriptural sources and derive 
laws. So to learn the law of Saudi Arabia, one turns first to the 
fiqh. In other words, one turns not to state legislation or court 
precedents but to the opinions, the ijtihad, of religious-legal 
scholars of the past and the present, whom we shall call 'ulama', 
literally the possessors of knowledge {'Urn). 
In practice, a lay Muslim, seeking to act in harmony with 
God's law in some difficult or perplexing situation, approaches a 
scholar of the law whom he or she respects, summarizes the 
situation faced, and asks for his views of the shari'a ruling for 
that situation. In this function the scholar is called a mufti, and 
his opinion is called a fatwa. Hearing the mufti's advice, the 
questioner is free to choose whether or not to follow it and apply 
the answer to his or her situation. Any sufficiently learned and 
pious individual is entitled to be a mufti, and his authority 
requires no official appointment or status. A scholar's influence 
has always derived more from his following among ordinary 
people, based on reputation for scholarly attainments, status 
among peers, and personal devotion and integrity, than from 
possessing official positions. Since at least the time of the 
Ottoman empire, however, governments may lend an official 
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Status such as "Grand Mufti" to a single mufti. 12 Saudi Arabia as 
a formal matter adopted this practice only recently, in 1993, 
conferring the title on Shaykh Abd al-Aziz bin Abd Allah Bin Baz 
(d. 1999), who had already held informal first rank among Saudi 
muftis for a considerable period. 
Almost all rules applied today in Saudi Arabian courts can 
be found in books of fiqh written by medieval 'ulama'. These 
books record the opinions of scholars issued over a period of 
nearly fourteen centuries, making fiqh a highly complex and 
diverse body of law. Much, however, is simplified by the early 
invention of the institution of the school of law {madhkab), a 
loose organization of scholars who agree to follow and contribute 
to a consistent stream of interpretation and decision descending 
from a certain revered scholar of the past. Sunni Islam, although 
it once knew reportedly hundreds of schools, settled down after 
the 7th/13th century- to having only four, the Hanafl, Maliki, 
Shafi'i, and Hanbali.i^ These schools have been discussed in 
chapter one. 
Since the Wahhabi movement (from which Saudi Arabia 
arises) acknowledged the Hanbali School, most Saudis now 
follow this school. Saudi judges ordinarily adhere to Hanbali 
legal positions, but, as we shall see below, they are free to adopt 
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views from other schools, or even from outside the four schools 
altogether, as long as they base their views, following proper 
interpretive procedures, on the Qur'an and sunnah. 
To explore the internal construction of judging and fatwa-
giving, let us begin by studying the office of the judge, called 
qadi, relying (as Saudis do) on the medieval texts. As Saudi 
'ulama' confirm, the best introduction to understanding the 
office of qadi, and an authoritative source of laws governing the 
qadi, is a famous letter purported to be from the second Caliph, 
'Umar bin al-Khattab (d. 644), to Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, deputing 
him as governor to Basra, i"* In part the letter reads: 
The judicial function is an unequivocal obligation {farida) and a 
Sunnah, which is as followed 
Do not let a judgment {qada) which you judged yesterday and then 
reconsidered, and about which you were guided to a wiser opinion {li-
rushdika), prevent you from returning to the truth (al-haqq), for verily 
truth is not voided {la-yubtiluhu) by anything. Know that 
[reconsidering and] returning to the truth is better than persistence in 
error. 
Use your understanding in matters that cause hesitation and 
perplexity in your heart on which there is no Qur'an [-ic verse] or 
Sunna. I^am the similarities and the analogies [al-ashbah wa-al-
amthaJ), then compare [qis) matters after that. Then adopt the most 
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pleasing of them to God, and the one closest to the truth in your view 
(i'mad li-ahahbiha ila allahi wa-ashbahiha bi-al-haqqi fima tara) 
God has taken responsibility in your stead for the secret [inner states 
of menj (inna allaha tawalla 'ankum al-sara'ir) and averted 
[responsibility) from you by [means of] the explicit [evidence or proofs] 
{dara ankum hi-al-bayyinaf^. '•'^  
Several fundamental points about judging {qada) emerge in 
these few sentences. The first paragraph shows that even 
judging needs its own religious-legal evaluation; it is declared 
not only permissible but a religious obligation. The second 
paragraph establishes that the qadi must strive for the divine 
truth for each case that confronts him, without being bound by 
past opinions, even his own. Truth is the ultimate precedent, to 
which one must re tam once it is revealed. 'Umar himself is 
reported to have said, "I adjudged in the matter of the 
grandfather [a much vexed issue of inheritance law] various 
judgments (qadaya), in each of which I did not desist from 
[seeking] the better."le There is no rule of precedent, stare 
decisis, in Islamic law. The third paragraph establishes that, 
just as an individual must do when he decides on his own 
actions, the judge must follow God's law, seeking to know it from 
the revelation, the Qur'an and sunna. Therefore he must be 
knowledgeable about the texts, a scholar. In perplexity, where 
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there is no clekr verse of the Qur'an or report from the Prophet, 
the judge is to use his understanding. 
According to the fourth paragraph, his understanding may 
be guided by similarities and analogies to cases he finds in the 
revelation. The outcome being sought is God's own ruling for the 
case, the judgment that is most pleasing to God, found either 
from an explicit text of revelation or through the seeker's efforts 
to determine what is closest to the revelation. Any one attempt at 
that truth may be in error, and so the qadi must strive to come 
ever closer to God's truth, according to his best judgment. In the 
fifth paragraph, the qadi learns that he is not responsible for 
attaining the perfection of the omniscient divine judge, who 
knows what occurred and knows the inner merit of the parties 
and witnesses. Rather, he may take the facts in the form proven 
and is relieved of responsibility to attain a correct judgment of 
men's secret inner states, but by this language, again, the letter 
holds out as the judge's objective to attain the true divine 
judgment of the cause. 
So far little would seem to distinguish the qadi from the 
mufti. The mufti also seeks to determine God's law for others, 
and in that sense he also is one of the instruments by which the 
legal system applies its law. What are the differences between 
147 
148 
ChaptcT-3 Judiciary System of Saudi Arabia 
the two roles? The following statement by the Hahbali" Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 751/1350) (known as Ibn al-Qayyim), Ibn 
Taymiyya's pupil and successor, introduces some of them: 
[The mufti's] fatwa states a general divine law {Shari'a Avnmd\ 
concerning both the requestor and others. As for the judge 
{hakim), his ruling (bukm) is particular and specific [juz'i khass), 
not extending to anyone but the two parties. The mufti opines in 
a ruling that is generally worded and generally applicable {hukm 
amm kuUij, that to one who does so-and-so is applicable such-
and-such, or one who says so-and-so is obliged to do such-and-
such. The qadi makes a particular judgment {qadi muayyan] 
upon a particular person, and his judgment is specific in terms 
and obligatory, while the fatwa of the scholar is general in terms 
and not obligatory, i'' 
Let us explore these differences in greater depth, 
supplementing them in a fev/ respects. First, the giving of fatwas 
{ifta) involves neither enforcement nor compulsion, even where a 
mufti is appointed or supported by the state; it is purely advice 
to the conscience, and compliance remains the responsibility of 
the requestor, not of the mufti" or the state.is The function of 
adjudicating, on the other hand, leads to the compulsion of a 
specific act; beyond that, it takes from one individual and gives 
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to another. The court is simultaneously a religious body 
constituted by Shari'a to enforce its law and an arm of secular 
power wielded to resolve disputes. Obedience to it is compulsory 
in both religious and secular terms. Even though an act may 
have had uncertain valuation before the qadi's judgment, in that 
various ulama' opined in contradictory ways on it, once the qadi 
has ruled, the act's valuation is fixed. One scholar declared that 
the qadi's judgment has the same force as if God himself had 
adjudged that unique case.i^ He states, "The qadi's judgment 
removes difference of opinion (khilaj).'"^^ The judgment is not 
thereby made religiously true. It may still be in God's eyes a 
wrong interpretation, but it provides the religious justification for 
compelling a particular action. 
A second difference between the mufti and the qadi is that 
while the mufti is concerned with facts in the internal forum of 
conscience, the qadi is only concerned with facts in the external 
forum of the court. 21 The mufti offers advice to the requestor so 
that the latter, in her internal forum, may make a righteous 
decision. The internal forum is called in Arabic the batin, 
meaning what is inward, secret, implicit, subtle, or true. 
Judging, because it deals in outer proofs and compels outer 
actions, can claim to be true only in the external forum, called 
149 
150 
Chapter-3 Judiciary System of Saudi Arabia 
the zahir, meaning what is outer, observed, explicit, gross, or 
apparent. The qadi's judgment cannot lay claim to necessary 
truth in the batin, even where the legal rule applied is certitude, 
because the secret reality of the event and the truthfulness or 
dishonesty of the parties involved may be unknown to the qadi. 
As 'Umar's letter pronounced, the qadi is not responsible for 
what only God can know, and may justifiably rely on the zahir 
evidences admitted by the law. That the qadi is thus relieved of 
responsibility does not relieve anyone else involved; each 
remains subject to the verdict of his own conscience. For that 
reason, if a participant is aware that on the facts the judgment is 
certainly false, he must not carry it out. As quoted from the 
Prophet: 
You bring me lawsuits to decide, and perhaps one of you is 
more skilled in [presenting] his plea than another, and so I judge 
in his favor according to what I hear. He to whom I give in 
judgment something that is his brother's right, let him not take 
it-for I but give him a piece of the Fire.22 
Third, the mufti gets the facts from the requestor in brief, 
abstract form, and assumes them to be true.23 Thus, despite its 
specialization as advice to conscience, the fatwa remains aloof 
from the uniqueness of circumstance where moral decisions 
150 
151 
Chapter-3 Judiciary System of Saudi Arabia 
must be made. The judge, on the other hand, must find and 
construct the legally relevant concrete facts. 
Fourth, a fatwa is usually privately requested and given to 
a single individual, while adjudication [qado!) involves the 
opposing parties, witnesses, and others, as well as the judge. 
Therefore, the fatwa is private and individual, both as to the 
mufti and as to the requestor, but the Judgment is public and 
multiple. 
Fifth, as remarked by Ibn al-Qayyim, the "fatwa states a 
general divine law concerning both the requestor and others," 
and is "generally worded and generally applicable," while the 
qadi's decision is "a particular judgment upon a particular 
person" and does not extend "to anyone but the two parties." 
Sixth, scholars discuss the relative moral weightiness of 
the qadi's and the mufti's positions, the risks each position 
entails of committing moral wrongs punishable in the hereafter. 
On the balance, the qadi's position incurs far greater moral risk 
because his decisions are binding on others. 
King's Law as Complement and Competitor to Fiqh 
Article 44. The authorities of the state shall consist of the 
judicial power, the executive power, and the regulatory (al~ 
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tarvzimiyya, nazam making) power. These powers shall cooperate 
to fulfill the tasks [of the state] in accordance ivith this and other 
laws. The King shall be the final resort (marja') of these 
authorities. 
Article 49. [TJhe courts shall have jurisdiction to decide all 
disputes and crimes. 
Article 55. The King shall undertake the governing (siyasa) 
of the nation in accordance with siyasa shar'iyya in fulfillment 
(tibqan) of the rules (ahkam) of Islam. . . . 
Article 67. The regulatory authority shall have jurisdiction to 
enact regulations (nizams) and bylaws (lawaih) in order to attain 
welfare and avoid harm in the affairs of the state, in accordance 
with the general rules (qawa'id) of the Islamic shari'a... 
—Basic Regulation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia' 24 
So far we have considered the law of the religious-legal 
scholars, the 'ulama', as legislated and applied by their muftis 
and qadis, but 'ulama' are not the only law-makers or even 
adjudicators in the Saudi kingdom. The fiqh, known from their 
ijtihad, is not the only law. Their world, apparently self-
contained, actually can exist only in symbiosis with another 
source or authority for law and its application, the king or ruler. 
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A community has the religious-legal obligation to select a 
Muslim ruler to uphold Shari'a. If this is impossible, the 
community must attempt to install its own qadi. As we see 
below, Islamic public law imposes on the ruler the responsibility 
to ensure that Shari'a is upheld in his realm, even to the point of 
declaring all other state functionaries, including qadis, his 
delegates for that purpose. Today and throughout histoiy the 
most visible of the instrumentalities that enforce the shari'a is 
the ruler. 
In Saudi Arabia the ruler is the king (malik). In other 
Islamic legal systems the ruler's appellation might be khalifa 
(successor, vicegerent), imam (leader), amir al-mu'minin 
(commander of the faithful), sultan (power), amir (commander, 
prince), luali (governor), or wali al-amr (person in authority). 
Saudi Arabia has constitutionally defined legislative and 
executive branches. At the present stage of Saudi constitutional 
development, they are still understood as extensions of the 
king's power; however, they have become indispensable and 
institutionalized. There are, however, two most-important 
influences on the formal legal system of Saudi Arabia, the king 
and the 'ulama'. 
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For our purposes we assume that Shari'a can be grasped 
and essentials by looking only at the two perspectives of ruler' 
and 'ulama', without any other actors. This is to ignore valid 
claims that can be made for other actors and laws, such as the 
activities of bureaucrats, laws of religious minorities, the tenets 
of religious trends like Sufism, or the customary laws of groups 
such as tribes, urban populations, professional guilds, or social 
classes.25 The justification for this is only that our focus is on 
understanding the formal legal system of legislation. 
The Saudi Yilama' willingly recognize that the ruler 
possesses an extensive authority to make laws. They do so as 
part of the fundamental fiqh doctrine forged by 'ulama' to 
represent and control the ruler's constitutional powers under a 
constitution of shari'a. The doctrine is siyasa shar'ryya, meaning 
siyasa in accordance with the shari'a.26 This doctrine is a 
characteristic position of Wahhabi jurists, since it is strongly 
associated with Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyiami, who played 
the major part in crystallizing the doctrine of siyasa skar'iyya 
from ancient precedents.27 Modem scholars, including Saudi 
'ulama', draw from their writings a (seemingly) simple doctrine of 
siyasa shar'iyya.28 This declares that the ruler may take any 
acts, including legislating to supplement the shari'a and creating 
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new courts, that are needed for the public good {maslaka 
'amma), provided that the shari'a is not infringed. 
Under all these formulations, siyasa shar'iyya permits the 
ruler to act directly, inspired by the public good, with no concern 
for texts except as a limit. It offers him an extremely wide scope 
of action. It excuses him of any obligation, such as those 
scholars labor under, to come to a rule solely by interpretation of 
the texts, following several methods, of which utility is one of the 
least important. In fiqh derivations by ulama, utility (maslaha) is 
employed as a make-weight when textual arguments are 
balanced or attenuated,and even then it is controversial as a 
source of law. This makes siyaso shar'iyya the virtual inverse of 
flqh as a law-making method. Notice how siyasa shar'iyya is well 
designed, with its macrocosmic focus on the utility of the actual 
society, to meet the deficiencies of an exclusively textualist, 
atomistic fiqh. Note also, however, that the role it assigns the 
ruler is hardly magnificent, resonant with the grandeur of 
caliphs of old. It invokes no grander legitimacy and law-making 
function than the securing of public good. 
Let us now see what Saudi kings have done with this 
doctrine in the legislative field. When the conquest of the Hijaz in 
1925 thrust his government into the modem legal world, King 
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Abd al-Aziz began to issue decree-laws or regulations (singular, 
nizam). The decree-laws came in two waves, the first just after 
the conquest of the Hijaz, with laws that applied only to the 
Hijaz, and the second in the 1960s and 1970s after the kingdom 
was administratively unified, with a number of modern and 
extensive laws that applied to the whole kingdom. Nizams tend 
to address modem legal problems new to the kingdom, such as 
laws for firearms, nationality, social insurance, and motor 
vehicles. For all such purposes, the king had no recourse other 
than to legislate on his own. He needed to create new legal 
institutions rapidly, and could not wait for them, or alternatives 
to them, to be developed by the ulama through meticulous 
ijtihad. 
The result is that today hundreds of nizams operate 
alongside the fiqh as a sort of subordinate system of law, 
supplementing the fiqh so that the law may confront modem 
conditions. They meet the most pressing needs of the society for 
mtacrocosmic law-making, such as defining unlawful narcotics, 
fixing rules for government procurement, setting up traffic laws, 
and organizing government entities. Their bulk on a shelf 
measures in inches rather than feet. They attempt always to 
avoid insult to fiqh. When they are being drafted, the ulama are 
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usually extensively consulted and often enjoy a veto power. 
Decree-laws have a clear subordinate status, in that, unlike 
statutes in an Anglo-American legal system, they are considered 
inferior to the common law, not superior to it. As to many of its 
rules, fiqh is more analogous to a constitution, overruling 
conflicting statute. Fiqh is also the residual law, filling gaps in 
the quite rudimentary nizams. Fiqh continues to govern the 
great bulk of cases, covering personal status, civil contract, tort, 
property, agency, and nearly all crimes apart from those that 
specifically enforce the nizams. 
In view of ail this, when we pass to consider the reaction of 
the 'ulama' to royal law-making, one certainly would expect the 
Saudi 'ulama' to favor the practice and lend the king their full 
support, yet it is a striking fact that the shari'a courts of the 
kingdom generally refuse to enforce the nizams. When 
confronted with a case arising under a nizam, the shari'a court 
judge will do as he himself thinks right. If he thinks that the 
case is governed by fiqh, he proceeds to decide it according to 
the fiqh without reference to the nizam. He thinks it a proper 
exercise of siyasa law-making. He usually dismisses the case, 
leaving it for some administrative entity to enforce. The thinking 
behind this emerges from comments by Shaykh al-Lahaydan, 
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president of the Supreme Judicial Council, who characterized all 
nizams as concerned with one or both of two things: the 
determination of certain criminal penalties {tazir) or purely 
administrative {idari) matters. In either event, in his view, it 
concerns matters of the executive branch and has nothing to do 
with the courts. If they venture beyond this, the courts properly 
should ignore them and apply the fiqh. He gave the example of 
traffic regulations: if a case concerns the misdemeanor of driving 
on the wrong side of the road, a siyasa authority may use a 
nizam to fix a penalty once guilt is established', but if the issue is 
determining retribution, compensation, or criminal guilt, then 
the shari'a courts must take charge.^9 Shaykh al-Muhanna, 
judge of the Great Shari'a Court of Riyadh, stated tliat the 
shari'a courts apply only the Qur'an and the Sunnah, not 
nizams. Nizams are the concern of the various ministries of the 
government. 
This opposition has faced the nizams from the beginning, 
forcing King 'Abd al- 'Aziz to accompany nizams with provision 
for non-qadi tribunals to enforce them, starting with a 
commercial court established in 1931. Since then, several of the 
major nizams established new tribunals to take jurisdiction of 
disputes and enforce actions arising under them. (These courts, 
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usually denominated board {hay'a) or committee (lajna), we shall 
call siyasa tribunals.) Although the classical siyasa shar'iyya 
authority clearly grants the king the exclusive authority to define 
jurisdictions and to create tribunals, yet the 'ulama' have 
opposed the creation of these tribunals and the attendant 
reduction of their owm jurisdiction. They frequently call for the 
reincorporation of the siyasa jurisdictions into the shari'a 
courts. They say, if these other tribunals do not apply shari'a, 
they should not exist; if they do apply shari'a, then why not 
abolish them and unify the courts of the country? Shaykh al-
Lahaydan declared that when siyasa tribunals apply nizams, 
they are dealing only with executive and not judicial matters and 
so are not truly courts (qada'). When they do decide other issues, 
such as commercial law, they are courts and must apply the 
fiqh, not nizams. 
Some 'ulama' came to acknowledge that the scholars' 
constitutional positions had outlived their usefulness, that the 
fiqh and its public law theory were too narrow and unrealistic, 
and that the ruler and siyasa principles had to be 
accommodated. Siyasa shar'iyya was the heading under which 
such thoughts were advanced. This theory recognized that 
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Muslim society needs , alongside fiqh, siyasa power, and even 
siyasa laws and t r ibunals . 
Ibn Taymiyya (d. 728 /1328) is peri iaps the mos t famous 
exponent of siyasa theory, and for h im it served as a vital par t of 
a m u c h larger a t tempt to revitalize the fiqh. He s t renuously 
worked to reorient the relat ionship of 'ulama' and rulers . He 
renounced the idea tha t the 'ulama' should withdraw from the 
practical domain of the shari 'a because of disdain for the state of 
the world, leaving the rulers in charge. 
According to Ibn Taymiyya: 30 
"If the sultan is isolated from the religion or the religion from the 
sultan, then the state of the people is corrupted. . . . Many of the 
people conclude that positions of command are incompatible with 
true faith and the perfection of religion. Some of them then become 
overcome by religion, and turn from even those uses of power needed 
to complete the religion. Others of them perceive [religion'sl need for 
such functions, and undertake them, abandoning the religion because 
of their conviction that it is incompatible with these duties. . . . Verily, 
the establishment of religion is by the Book of Guidance and by 
victorious iron, as God has mentioned: "Everyone must exercise 
ijtihad to unite the Qur'an and iron for God's sake and to seek what is 
within his power, asking therein the aid of God. Then the world will 
serve the religion. 
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usually denominated board (hay'a) or committee [lajna), we shall 
call siyasa tribunals.) Although the classical siyasa shar'iyya 
authority clearly grants the king the exclusive authority to define 
jurisdictions and to create tribunals, yet the 'ulama' have 
opposed the creation of these tribunals and the attendant 
reduction of their own jurisdiction. They frequently call for the 
reincorporation of the siyasa jurisdictions into the shari'a 
courts. They say, if these other tribunals do not apply shari'a, 
they should not exist; if they do apply shari'a, then why not 
abolish them and unify the courts of the country? Shaykh al-
Lahaydan declared that when siyasa tribunals apply nizams, 
they are dealing only with executive and not judicial matters and 
so are not truly courts (qada'). When they do decide other issues, 
such as commercial law, they are courts and must apply the 
fiqh, not nizams. 
Some 'ulama' came to acknowledge that the scholars' 
constitutional positions had outlived their usefulness, that the 
fiqh and its public law theory were too narrow and unrealistic, 
and that the ruler and siyasa principles had to be 
accommodated. Siyasa shar'iyya was the heading under which 
such thoughts were advanced. This theory recognized that 
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He argued that the diy textualism and the overscrupulous 
method of the fiqh had led to its stultification and its removal 
from reality, forcing events into the hands of corrupt rulers, 
whose practice would thereby never be redeemed. 
In contrast to the 'ulama' who had sought to advance 
shari'a by reducing rulers' legitimacy in the people's eyes, Ibn 
Taymiyya argued that rulers needed legitimacy for renewal and 
that 'ulama' needed greater access to power to do good. The only 
real criterion for the legitimacy of a ruler is whether he upholds 
the divine law, whether he orders the good and forbids the evil. 
To Ibn Tajoniyya, ignoring the various prerequisites for the 
legitimate ruler set by classical theory was not a grudging 
concession, but the correct fiqh rule. Since the period of the 
Righteous Caliphs, the imamate itself had never meant more 
than rulership de facto. There was no point in demanding more 
exacting qualifications in the imam than the good character of a 
witness. He asserted that there can be more than one true imam 
in an age. He denied that a single umma^i must have a single 
political leadership; upholding shari'a provides that unity.32 
Ibn Taymiyya proposed a different means to check rulers. 
He proposed a condominium of power, a cooperation {ta'aumn) 
between rulers and 'ulama'. Interpreting the Qur'anic verse 
if)! 
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enjoining obedience to God, the Prophet, and "those in authority" 
[uli al-arar), he declared, "Those in command [ulu al-amr) are of 
two types: the scholars ('ulama') and the rulers (umara'). If they 
ai"e sound, the people are sound, but if they are corrupt, the 
people are corrupt.''33 Al-Mawardi, for example, had interpreted 
the term ulu al-amr as meaning either the 'ulama' or the rulers, 
but not both.34 He chided as neglectful of their duty 'ulama' too 
fastidious to risk their piety among the temptations of power.ss 
In fact, he advocated that the principle of cooperation be applied 
broadly.36 The Muslim community can fulfill its obligations to 
God only by combining the complementary strengths of its 
members. In appointing an army commander, for instance, one 
who is evil-living but strong should be chosen over one who is 
pious but weak; the reverse rule should he followed in choosing 
a clerk.37 All have the obligation to give advice [nasihjd) to 
rulers.38 Reducing evil is a good, and drawing difficult balances 
between evil [mafsada) and good (maslaka), and between degrees 
of evil and degrees of good, is an indispensable part of enforcing 
the shari'a39 requiring one at times even to do something 
forbidden by the shari'a in order to avoid a greater evil.'^ o God 
does not demand more than mankind is capable of.'^ i 
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Ibn Taymiyya, at least as intei-preted by Ibn al-Qayyim, his 
student, advocated a reunification, in the spirit of the earliest 
Muslims, of fiqh and siyasa. Siyasa, too, and not fiqh alone, was 
part of the divine shari'a. According to his definition, shari'a 
includes "the [tenets of theology,) the siyasa of rulers and 
treasurers, the judgment of the judge, the chieftainship of the 
shaykhs,'^2 the hisha authority [a market inspector and upholder 
of public morals],"^3 etc., for all of these persons are obliged to 
rule by the revealed shari'a."'*'^ j ^n Taymiyya sought to advance 
the utility or welfare of the Muslims as a vigorous component of 
ijtihad. He asserted as a fundamental principle that utility could 
never fail to agree with ijtihad from texts, unless some error in 
appreciation either of utility or of the texts had occurred. 
Ibn al-Qayyim criticizes those who would hold that "there 
is no siyasa but what the shari'a enunciates," as rendering the 
shari'a: 
"deficient, ineffective to meet the Interests [masalih] of mankind. . . This 
is a... deficiency in their knowledge of the reality of the shari'a, and of 
the harmonization between it and the world of fact. When those in 
authority see this, and that the people's affairs will not be, put right 
without something added to what [a] group understands of the shari'a, 
then they create for themselves siyasa laws [qawanin siyasiyya) by 
which the interests of men are ordered ""^^ 
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Ibn Tayiniyya and Ibn al-Qayyim hold that, if shari'a is 
duly observed, the siyasa of rulers cannot come into conflict with 
scholarly fiqh. Against the views of al-Mawardi and others that 
rulers have a right to deviate from fiqh to achieve effective siyasa, 
they protest that such deviations are imaginary. Due siyasa and 
due fiqh must agree; if conflict between them appears, it is either 
because the fiqh is understood too narrowly or because rulers 
disregard the divine will and act unjustly [siyasa zalima). True 
siyasa (siyasa adila) is but part of the shari'a.'^s 
Ibn Taymiyya is willing to concede validity to any action of 
a ruler that met the conditions of siyasa shar'iyya, which he 
formulates as two: that the action not offends revealec^ text or 
ijma', and that on a balance it advances the general welfare. 
Ibn Taymiyya's constitutional ideas appear to have exerted 
a large but intangible influence on public affairs for centuries 
after him, easing the emergence, for example, of the wedded fiqh-
siyasa regime of the Ottomans, but their full-scale, explicit 
implementation awaited the emergence of a Wahhabi regime in 
Arabia in the 12th/ IStJti century. 
The Wahhabi states of Arabia made the first full-fledged 
attempt to enact Ibn Ta3niiiyya's program, in both politics and 
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law. Ibn Taymiyya was a major influence on the ideas of Shaykh 
Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab who set about reforming Islam, beginning in 
his homeland of Najd. After studying in Mecca, Medina, Basra, 
and elsewhere, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, in a dramatic realization of 
Ibn Taymiyya's theory, returned to Najd to find a ruler willing to 
make a compact with him and mount a jihad for Islamic reform 
in return for worldly suzerainty.'^'^ He found that ruler in the 
person of Ibn Sa'ud (1159-1179/1746-1765), the leacler of al-
Dir'iyya, a small town in Arabia. This compact, drawn up in 
1158/1745, is still the basis for Saudi Arabian legitimacy. 
The first two Sa'udi rulers were referred to as Amir, 
meaning commander, prince.'^s After them, the term imam came 
into use for the ruler, and it is applied retrospectively to the first 
two rulers. Use of the tiHe imam, implying as it does that the 
holder of the office is legitimate under the fiqh theory of the 
imamate, was properly given Wahhabi endorsement of Ibn 
Taymiyya's lenient positions as to religious suitability for that 
office. Early in the twentieth century, the imam 'Abd al-'Aziz 
began to use the term far less frequently, replacing it in 1926, by 
malik, king, for the Hijaz and then in 1932, for the entire 
country. The replacement is puzzling in some ways, since the 
term malik is religiously a pejorative for rulers who seize or 
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inherit power. The Qur'an, quoting the Queen of Sheba, 
castigates kings: "Verily, whenever kings (muluk) enter a country 
they corrupt it, and turn the noblest of its people into the most 
abject. And this is the way they (always) behave" [27:34]. 
It seems that 'Abd al-'Aziz chose' malik as his title for 
several reasons: one being that, outside the Wahhabi 
environment, to call oneself imam was to be seen as claiming a 
near-caliphal legitimacy; second, that malik translated to the 
western "king"; and third, that he succeeded the Sharif Husayn 
in the Hijaz, who had already used the title. 
The alliance begun by the Shaykh and the Amir continued 
informally after their deaths in connections between their 
families, the AI al-Shaykh (the "family of the Shaykh") and the AI 
Sa'ud. 'Ulama' who did not belong to the family of the Shaykh 
could, however, rise to the highest ranks.'^^ 
Ibn Taymiyya's principle of a condominium of power 
between 'ulama' and ruler was deliberately put into practice by 
the Wahhabis from the beginning. For example, on hearing that 
Ibn Sa'ud had been criticized publicly for irreligious acts, 
Shaykh Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab wrote a letter of rebuke to the 
complainants: 50 
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The men of religion have a duty to join people to their ruler (amir) and 
to overlook his error. . . . We have heard reports that there has occurred 
between the men of the religion and the Amir a certain roughness. This 
is something that makes religion incorrect. Religion is love for God's 
sake, and anger for God's sake. If the ruler does not make his retinue 
men of religion, then his retinue will be men of evil. The men of religion 
have a duty to join people to their ruler, and to overlook his error. This 
is required of the men of religion, who overlook the failings of their 
inler, just as the ruler overlooks their failings, and makes them his 
advisers and those of his council. There shall not be heard concerning 
them any talk of enmity. You will not see either—the men of religion or 
the ruler—worshiping God unless with his partner. 
The Wahhabis accepted in its entiretv'^  Ibn Taymiyya's principle of 
the cooperation of all toward upholding shari'a: rulers and ruled 
owe each other mutual correction. The ruler is obliged to seek, 
and his subjects to offer, religious advice {nasika).^^ The 
egalitarianism of these principles is mitigated, however, by 
another basic norm, equally emphasized by both Ibn Taymiyya 
and the Wahhabis as essential to the moral order: strict 
adherence to the classical principle of obedience to the ruler, 
even if he is a sinner, as long as he does not issue an order that 
would entail disobedience to the shari'a.52 This duty must 
moderate the exercise of nasika. A treatise by several Wahhabi 
'ulama' states: ^ 3 
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As for those sins and deviations of the leadership that do not 
entail disbelief or departure from Islam, it is obligatory to offer 
leaders advice [nasihd) in the manner provided for by shari'a. 
with gentleness and following the example of the pious forebears, 
and without, pillorying them in meetings and gatherings of the 
people. Belief that [such criticism] is the repudiation of evil-doing 
of a type and degree that requires repudiation in public is a 
glaring error and a manifest of ignorance. One who holds such a 
view does not know the corruption in religion and in this world 
that results from it. 
Henri Laoust has written that, "Of the neo-Hanbalism of 
Ibn Ta3rmiyya, Wahhabism seems always to have retained the 
principles most favorable to the power of the imam."54 The 
Walihabis emphasized the principle of obedience to the imam, 
the validity of the imamate gained through force, 55 lawfulness of 
multiplicity of imams,56 and the imam's power, in furtherance of 
public welfare to impose discretionary criminal penalties (ta'zir) 
to the degree of death.57 These positions of the 'ulama' 
corresponded to a political order in which they themselves 
possessed extraordinary powers compared with earlier Islamic 
regimes. The breadth of authority accorded the ruler reflected 
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their own security in the system, which ensured that their own 
functions would influence, and benefit from, the ruler's powers.58 
As we have seen, the Wahhabi fiqh spirit inspired by Ibn 
Taymiyya advocated ijtihad by qadis, as well as by muftis and 
other 'ulama', and rejected any submission of the independent 
fiqh conscience to the opinion of any man "whosoever he may 
be."59 The political and constitutional significance of this stance 
is now clear, in that it preserves for the 'ulama' a vital 
constitutional role in a system otherwise characterized by a 
strong and legitimate ruler. Vigorously microcosmic positions 
defend a vigorous and independent role for the 'ulama', but these 
give rise, as their inevitable concomitant or complement, to a 
vital role for the ruler in macrocosmic dimensions. Ibn 
'Taymiyya's characteristic combination of a stringently 
transcendental vision of fiqh with a pragmatic acknowledgment 
of the divine law's dependence on crude force and its bearers, 
indelibly marks Wahhabi-Saudi thinking. 
How does this conception of 'ulama'-ruler cooperation 
compare with the Ottoman legal system? In some respects the 
Ottoman and the Wahhabi legal systems are similar. Both 
endorse a condominium of power between the 'ulama' and the 
ruler, frankly acknowledge a broad scope for legitimate action by 
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the ruler, and allocate to the 'ulama' important, central functions 
within the system. Other lines of comparison, however, show 
equally great differences. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab vehemently 
opposed blind taqlid and the closing of the door of ijtihad. He 
called for a return to shari'a as the core of religious life and 
piety, coupling this with a vehement attack on Sufism, the 
prevailing chief channel elsewhere for popular religiosity. These 
Wahhabi' positions were intended, and understood by 
contemporaries, as stark rejections of the prevailing Ottoman-
sponsored legal theory and practice (many anti-Wahhabi 
polemics focused on just this point). 
Against this background Saudi Arabia stands out as a 
redoubt of the first of these three models, the bi-polar flqh and 
siyasa system, since it, never colonized at its core, claims a 
unique degree of continuity with shari'a systems of late medieval 
times. 
As a backdrop of historical memory against which Saudi 
rulers and 'ulama' interact within their legal system, the ruler-
'ulama' relationship, we now undertake detailed case studies of 
that relationship within the contemporary Saudi Arabian legal 
system. 
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There are four main arguments from traditional fiqh in 
favor of the power of a ruler to fix the laws applied by qadis. We 
spend somewhat more time on these than on the views of 
opponents, since they are less familiar. 
The first argument is that the ruler is the supreme qadi. As 
we have seen, the public law of Islam concentrates state 
functions, including adjudication, in the ijtihad-guided 
conscience of the imam. If he is qualified to act as judge and if 
practical circumstances permit it, he can if he chooses be the 
sole qadi. He can delegate ihat authority to such persons and for 
such jurisdictions as he wishes and can also remove his 
delegates. Several modern scholars argue that this proves a ruler 
may codify. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Qasim, a Saudi author of a book 
advocating codification, considers that even the traditional 
freedom of the judge to interpret the shari'a is itself a delegation 
from the naler, who now may prefer to delegate that authority to 
others, such as a legislative body.^o The late Shaykh 'All al-
Khafif, an Egyptian Azharite and law professor at the University 
of Cairo, states that the caliph always had the right to decide the 
law he would apply; he could consult the learned, but he was 
never bound by their opinion, even a majority opinion. Therefore, 
he adds: 6' 
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it is the right of the ruler that he choose from among the schools 
whatever he in conscience feels is best, and which, in his opinion and 
by his estimation, serves welfare [maslaha ). [This is] because the 
responsibility of giving judgment [al-hukm] is his ab initio {ibtida'ari) , 
qadis are his delegates and he has the right to bind them to what he 
chooses and considers best. They have no right to differ with him in 
this matter, even if their opinion is other than that he imposes on them, 
because their jurisdiction is drawn from the ruler If their judgment 
differs with what he commanded, it is void. Jurisdiction may be limited 
by time, place event or legal school. Obedience to the ruler is obligatory 
in all that is not clear sin [ma'siya). 
In carrying out this responsibility, he adds, the ruler is 
obliged neither to qualify himself as a mujtahid himself nor 
consult those who do.^^ 
The difficulty with this argument is that - speaking, as al-
Khafif does, solely within fiqh theory - rulers in Islamic history 
have not possessed the powers here invoked. First, anyone, 
whether the ruler or his delegate, who is to apply the shari'a 
does so, not by consulting the ruler's command, but by either 
ijtihad or taqlid within fiqh. Even the Righteous Caliphs are not 
accorded papal powers allowing them, to declare what shari'a is, 
and even they chose not to overrule or constrain the ijtihad of 
others. Only in legal matters that fiqh does not cover, whether 
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from lack of revealed texts or from lack of 'ulama' interest, 
power, or opportunity, and that are not at issue here, was the 
ruler permitted to impose legislation of his own making. Second, 
if his power is instead understood as choosing one fiqh opinion 
among others and making it binding on judges, all schools would 
deny him this power. Fiqh is clear that the qadi is dependent on 
the ruler, not for the substance of the law applied, but only for 
appointment to office, and with it a defined jurisdiction and 
official status, salary, the police to enforce his judgments, and so 
forth. Therefore, considered in traditional terms, this argument 
carries little weight. 
The second argument is that the shari'a itself holds that all 
Muslims owe obedience and loyalty to their ruler, as long as he 
does not command them to perform a clear sin [ma'siya), 
meaning an act categorically prohibited by the shari'a. If a ruler 
commands his qadi, even a mujtabid one, to apply a particular 
fiqh rule not in conflict with the shari'a, should not the qadi 
obey? In any case, should the qadi in practicing his ijtihad not 
consider the command of the ruler as a weighty factor in his 
consideration, ordinarily outweighing any other proof? A qadi, 
even a mujtahid, who neglects that to which his ijtihad leads to 
follow a code "would not be judging by other than the truth, 
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because what is ordered by the ruler is a truth also, it being a 
shari'a ruling. . .. [The ruler) knows where utility {maslaha) lies 
because of his continual practice (tamar-rus) of siyasa shar'iyya 
and ordering affairs under it"." 
Opponents answer this by pointing to the fiqh doctrine, 
claimed as ijma' as mentioned above, that prohibits a ruler from 
binding a qadi to a particular school. If the argument employed 
here were valid, it would have been discussed, indeed enjoyed 
pride of place, in the medieval debate on that doctrine. 
The final two arguments based respectively on siyasa 
shar'iyya and maslaha or utility are closely related and are the 
core of the case for codification. 
Siyasa shar'iyya is the general criterion for the legitimacy of 
any action by the ruler not otherwise dictated by the shari'a. 
Proponents of codification argue that the king may order any 
action as long as it offers no conflict with an indisputable 
provision {nass) of the shari'a. By employing this particular 
version of the siyasa shar'iyya constraint on a ruler's power, they 
put forward the most permissive notion of law-mxaking possible. 
This broader notion, moreover, permits going further, toward 
replacing usul fiqh altogether as the determinant of laws or 
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adjudication, even in areas that traditionally were covered by 
fiqh. In other words, on its face it could permit legislation that 
not merely "complements" fiqh rules (as nizams are said to do in 
Saudi Arabia), but supplants them with something new. 
Opponents respond, in essence if not in so many words, 
that siyasa shar'iyya by definition may make laws only in areas 
where it complements, or supplements, fiqh and its methods, not 
where it would compete with them. We saw how Saudi 'ulama' 
acknowledge nizams as valid only if they are administrative or 
penal in nature, and consider even such nizams ill-suited for (or 
beneath the dignity of) the shari'a courts, to enforce. In other 
words, opponents of codification, as to the issue of qadi court 
application of nizams, apply the most restrictive test for siyasa 
shar'iyya legislation: that of no conflict with any fiqh provision at 
all, or in, other words, no trifling at all with matters already 
governed by fiqh rules. Their position reflects Saudi Arabia's 
highly fiqh-oriented approach to the fiqh/ siyasa hierarchy. 
The fourth and final argument, from maslaha, is the most 
fundamental argument for codification possible within classical 
fiqh doctrine. Utility is the basis for law making under siyasa 
shar'iyya, the previous heading, but is also seen as a source of 
law within fiqh. 
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Groups agree that the codification as a form oi law-making 
occupies a lower order of legitimacy than ijtihad itself. This is a 
constant; 'ulama' throughout the ages, obliged to compromise 
with macrocosmic methods whether in fiqh or siyasa, have 
turned to relative de-legitimization as the key mechanism to 
preserve an ijtihad ideal, which might otherwise be swept away. 
The difference between the groups may be whether, in this 
particular occasion, compromise is needed, or whether it can be 
controlled once it is launched. Going further, proponents may 
even see in codification a way, like school, taqlid, the chief-
judgeship or other hierarchical control of qadis in the past, for 
'ulama' elites to gain power over qadi judgments and the 
direction of fiqh. 
In any event, supporters of codification seem to believe 
that, even if codification does mean sacrificing much of the 
higher legitimacy of law in shari'a courts and much of the piety 
of the qadi function, they ensure that elite 'ulama' dominate the 
drafting of codes. The result would be a net long-term gain for 
the 'ulama' and the fiqh. After all, it has always been the elite 
alone who enjoy the freedom of ijtihad and the responsibility to 
treat vidth the ruler. 
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The historical record does not support any optimism that 
codification would enhance, or even maintain, the legislative role 
of the 'ulama', collectively or individually. Since western 
influence began and the idea of codification spread, no similar 
accommodations on the part of the 'ulama' have realized such 
hopes. 65 
As part of their call for unification of the system, both 
groups of 'ulama' seem to expect greater involvement by 'ulama' 
in the future of Saudi Arabia's legal system than the 'ulama' 
enjoy even now. 
Taken as a whole, will the 'ulama' responses to the 
challenge of codification be adequate to deflect the forces 
pushing for it? Their present stance, dominated by simple 
opposition, seems more likely to result in either codification on 
the dreaded civil-law model, assigning 'ulama' only an advisory 
role, or a stagnating status quo. Is there an alternative for a 
reconciliation acceptable even to opponents? There are in fact 
many, but all do impose costs in terms of change in 'ulama' 
habits of mind, if not their beliefs. All of them involve deploying a 
great deal of legal creativity, enriched by comparative legal 
knowledge, along the lines perceptively advocated by Dr. al-
Nafisa. 
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To give one encompassing example, one can imagine a 
successful model evolving from the following elements: 
- as to the judicial system: strong and independent judges, educated 
chiefly in fiqh but also in nizams and positive law, who, applying both 
nizams and fiqh, assert a broad delegation to interpret the law, and, 
by also asserting a discretion to do justice case-by-case, maintain live 
connections vidth the law's ultimate ethical, textual roots 
- as to the substantive content of laws: continued reliance on both 
Hanbali fiqh and nizams, supplemented as to fiqh by fatwas emerging 
from a massive effort at group ijtihad, these fatwas circulated to 
judges as presumptively, but not conclusively, binding 
- as to the legislative process: in siyasa matters, continuation of the 
present system, but disciplined now by pogt-hoc shari'a court review 
for conformity with constitutional siyasa shar'iyya limits; and in fiqh 
matters, new procedures for conducting ijtihad by direct collaboration 
between fatwa and judicial authorities, disciplined now by concern for 
fiqh's interaction with nizams and by new procedures for consultation 
with siyasa legislative bodies. 
Such a system would demand little profound change in 
fiqh principles of legitimization. It has, however, the resulting 
drawback that, while it perhaps reconciles the two halves of the 
legal system, it does not integrate or unite them. Is there yet 
another way, which would accomplish integration? Again, there 
are many such v^ays —but all demanding not just changes of 
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habit of the 'ulama, but partial renunciation of the fiqh/siyasa 
dichotomy and much that goes with it. They demand radical 
shifts from traditional usul al-fiqh toward new sources of 
legitimacy, or more accurately, primordial legitimacies that at 
first sustained siyasa, but have long since been sidelined and 
diminished by fiqh. 
These other legitimacies draw on the many relatively 
macrocosmic conceptions that spring, in their ultimate root, 
from the conception of the umma or the Muslim community. For 
example, ideals of justice and equality could be invoked to 
advocate codification as a means to advance due process and the 
equal protection of the laws, and to quell corruption and false 
privilege. Conceptions such as nasiha (advice toward doing good, 
including advice to the ruler), bay'a (a contract of loyalty 
between ruler and subject), and ijma' (in a scaled-down, 
relativized sense of consensus among authoritative persons, 
perhaps members of an institution), and most importantly, 
shura (consultation) could be combined to construct a more 
compelling, more highly legitimated, theory of codification than 
one relying merely on maslaha. Such theories, in passing the 
confines of medieval usul al-fiqh, emerge into constitutional and 
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political thought, or usul al-hukm. Indeed, they tend to combine 
the two usul together, in new constructs. 
Such new constructs are gaining ground slowly throughout 
the Muslim world, and will become increasingly a part of the 
Saudi debate over codification. The petition of the 'ulama' to the 
king in 1991 reflects them to an extraordinary extent, in its 
demands not only for a Consultative Council {majlis al-shura), 
but for suppression of official corruption, favoritism, abuse of 
influence and incompetence, and its praise for equality, 
economic justice, defense of rights, freedom for restraint, and 
human dignity. The king's 1992 decision to create a Consultative 
Council gives institutional form to the most emphatic of these 
emerging ideals, consultation. Although many Saudis were 
disappointed with the concept of the new Council when unveiled, 
judging it against the legislatures of democratic states, its 
adoption indubitably plants a seed, and experience since its 
founding indicates that it is evolving and its power is slowly 
growing. If this Council continues to develop, or as other 
smaller-scale or even private experiments in governance gain 
strength, then demands for law-making may be aroused that the 
'ulama' may find more difficult to reject and may wish to make 
common cause with. After all, the 'ulama' do wish to remain the 
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protectors of the ideal interests of their people. Then alone would 
the prospects for a real solution to the problem of codification 
drastically change.66 
On the Saudi legal system, the study shows how the 
system has achieved and maintains high degree of doctrinal 
consistency and justifiability, according to the fiqh conception 
endorsed by its 'ulama'. Many old habits and institutions have 
changed to suit modem conditions, without the 'ulama' yet 
losing their balance. Still, evolution in fiqh and 'ulama' 
conceptions and institutions has not kept pace witli extremely 
rapid economic and material change and with attendant less 
rapid but still breath-taking economic, social, cultural, and 
political shifts. Even after these events, Saudi Arabia remains 
deeply patient and postpones any deliberate change that has not 
gained wide consensus, particularly among the elder generation 
in every sphere. As our study showed several times, the country 
is willing to pay a very high price in material terms for slowing 
even desperately needed reforms when these reforms implicate 
publicly or privately held values. Patience and consensus being 
such pervasive norms, it becomes difficult to discern where they 
are being unfairly exploited by elites to preserve their influence 
or privilege. 
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Establishment 'ulama' may not be aware, convinced of the 
eternal validity of their law, how much inadvertent social change 
has already undercut their influence and institutions, and 
reduced their share of social meaning. Merchants demand new 
commercial laws. World Trade Organization membership looms. 
Common religious thought and feeling also move (satellite dishes 
pose an even graver threat). On the fringes their attention is 
riveted on the West with ever more radical rejection or embrace. 
As a result of all this, if reforms are too long delayed because of 
the religious and political sensitivities surrounding official 
shari'a, when change comes it may come very suddenly. 
As always in Saudi Arabia, the vital sign to watch is the 
transition to the next generation, who inherit the country after 
its half-centuiy of rapid transformation. As senior elite 'ulama' 
pass from the scene, will the next generation secure greater 
virtue in change or in remaining resolute? 
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The Constitutional Reforms 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has been governed without a 
written constitution since its unification in 1932. In fact, the 
term constitution, Dustur, is not commonly used among the 
Saudi population. The Saudi monarchy believes that only the 
Qur'an could be called a constitution. 
The various constitutional instruments that were enacted 
during the formative time of the Kingdom were only limited to 
the Hija^i region during the early days of its amalgamation with 
rest of the Saudi domain. These constitutional instruments were 
undertaken as an attempt to cope with the new realities of the 
more developed region of Hijaz. Their potential growth and 
evolution in controlling a broad range of areas, however, were 
halted several times, until they finally disappeared in the early 
nineteen thirties. These various constitutional instruments 
include the Consultative Council, the Fundamental Instructions 
of the Kingdom of Hijaz, and the Council of Deputies. A few 
remarks regarding tiiese faded instruments, especially the 
Fundamental Institutions and the Consultative Council, are 
essential at this stage to pave the way for a comprehensive 
understanding of the newly promulgated constitutional package 
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of 1992. The new Saudi constitution is notably based on 
elements from these previous constitutional documents. ^ 
Constitutional Reforms 
In 1901, when Abdul Aziz returned to his fatherland, the 
Najd consisted of scattered, independent tribes and villages, 
each ruled by an Amir /governor/ tribal Shayldi. The ruler's 
primary duty was to ensure the survival and well being of his 
constituents through wise leadership, in consultation with its 
senior members. Leadership in the Najd was necessarily informal 
and mobile, and the Majlis (council) was the only institution of 
any importance, which provided the forum for all important 
debates on decisions affecting the welfare of the tribe, legal 
disputes, and social contracts, such as marriages. It held its 
meetings wherever the governor happened to be. The leader 
combined the roles of a mayor, judge and general, as war was as 
much a part of daily Hfe as peace. The elders of the leading clans 
and the Ulama carried the most weights, but everyone could 
participate in the discussions, provide suggestions, raise 
objections, or make personal complaints, and arbitrary decisions 
by the ruler were not tolerated. Expected to seek the wise 
counsel of his kinsmen, the Shaykh usually approached 
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decisions on the basis of a consensus, but once a course of 
action was agreed upon his orders had to be obeyed. 2 
In the early years of his campaign to unify the Najd, Abdul 
Aziz did not need to establish a government in the western 
sense, relying on traditional patterns, v/hich adjusted the 
expansion of his domain. He placed loyal governors in charge of 
provinces and dealt directly with the tribal and village notables, 
as the paramount, meeting with them as often as required in a 
Majlis, intending to gather information and advice. The mobile 
Majlis thus served both his own needs and the needs of his 
constituents. 
Abdul Aziz inherited Sherif Husain's administrative systemi 
and a sophisticated government machinery when Abdul Aziz 
conquered the Hijaz in 1924. The next major step in the 
administration of the Hijaz came when a Constituent Assembly 
composed of eight elected and five appointed members was 
charged with writing a constitution for the Hijaz, and the 
resultant "Basic InstrLictions for the Hijaz" was published in 
September 1926. This constitutional document resulted in the 
establishment of a consultative council (Majlis al-Shura) for the 
Hijaz, and a number of city and village councils. ^  
9,-! 
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After further amendment of the Basic Instructions, the 
consultative council was constituted in July 1927, with four 
members chosen in consultation with prominent members of the 
community, another four appointed by the government, and the 
viceroy as Chairman. Its mandate was to account for reviewing 
budgetary questions, new projects and other economic matters, 
and the enactment of laws and statutes. Further changes, rooted 
out a year later, included the stipulations on consulting 
community members for some appointments and the necessity 
of including the Najdis after a year. Its size was increased to 20 
members in 1952, and 25 in 1955. This consultative council was 
not designed as a "democratic" institution in the western sense, 
it was directly responsible to the King and the viceroy as an 
appointed body. 
A consultative council was accepted for Mecca in 1925, 
vwth representatives of the religious leadership (Ulama), notables 
and merchants, each electing delegates to the 15-member 
council. It was substituted six months later by a broader council 
vidth two members representing the ulama, one member 
representing the merchants, and 12 members each representing 
a different quarter of the city; another three members were 
selected by the King. Similar councils were announced for the 
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Hijazi cities of al-Madina, Jeddah, al-Taif and Yanbu, and these 
councils, together with key tribal Sheikhs, were to elect the 
members of a General Consultative Council.'' 
The successors of King Abdul Aziz assured their people a 
Representative Assembly. In fact, eveiy time the King or the 
regime as a whole was afraid of a legitimacy crisis, it was met 
with the promise of a Shura.s 
King Saud declared his intention of promulgating a new 
constitution and a Shura. In 1962, when Faisal constituted a 
new government, he proclaimed a 10-point program as the major 
task before him. One of the points referred to the previous 
attempts pf forming a consultative council and promised people 
that he would satisfy their aspiration in this regard. King Khalid 
also applied the same promise to his people. All these promises 
TmallY maiterialized when King Fahd declared a set of 
constitutional reforms on March 1, 1992, which among other 
constitutional measures intended to set up a 60 member Majlis 
al-Shura (consultative council). King Fahd increased the 
membership of the Majlis to 90 in 1997, and again to 120 in 
2001. 
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Constitutional Reforms of 1992 
Saudi Arabia has been an Islamic absolute monarchy wit±i 
a closed political setup since its inception in 1932. The 
institutions and processes of western liberal democracy show-
anathema to the Saudi political establishment. The political 
process in Saudi Arabia has been a family enterprise and Saudi 
Kings have proven to be "total rulers". Saudi rulers have opposed 
calls for democratic change and have declared that Quran as the 
constitution and that Shari'a must be the guiding principle of 
the state. On March 1, 1992, King Fahd ordered a package of 
constitutional reforms, which showed major changes in the 
state's organic institutions. The package was made up of three 
separate documents and was enacted in three separate royal 
decrees: [1] a Basic System of Rules; [2] a statute covering the 
establishment of a Consultative Council within six months; and 
[3] a statute requiring administrative devolution, vidth regional 
assemblies v^dthin one year. The package also possessed several 
permanently entrenched fundamental rights and freedom. Thus, 
a set of general guidelines outlining the powers and limits on the 
government and the sights and obligations of the citizens was 
issued for the first time.^ These three statutes were intended to 
reestablish the basis for government and regulate political 
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participation through the establishment of the consultative 
council and regional governments The Basic System of Rules, 
however, remains subordinate to the official constitution of 
Saudi Arabia, the Shari'a, despite the move towards political 
modernization. 
Background of the Reform 
The need for a constitution towards the working of the 
government was realized from the initial unification of the 
Kingdom to cope with the emerging political and economic 
problems. A constitution and the establishment of a Consultative 
Council were first introduced during the rule of King Abdul Aziz. 
King Saud, in his strLiggle for power with his younger brother 
Prince Faisal and to appease the democratic princes led by 
Prince Talal, revived the proposal of adopting a constitution.^ He 
assured several steps towards a democratic and constitutional 
government. But King Saud finally lost the throne owing to the 
determined effort of Prince Faisal who succeeded him in 
November 1964. As the Vrime Minister in 1962, Faisal declared a 
ten-point program, and determined to promulgate a fundamental 
law. With the assumption of throne in 1964, Faisal framed a 
constitutional committee composed of several members from the 
Council of Ministers to draft a constitution. King Faisal declared 
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a resurrection of the old Consultative Council as part of his 
reform package announced in November 1962. ^ King Faisal did 
not, however, try to involve the ordinary people in the process of 
constitutional reform. ^^  The pressure on the committee to 
produce its report was simplified, and by 1967, with no threat to 
Faisal's rule, the promise never materialized. 
King Khalid in the wake of the attempted 1979 Mecca 
mosque take-over by opponents of the regime broached the idea 
of creating a consultative council and assured to promulgate a 
basic law. The siege of the Grand Mosque cleared a degree of 
popular unease in Saudi Arabia. Although the royal family kept a 
firm grip on power, there was misinterpretation wdth the royal 
family's conspicuous consumptions and privileges. An eight-
member committee under the chairmanship of Prince Naif, 
Minister of the Interior, was appointed in March 1980 to draft a 
200-article "System of Rule" based on Islamic principles.^i The 
committee revived the earlier constitutional committee that had 
been formed by King Faisal during the 1960s power struggle 
among the royal family. 
King Fahd confessed the promise to enact a constitution 
and constructed a National Assembly Complex in 1984. Though 
the government appeared serious about the need to respond to 
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the increasing demands for constitutional reforms, the King was 
not inclined in promulgating a constitution until the very last 
moment. '2 Thus the announcement of the constitutional reforms 
by King Fahd in March 1992, showed the end of politicking that 
the Saudi rulers had devoted themselves to vis-a-vis the people, 
on the sensitive issue of injecting elements of democracy and 
political pluralism into an otherwise confined political setup.^3 
Reasons for the Announcement of the Reforms 
Many factors have contributed to the decision of the King to 
introduce reforms in the confined political setup. Both domestic 
and external events made the King [eel that the time was ripe to 
declare the reforais. The reforms targeted at satisfying the 
existing dissent among the people, as well giving further 
credence and legitimacy to the rule of the House of Saud. The 
following may be summarized up as some of the reasons that 
directed the announcement of the reforms. 
The most significant factor was the economic growth as a 
result of the oil boom in the country. This has changed a highly 
illiterate, traditional society into a wealthy, urbanized and 
educated one and effectively incorporated the masses into a 
political society. Saudi Arabia's demographic profile is a unique 
one. According to the World Development Report 1993, in 1991, 
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43 percent of total population was below 14 years of age and 
54.7 percent was in the 15-64 years age group. The report 
supposes that by the year 2025, the total population below 14 
years of age will fall to 34.8 percent, and that the percentage of 
the 15-64 age group will rise up to 59.6 percent. Saudi Arabia's 
demographic structure (i.e., smaiiness and youthfulness of the 
population), heavy presence ol expatriates, and massive socio-
economic growth has put the leadership on the spot. The new 
generation of well-informed and well-traveled Saudis has been 
irritated by what they have seen as the incompetence of the 
government in convincing mounting problems, and they have 
shown a greater say in the nanning of their nation, i^  
The internal policies of Saudi Arabia and its stability have 
been seen as concerns of the international community at large. 
The Muslim world avails the opportunity for Haj (which is for 
more than two million pilgrims armually), and western as well as 
other oil-consuming countries of t±>e world are dependent on its 
oil. These factors have confined the country's internal stability of 
paramount Importance, and the paling establishment has been 
encouraged if not pressured by iis edlies among the western 
nations to reform its outdated system so as to be in line with the 
new international order, i^  
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The growing assertiveness of the Saudi middle class for 
political change arose because the people had been saturated by 
the empty promises made by their rulers, i^  In April 1991, several 
key Saudi figures including 43 intellectuals and businessmen 
posted an open letter to King Fahd, urging him to initiate steps 
tov/ards political reforms, including the following: establishment 
of national and municipal councils; changes in the activities of 
Mutaween (Religious Police); changes in the field of human 
rights; establishment of a rule-making representative assembly; 
creation of political parties; and freedom of the press, expression 
etc. Immediately, the Saudi Ulama was energized with their own 
brand of memorandum for Islamic reforms. In May 1991, a 
group of 500 religious scholars demonstrated a petition to King 
Fahd, which among other things called for a consultative 
council, greater Islamization, fundamental changes in the army, 
equitable distribution of resources, radical judicial reforms, and 
opposition to pacts and treaties with the west. 
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which overthrew the 
Shah, sent Shockwaves throughout the Gulf. The Islamic 
revolution in Iran expressed a direct challenge to Saudi 
legitimacy, as AyatoUah Khomeini declared monarchy to be an 
un-Islamic form of government and invoked Saudi citizens to 
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rebel against their government.''^ The Khomeini-led popular 
upsurge in Iran posed a serious challenge to the Gulf 
Sheikdoms. The Ayatollah openly discussed exporting his brand 
of Islam to halt the unpopular and anti-people monarchical 
systems operating in the oil-rich Gulf states. As far as Saudi 
Arabia was concerned, the sensational seizure of the Mecca 
Mosque was a timely warning bell to awaken the Saud dynasty.'^ 
Faced with a threat of regime instability, the King once again 
availed shelter under the oft-repeated, yet never implemented 
proposal of sharing power with the people through the creation 
of a Majlis. 
Drawing on its considerable political and economic resources, 
the Saudi leadership has consistently acknowledged that it has 
pursued domestic policies in support of modernization and 
development, with an emphasis on cooperation, negotiation and 
compromise that is consistent with the Quran. Nonetheless, the 
royal family has been resistant to criticism and threats to its 
political legitimacy. Opponents of the regime, whether secular or 
religious, complain that the oil wealth has been used to enrich 
the Saudi family more than the country as a whole, that the 
government is corrupt, and that the refusal of the House of Saud 
to share power is non-Islamic. There is also dissatisfaction 
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among some with the close ties between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States. i9 
In the wake of 1990-91 Kuwait crisis, the struggle for 
democracy and people's participation in the decision-making 
process received serious momentum. The Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait expressed a serious challenge to the very existence and 
territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was 
both a military and political challenge to Saudi Arabia, as 
Saddam Hussain branded the Saudis as traitors to Arabism and 
Islam, like Khomeini, before him, urged Saudis to overthrow the 
monarchy.20 Many citizens stared questioning the wisdom of 
King's policy. The realization that people should have a role in 
policy-making and control over the way the country is run, 
gained momentum. This was especially so with the country's 
growing educated middle class. The expression to western 
educational system convinced the younger generation about the 
necessity of a more democratic and open political system in 
Saudi Arabia. This section of the Saudi society got further 
credence and legitimacy when the Kingdom played host to the 
two-day Kuwaiti people's conference. The central theme of the 
conference rotated around the strategy to Liberate Kuwait and to 
revive parliamentary democracy in the liberated Kuwait. The 
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implication was serious when the Kuwaitis explained the policy 
of sharing power with their rulers, in the veiy heart of the 
Kingdom where the Saudis cannot do the same. 21 
Further, the arrival and stationing of thousands of non-
Muslim US-led allied troops on Saudi soil during the Gulf War, 
obtained the wrath of the strong and influential religious 
establishment. The sight of US women soldiers, with shorts and 
jewelry, driving around Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province must 
have come as a shocking humiliation to the self-proclaimed 
protectors of the Quran and Islam. They too desired changes 
within the existing system. 
Features of the Reform Package 
The following are the important components of the reform 
package declared by King Fahd on March 1, 1992. 
I) Monarchy 
The Basic System of Rules explains the system of 
government as a Monarchy and institutes a new system of 
succession to the throne. It calls for the formation of an Electoral 
College made up of Abdul Aziz's brothers and grandsons to name 
a successor. The King, however, possesses the right to dismiss 
the Crown Prince and name someone else at an>lime. The King 
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selects heir apparent and relieves him of his duties by royal 
order.22 The heir apparent is to orient his lime to his duties as 
an heir apparent and to whatever missions the King entrusts 
him with; also, the heir apparent takes ovsr the powers of the 
King on the death of the King until the act of allegiance has been 
removed. 
The Basic Law does not mention any limitations 
constraining the King's execution of his prerogative as the 'final 
resoit. ' The Basic Law provides full discretion to the King in the 
times of national crises. The King possesses the absolute power 
to defend the country from an external force that threatens tiie 
safety of the nation or its institutions.23 The King also possesses 
the power to unilaterally amend the Basic l^aw, and to suspend 
the Basic Law at the time of war. Even lor the judiciary, the 
King, as the commander of the faithful, serves as the highest 
court of appeal and source of pardon. Thus, the King is the point 
of reference, and the final authority for all of the state's power. 
2) The Executive 
The executive power of the country is vested in the King. 
The Basic System of Rules orders that the King carries out the 
legitimate policy of the nation in accordance with the provisions 
of Islam, and that he oversees the implementation of the Islamic 
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Shari'a, the system of government, the state's general policies, 
and the protection and defense of the countiy.24 In this task, he 
is supported in carrying out his duties by the Council of 
Ministers of which he is the chairman.25 With regard to the 
executive organization, the Basic System of Rules constructs a 
hierarchical system: the national government represented in the 
Council of Ministers, and the local governments of various 
regions of the kingdom with their own regional councils. These 
local governments are subordinate to the national government 
and accountable to the Minister of Interior. 
The Council of Ministers is responsible for laying down the 
policy of the state with respect to internal and foreign affairs, 
finance, the economy, education, defense and all public affairs, 
and to oversee the execution thereof. The Council of Ministers 
has regulatory, executive, and administrative authorities. It is 
the ultimate authority for financial affairs and for all matters 
concerned with various ministries of the state and other 
governmental departments, and it clears what measures should 
be taken in these matters. Treaties and international agreements 
would not be considered effective until approved by the council. 
The decisions of the Council of Ministers are final except for 
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those which need the issuing of a royal decree or order, in 
accordance with the Council regulations. 
The new Provincial System, covered in the constitutional 
package of 1992 calls for the reorganization of the local 
governments around the country, and lays down several 
regulations influencing the governorship. The new regulation 
does not differ a great deal from the previous ones. They are, in 
fact, a slightly modified revision of the previous Provincial 
Regulation of 1963.26 The Kingdom is parted into regional units. 
Each I'egion is parted into a number of goveinorates, controlled 
by a governor. The govemorate is further divided into districts. 
Each district is controlled by a director, appointed by a decision 
of the Minister of Interior and defined on a recommendation by 
the Amir of the region. The districts are further divided into 
centers, each with a chairman who is appointed by a decision of 
the Amir of the region based on the recommendation of the 
governor of the govemorate. The division of these regions and 
their subunits are to explain the demographic, geographical, and 
security considerations, environmental conditions, and 
communications. The regulation grants the governors and the 
local council extensive autonomy in deciding the priorities of 
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spending and development plans affecting their region. The 
governor remains answerable directly to the King. 
3) The Legislature 
The Basic System of Rules arranges for the establishment 
of a Consultative Council. The Consultative Council lays down 
regulations and motions to meet the interests of the state or 
remove what is bad in its affairs, in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari'a. It debates government policies and presents draft 
regulations to the King. The council shows opinions on the 
general policy of the state, which will be referred to it by the 
Council of Ministers. Ten members of the council have the 
authority to propose a new draft law or amendment of, an 
executive law and submit it to the chairman of the Consultative 
Council. 
In particular, the Consultative Council can do the 
following: 
a) explain the general plan of economic and social development, 
and express an opinion on it, 
b) study international laws, charters, treaties, agreements and 
concessions, and provide appropriate suggestions regarding 
them, 
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c) predict t±ie regulations, 
d) explain the annual reports submitted by ministries and other 
government bodies and make appropriate suggestions regarding 
them, and 
e) question the ministers and other government officials. 7^ 
All of these functions had previously been commanded by 
the exclusive monopoly of the Council of Ministers. The 
introduction of the Consultative Council, however, entails an 
adjustment of government functions. Article 56 of the Basic 
System of Rules invites the Council of Ministers to amend its 
statutes in order to align with "the provisions of this and other 
laws," which simply means that the Council of Ministers' power 
over legislative functions is to be decreased. According to the 
constitution of the Consultative Council, the government's 
actions have to be rectified by it; those not rectified will be 
transferred back to the King. Additionally, Article 69 of the Basic 
System of rules provides provision for joint meetings between the 
Consultative Council and the Council of Ministers, and for 
summoning and calling on non-governmental officials to explain 
whatever matters the King fixes. In addition to its basic role as a 
'regulatoty' body participating in a formal legislative process (the 
consultative process), the Consultative Council is activated as a 
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watchdog over the government, and argues government policies -
both executive as well as legislative. It is empowered to disagree 
with and even disappoint the executives (the Council of 
Ministers). 28 
4) The Judiciary 
The Basic System of Rules apparently reaffirms the 
independence of judiciary in rigid terms. It proclaims that the 
courts are not dependent and further implores judges to be 
governed only by the Islamic Shari'a. Accordingly, Article 46 
orders that there is no command over judges in dispensation of 
their judgements except in the case of Islamic Shari'a. Some of 
the usual constitutional protections of judicial independence 
including protection against abolition of tenure and similar 
apprehensions, i.e., a reduction of salary, are not specifically 
explained.29 Safeguards on the appointment and removal of 
judges are generally included. Article 52 of the Basic System of 
Rules forms the Council of the Grand Ulama to act as Higher 
Council of Justice, responsible only io present the appointment, 
promotion, and dismissal of judges. Such recommendations are 
held by royal decree. Additionally, the Higher Council of Justice 
guides the work of the courts. 
215 
216 
Chapter-4 The Constitutional Reforms 
5) The Bill of Rights 
Since the legal system of Saudi Arabia is dependent on the 
Islamic Shari'a law, rights and liberties need not necessarily 
have been enumerated in the constitution, as they are already 
implicitly secured by the Islamic law. Nevertheless, the 
constitution does in fact spell out selected constitutional rights 
for ordinary citizens. These incorporate freedom from arbitrary 
arrests, punishment and search. There can be no fine without 
due legal process. No person can be arrested, jailed or have his 
actions restricted except under the law.^o 
Article 37 states that private homes cannot be searched 
except in accordance with the law. The Basic System of Rules 
also restricts the rights of the government to spy on its citizens 
and guarantees the privacy of posts and telecommunications. 
They cannot be confiscated, delayed or published.^i The right to 
take action in the court is also guaranteed on an equal basis for 
the citizens as well as the non-citizens residing in the country. 
The state guarantees the rights of the citizen in case of 
emergency and social security for its disabled and old citizens. 
According to the Basic System of Rules, the state saves freedom 
of private property and its sanctity. iVo one is to be stripped of 
his property except when it serves the public interest. 
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Drawbacks of the Reforms 
The kind of system that the new constitution proposes 
suffers from numerous drawbacks. 
1. The King remains constant as an authoritarian as 
before. The Basic System of Rules only shows the powers of the 
King in a formal and written form. The new reform doesn't 
precisely explain the distribution of power between the branches 
of government administration. It nonetheless reforms a 
horizontal as well as a vertical division of authority v^thin the 
workings of the government. The horizontal division is drawn by 
Article 44 of the Basic System of Rules, which shows that the 
authorities of the state (judicial, executive 85 regulatory) are 
subordinate to the King; these three authorities are to cooperate 
with one another. The vertical division of power can be exhibited 
in the regional constitution, with its semi-autonomy for the 
dozen major urban areas. 
2. The Consultative Council law establishes no consensus 
or majority rule. In fact, the consultation requirement does not 
impose any real restraint on the King's power.32 The King 
possesses the exclusive right to nominate the chairman and the 
council members, and their rights and duties are framed by 
royal decree. Again, the powers of the council are severely 
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confined. It is a regulatory body, which can only explain and 
predict the reports, and can advise, without any real legislative 
powers. 
3. The problem with the Bill of Rights is not what it 
declares, but what it does not say.33 it is confined and 
incomplete. The Basic Law doesn't provide for freedom of 
religion. Aversion to western religious freedom concept is 
evidenced throughout the Kingdom's history.S'^ Although Saudi 
Arabia is signatory to the Genocide convention, the Slavery 
Convention, and the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition 
of Slavery, Saudi Arabia did not vote for the Universal 
Declafation of Human Rights on December 10, 1948, charging 
that the Declaration's freedom of religion clause violated Islamic 
tenets. 
4. Though there are a few progressive reforms in the 
private sphere, the Basic Law confines rights in the public 
realm.35 For example, there is no freedom of speech or 
expression guaranteed in the Basic Law. Nor does the Basic Law 
explain for freedom of the press. Instead, Article 39 stipulates 
that "the information publication media should define 
themselves in a courteous manner and abide by the regulations 
of the state". All actions that lead to sedition and disunity or 
218 
219 
Chapter-4 The Constitutional Reforms 
undermine the state's seciirity and public relations or insult the 
dignity and rights of the people are strictly prohibited. Foreign 
and local publications are subjected to pre-distribution 
censorship. 
5. The Basic System of Rules is silent with regard to court 
organization, and, the hierarchical system. It also contain no 
usual constitutional protections of judicial independence, 
including protection against termination of tenure and a 
reduction of salary.36 Also, nothing is defined of the extent of 
judicial power to recheck the actions of the government.^'^ 
6. Protecting rights in the private sphere while curtailing 
them in the public sphere shows a desire on behalf of the King 
and the drafters of the Basic Law to extend rights to the Saudi 
individual in the context of conducting his private life, but not to 
extend rights, such as freedom of speech, which may be utilized 
in a public manner to undermine the govemment.^s It is this 
private/public distinction which most clearly differs in Saudi 
Arabia's approach to civil and human rights from that of other 
nations. 
7. The Basic Law is pseudo-projected on the status of the 
royal family. No mention is made of any special legal status of 
members of the royal family. Also no explicit statement that the 
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royal family members will be subject to the same legal and 
judicial processes as commonness was not excluded either.39 
8. Saudi Arabia's approach to political asylum conflicts 
sharply with established international principles. Whereas most 
states base political asylum on the demand of the asylum seeker, 
Saudi Arabia bases political asylum on Saudi "public interest." 
Article 42 of the Basic Law stipulates that "the state provides 
political asylum if the public interest needs it and the 
regulations and international agreements will define the 
procedures pertaining to the extradition of the criminals, "^ o 
The presentation of a written constitution with other 
constitutional institutions is unprecedented in the history of 
Saudi Arabia. These political innovations did not, of course, 
present an end to tlie authoritarian political rule in Saudi 
Arabia. They certainly did, however, launched a process of 
responses which raised hopes among the Saudis that these 
measures could be understood as a precedent for further 
political development in the future. Compared to the western 
experiences, these are unnoticeable democratic innovations, and 
they certainly launched a process of responding to the demands 
for a share in the political decision-making process.'^i 
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The long-awaited constitution that was declared in March 
1992, has undoubtedly marked a beginning of a new era in 
Saudi law and politics. Although the royal family was always 
hesitant to promulgate a constitution (as according to them the 
Quran is the constitution of the country), the promulgation of 
the Basic System of Rules, a statute for the establishment of a 
consultative council as well as the regional statute, has been 
effectively declared to be the country's first written constitution. 
General Reflections 
The long-awaited constitution that was announced in 
March 1992 has undoubtedly marked the beginning of a new era 
in Saudi law and politics, and it may well break significant new 
ground in substantive Islamic constitutional legal terms. 
Although the royal family was always hesitant to promulgate a 
constitution, and all along it had maintained that the 
Constitution of Saudi Arabia is the Qur'an, the promulgation of 
the basic System of Rules, a statute for the establishment of a 
Consultative Council as well as a Regional Statute, has been 
effectively amounted to be the first written constitution of the 
country. "^^ 
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The Political Implications of the Reform 
Generally speaking, constitutionalism is not democracy; 
however, an improvement in the mechanisms of 
constitutionalism could lead to a form of democracy. A rising 
influx of unmet expectations will begin to surface, and will 
certainly erode loyalty to the regime if no wider popular 
participation and collective responsibility of the members of 
society are introduced to satisfy the wide expectation and the 
new reality. The reform has started, but the pace is yet to be 
determined. "^^ 
The introduction of formal constitutional change in 
Saudi Arabia was the result of continued foreign and domestic 
challenges. Such challenges did much to inspire the new reform 
and speed up its materialization. The continued foreign 
challenges, i.e., Iranian revolution and later the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, disrupted not only the relative internal security that the 
Saudis have enjoyed but also threatened their very national 
existence. Such events enhanced the growth of a new breed of 
Saudi fundamentalists, who have become increasingly concerned 
about the westernization of the society. They are highly critical of 
the ruling establishment on domestic and foreign issues. 
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All in all, Saudi internal stability has been and will 
remain influenced by developments elsewhere. This fact partially 
explains the sensitivity of the present formal political change, 
which entails a softening ol ties with the religious establishment. 
It has come into effect during a time when the Islamists are 
gaining popularity, not only inside the country but also 
throughout the Middle East. These Islamic revivalists have a 
greater access to a large audience through the Friday khutba, 
public speech, weekly meetings for public seminars, and most 
importantly, the usage of audiocassette tapes. Therefore the 
religious establishment is the only entity inside the country that 
relatively retains the quasi-independent base of power and 
influence from that of the royal family's. The point here is that 
the 'Ulama' remains very much, as it always has been, reserved 
to the classical knowledge of Islam. With the new emerging 
realities, the religious establishment now has been subjected to 
new stresses related to the demands of the changing 
environment, for there is no other group adequately trained in 
Islam capable of appljdng traditional knowledge to contemporary 
problems. 
It is widely believed that the reform was partially designed 
to curb the religious consen/atives and their noticeably 
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increasing power in recent times. In general, the reform came 
following the presence of foreign troops, the defeat of Saddam 
Hussain of Iraq with his appeal to fight the infidels, and the 
popular denunciation of laxity. When it was introduced, the 
reform carried many elements that will certainly contribute to 
the weakening of the religious establishment. 
Internal disturbances and power struggles, as a result of 
the challenge of emerging power to the royal family, have taken 
place in Saudi Arabia ever since its very existence. Historically, 
the religious ulama and the royal family have been in constant 
tension.'*^ Cases in point include the following: the 1920s Radio 
85 Telegram dispute between the religious zealots and the royal 
family;45 the 1929 Ikhwan revolt against the Monarch; in the 
1960s, the succession rivalry amongst the royal family and the 
religious establishment, the issue of the opening of girls' schools 
which provoked the ulama to protest,'^^ the riots and the protest 
of some of the ulama at the transmitting of TV signals, 
culminating in the unsuccessful armed attack on the TV station 
at Riyadh'^ '^  (that resulted in the killing of their leader, Prince 
Khalid Ibn Musaid Ibn Abd al-Aziz, whose brother Faisal 
assassinated King Faisal in 1975, in revenge; and lastiy, the late 
1979 takeover of the Grand Mosque by some fundamentalists. 
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None of these religious clashes, however, raised the question of 
the legitimacy of the royal family, except in the two cases when 
the religious opposition came from a religious-tribal alliance, i.e., 
the Ikhwan revolution of 1929 and the taking-over of the holy 
mosque in 1979. 
Generally, the Saudi royal family is facing two competing 
parties within the informal political establishment. They are the 
secular liberal, essentially materialistic elements, concerned with 
conspicuous consumption on one hand, and the religious 
conservatives who still adhere to the strict' application of the 
Shari'a, on the other. The royal family shows signs of being 
skeptical of the ulama, and continues to make efforts to keep 
them as distant as possible from politics. Eventually, the gap 
between the two groups has been growing vvdder and deeper. 
While religion was the unifying force in the early Saudi State, it 
is now increasingly becoming an element of division. The royal 
family, standing at the apex of this setting, has done little to 
enhance the cohesion between these two groups. 
The reform is indeed far-reaching for both religious 
fundamentalists and the growing liberal middle class. This came 
in effort to reconcile two different and opposing views within the 
Saudi society, and to bring the Islamic elements under greater 
225 
226 
Chupter-4 The Constitutional Reforms 
control. As a consequence, the reform will almost certainly lead 
to a more open conflict between the royal family and the religious 
establishment on the other hand. ^^ The conflict will indeed open 
the door to greater change. 
As internal pressure mounts, loyalty among the three 
groups, i.e. the religious, the liberal and the royal family, is 
intense. Nevertheless, the royal family realizes the necessity to 
improve its political conduct if it is to continue its dominant 
traditional role. Thus the royal family increasingly realizes that 
inclusion of commoners in decision-making Would malce a large 
spectrum of the society feel they have a stake in the existing 
system and its continuity. The various petitions and 
memorandums requesting a reform in the system and the 
promulgation of the constitution vividly illustrate that political 
life in Saudi Arabia, which has been dominated exclusively by 
the royal family in the last century, is creeping towards 
emancipation. 
Indeed, the constitutional reform has made visible the 
monarchy's cautious political move to the side of the liberal 
intelligentsia of the society, instead of its usual and traditional 
reconciliation with the religious establishment whenever the 
royal family faced difficulties. This move signaled the start of an 
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expansion of the bases of the Saudi political system to include 
other "progressive" forces — that is, the representatives of the 
growing educated-middle class and technocrats. The link 
between the royal family derives considerable moral and political 
influence from its alliance with the religious establishment, and 
the political strength of the House of Al-Saud is still tied to its 
religious role. A balance favoring different representatives of 
society will be the detriment of the religious establishment's 
share of power. This share will not be surrendered passively, and 
may upset the internal balance of the political establishment 
altogether. 
Because of the shift in the continuity of the monarchy's 
religious policy, it seems that the leadership has a dual 
emphasis. On one hand, the monarchy is in direct opposition to 
Islamic revivalists. On the other hand, the liberal progressive 
force has its own agenda. These progressive groups uphold the 
beliefs of some form of popular sovereignty and that the right to 
legislate rests with the people's authorized representatives. This 
view may come into contest with the explicit monopoly of power 
of the throne. 
As this suggests, the constitutional reform inevitably raises 
many issues, and embraces changes in the way in which the 
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government operates and in the power structure of the state. The 
fact that a constitution was promulgated is a recognition of the 
need for political change, and thus, the constitution will 
certainly over time transform the political culture of Saudi 
society. '^^ 
It is hard to measure with any precision the extent to 
which people look at the royal family as a separate entity from 
government in general, or view the government as simply a few 
looking out for themselves, unconcerned with the benefit of all of 
the people. Nevertheless, and broadly speaking, a number of 
different developments could influence significantly the course of 
constitutional development into a democratic form. A significant 
factor in this development is the prospective role of women in the 
society. The constitutional reform did not mention the status of 
Saudi women as it would have stimulated a widespread religious 
reaction. 
Similarly if the government suggested a reform in women's 
rights, it could ignite a significant religious opposition, in 
particular, by affecting the views among the traditional ulama. 
This potential conflict was managed during the women's 
demonstration of November 1990, by yielding to the position of 
the Ulama when the Ministry of the Interior made the ban 
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official. The ulama's protest, however, did not go as far as 
questioning the legitimacy of the royal family and their conduct. 
This may be attributed to the speedy response of the regime. 
Similar issues, nonetheless, are bound to happen and contention 
will certainly arise again with a different contour but with the 
same issue involved - the role and freedom of women in Saudi 
society. 
Another prospective development is the possibility of a 
further escalation in external hostility to the Kingdom as was the 
case with Iraq, for the Kingdom is surrounded by several 
neighboring states who have shown hostility from time to time. 
Embarking on hostilities may put pressure on the government to 
side with the religious establishment. Religion would certainly be 
used as a vehicle to express the unity and integrity of the nation. 
The Gulf crisis was embarrassing for the Saudi royal family on a 
number of counts, chief among them is the exposure of the 
weakness of the militaiy machine, which has been consuming 
half of Saudi oil revenue till the last two decades, and the 
outright criticism of the Saudi's alliance vwth Western powers, 
among not only the Islamists but also the liberals. The huge 
American military presence is unlikely to escape resentment 
from even v^dthin the Saudi military establishment itself. 
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Involvement of the military within Saudi polities (inspired by 
religious establishment or even by a faction^o within the royal 
family) may jeopardize the unity essential to the constitutional 
process. 
In addition, internal strife among the members oi the royal 
family themselves may drastically change the course of 
constitutional development. The criteria of selecting a King from 
among the five hundred or more princes will, undoubtedly, 
involve many factors, of which the existing institutions, i.e.. 
Council of Ministers and the yet to be established Consultative 
Council would contribute to, and may influence, the choice of 
the future King by ratifying his inauguration as well as 
confirming the selection of his successor. It is likely that the next 
King would determine the distribution of power more forcefully 
by strengthening the role of some institutions. The indigenous 
conflict within the ruling family might arise. So far the royal 
family has demonstrated its capacity for unity and solidarity. 
This mutual interest of the royal family has been realized among 
all its members; however, the explicitly stated monopoly of the 
throne by only two percent of the members of the royal family 
(the sons of the late King Abd al-Aziz and their grandsons) may 
end the capacity of the royal family to unify.si 
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The Legal Implications of the Reform 
While the reform does not abruptly alter the long 
established legal traditions and customs of the Kingdom, it 
carries with it the seeds of more and broader legal change. The 
introduction of new institutions within the government 
structure, together with the reformation of the state's judicial 
councils, i.e., the Council of Higher Justice, and the Board of 
Grievances, will certainly affect the traditional long-established 
legal system by its categorization of the state's authority. 
The contest between the authority of the executive and the 
authority of the judiciary in many basic and essential issues 
such as human rights would promote the evolution of legal 
norms within Saudi Arabia. It is likely to encourage the judiciary 
to play an active role in defining applicable legal norms such as 
human rights in the shari'a. Furthermore, the Basic System of 
Rules indicates in Articles 45 and 51, the law will define the 
composition or the Council of Higher Justice, including the 
methods of deliverance of fatwas and their functions. Presently 
the fatwa is issued by the religious institution of the Council of 
Higher Justice.^i 
The establishment of a legislative institution with its 
predicted impact on the legal norms, as denoted in constant 
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repetition of the term Nizam (meaning non-religious law) in the 
Basic System of Rules, will have an obvious contribution to 
providing legal framework of the judiciaiy. The Council's 
legislation will gradually guide and direct the legal process of 
Saudi civil society. With this in mind, the Consultative Council 
will certainly plan a prominent role in promoting the role of, and 
respect for, the law, and direct the political process into legal 
channels. The opportunity for the people to be directly involved 
within the working of the government for the resolution of the 
existing economic, political and legal problems will undoubtedly 
influence the legal development of Saudi Arabia. 
Moreover, the establishment of the Consultative Council 
implies the transfer of legislative power from the Council of 
Minister to the Consultative Council (Article 56). A delicate 
balance between the Council of Ministers and the Consultative 
Council, therefore, will have to be maintained. The division of 
function, though vaguely defined, would provide the framework 
in which power is physically symbolized. The visibility of division 
may prove to be a useful tool in restraining the arbitrary exercise 
of power by the state and in limiting the administrative power in 
relation to the citizens' rights. 
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The transference of legislative power to the Consultative 
Council together with the process of reforming the Supreme 
Judicial Council will certainly cause an institutional tension, but 
may well clarify the power division lines. The process is risky, 
but if handled cautiously, it may generate a mechanism of 
checks and balances of political administration. The prospective 
legislative body will, indeed, prove to be the starting point in 
widening the juridical basis of authority beyond the shari'a, 
which has been hitherto solely administered by the religious 
Ulama. 
The general analysis indicates that it is apparent that the 
government of the royal family no longer has the uncontested 
legitimacy that it used to enjoy. The constitutional reform of 
1992 was thus enacted and the political development is 
proceeding. The pace, however, is yet to be determined.52 
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Conclusion 
To study Saudi polity in relation to Shari'a has been the 
focus of the thesis and an attempt has made to analyze the same 
in the preceding chapters. There has also been an endeavor to 
look into the workings of the Saudi political system whether it 
functions according to the rule of shari'a or not. The Saudi royal 
family has consolidated a Saudi national identity by resorting to 
effective use of religion as an additional attribute for the 
legitimacy of the ruling dynasty. 
In Muslim history, relations between state and religion 
were introduced in two ways; (a) the resources and apparatus of 
the state were used to promote Islam as in the time of the 
Prophet and the first four khalifas; and (b) Islam was mobilized 
to protect the state. Saudi Arabia is a modem manifestation of 
the latter. 
Political participation in the secular Western sense is 
mostly absent in the West Asian region, and this is also true of 
Saudi Arabia. As far as the Saudi royal family and its rule is 
concerned, religion has provided a major and almost exclusive 
source for legitimacy. At the secondary level, it is the tribal 
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allegiance to the royal family that has sustained it for almost 
eighty years. It has also been argued that the promotion of 
national identity has been an official, as well as a practical 
policy. It reflects the regime's endeavor to enhance its position 
and legitimacy. This sought out identity is based primarily on 
strict observance of Islam, and on loyalty to the House of Saud. 
Saudi Arabia is a state, but not a nation in the strict sense 
of the term. Islam being its source of legitimacy, the nation is 
more outside the state boundaries of Saudi Arabia than inside it. 
This concept that Saudi Arabia's collective identity is part of the 
nation is frequently and repeatedly underlined by the regime's 
spokesmen. 
Therefore, religion (primarily the Wahhabi version of Sunni 
Islam) has played a prominent role not only in molding the 
individual's private and collective identity but also in 
consolidating his national values. 
The Saudi constitution is the Qur'an, and the Shari'a is the 
source of its laws. Even the Basic Law of Government [al-ruzam 
al-asasi li'l hukm), issued in 1992, stressed their supremacy. 
Moreover, in order to underline that there is no other mundane 
source of legislation, the use of terms such as qanun (law) and 
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musharri' (legislator) are practically forbidden as they imply 
Western-style statutory enactment. They are substituted by 
nizam (regulation) and marsum (decree), which are supposed to 
complement the Skari'a and not take its place. 
While nationalism, usually associated with modernization 
and secularization, preaches the love of society and state and 
promotes loyalty to them, in Saudi Arabia religious faith and 
loyalty to the ruling family are still predominant components of 
the collective identity. These two elements were identified as 
early as the 1920s by King 'Abd al-'Aziz (commonly known as Ibn 
Saud), founder of the present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, who was 
quoted as sa5dng, "Two things are essential to our State and our 
people... religion and the rights inherited from our fathers." 
Almost 70 years later, his son King Fahd expressed more or less 
the same views. 
The House of Saud achieved substantial power owing to a 
bond with a religious harbinger. The supreme position the 
dynasty has enjoyed in the Arabian Peninsula for two and a half 
centuries arises from the facilitative acumen with which 
members of the Al Saud family utilize religion as a unifying 
instrument and as a source of political legitimacy for their rule. 
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The Wahhabi doctrine (derived from the Hanbali school of 
Sunni Islam) was first preached in Najd in central Arabia in the 
1740s by a native Muslim scholar, Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-
Wahhab. The school he founded was later named after him. He 
called for the reinstatement of exactly the same religious, social 
and political customs that had been practiced by Prophet 
MuhamiTiad and his followers, namely adherence to the Qur'an 
and the sunna as the only sources for religious conduct, and the 
rejection of any new element or concept introduced into Islam 
thereafter (those were branded as bida). The most important 
Wahhabi tenet was tawhid, the oneness of God. Not only is God 
omnipotent. He is the one and only who is such. No person or 
object possesses divine traits, and so no one and nothing can or 
should mediate between a human being and God. The use of 
such an intermediary was considered shirk (polytheism, 
idolatry). 
These were not merely theoretical theological rulings. They 
had considerable impact on daily life, because the cult of holy 
places (i.e., objects mediating between man and God) was 
common and widespread then in central Arabia. Muhammad Ibn 
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'Abd al-Wahhab's call for the destruction of such places shook 
the prevailing religious and social order in Najd. 
Leaders of the local sedentary communities regarded him 
as a menace to peace and stability' as well as a threat to their 
own authority. He was expelled kom several places and his life 
was threatened. The cooperation between Muhammad Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab and Muhammad Ibn Saud yielded two interrelated 
occurrences: the establishment of the Al Saud dynasty as the 
political masters of most the Arabian Peninsula and the 
simultaneous spread of Wahhabism and its installation as the 
predominant Islamic school in those same territories. 
That bond between urnara and ulama (statesmen and 
divines) marks the modem inception of the use of religion as an 
instrument for both consolidating a collective identity and 
legitimizing the ruling family. It served the interests of the two 
parties, in the spirit of the political vmting of Ibn Taymiyya. This 
scholar, whose most stringent interpretation of the teachings of 
Ibn Hanbal (founder of the most orthodox of the four Islamic 
schools) was adopted by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, held 
that religion and state are indissolubly linked. Without the 
coercive power of the state, religion is in danger, and on the 
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other hand, without the shari'a the state becomes a tyrannical 
organization. 
The insertion of the religious component (in the new, 
dynamic, version) not only facilitated continuous military 
victories over neighboring tribes and nearby settlements, it 
created a sort of a nascent Najdi territorialism. Cooperation 
between the Book and the Sword helped to unify the whole area 
and transformed the authority of dozens of local rulers into a 
comprehensive supra-local and supra-tribal structure. Under 
Wahhabi-Saudi rule, the first indications (particularly among the 
sedentary population) of loyalty to the 'state' or to the ruler 
appeared, which enjoyed a certain consensus. It did not, as 
before, have to be constantly kept alive by military victories or to 
be enforced by coercion, and it even survived occasional defeats. 
The same alliance also prevailed in the second Saudi state of the 
nineteenth centuiy and in the current kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The cooperation between Muhammad Ibn Saud and 
Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab gave rise to a state structure 
that embraced the entire Peninsula. All forms of Islamic rites 
(and of course non-Islamic, mainly pagan) were violently 
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suppressed and replaced by Wahhabi tenets. The Saudi domain 
was actually a Wahhabi state. 
Twenty years after the first Saudi-Wahhabi state was 
destroyed by a powerful foreign invader (Muhammad Ali of Egypt 
in the early nineteenth centuiy), it was again revived. This 
resurrection was possible owing to the tremendous will for 
political survival of Muhammad Ibn Saud's descendants and to 
the vigor of religious fervor. Wahhabism still existed as a factor 
that allied the Najdi population with the Saudi dynasty. 
The second Saudi-Wahhabi state fell again, this time at the 
hands of a neighboring Amir, a former vassal of the Saudis and a 
practicing Wahhabi himself. 
The formation of third and present Saudi state at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, and its trials and tribulations 
on the way to its crystallization as a nation-state, have been 
accompanied by a continuing religio-political partnership. 
Religion continued to serve as an instrument of expansion 
and control; nevertheless, the king's endeavors for modernization 
and nation building brought to the surface an imminent conflict 
between state and religion. The technical innovations he 
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introduced, such as motor vehicles and communications, 
essential for consolidating his authority and implementing his 
political aim^s, were prescribed by religion as bida'. 'Abd al-'Aziz 
had to mobilize his ulama to legalize them. These religious 
leaders, who formerly had been responsible for encouraging and 
strengthening the Islamic faith in the spirit of the 
uncompromising Wahhabism, were now required to function as 
state appointees and to check manifestations of religious 
realism. They had to explain and justify secular reforms and 
changes, against which they used to preach constantly in 
Islamic terms. It is no wonder that some zealous Muslims, whose 
religious ardor until then had been fostered by the same ulama, 
questioned their religious authority and defied their rulings. A 
rift between Islamic revivalism on the one hand and the 
institutionalized religion and the state on the other, was 
inevitable. 
In the late 1920s, this rift indeed turned into a violent 
conflict between the 'state' and the ikhwan. The state does not 
tolerate an autonomous religious domain that may compete with 
it for the loyalty of the citizens. Hence, the state has not shifted 
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to become more Islamic, but Islam has been used as an 
instrument to help the state. 
Promoting Islam as a state religion means, in the first 
place, bestowing a prestigious, favorable status on the religious 
establishment. It is, however, a state establishment, whose 
power and authority derive from the state, i.e. the ruling family, 
whose decrees and directives regulate its activity. The Saudi 
ulama occupy a prominent position within the state's political 
elite, unparalleled in any state in the contemporary Sunni 
Muslim World. The muftis, the most distinguished members of 
the religious hierarchy, particulaiiy enjoy power and authority 
never dreamed of by their peers in other Muslim countries. 
The authority of the muftis has been honored and 
respected by the Saudi kings as the former provided the latter 
with the sanction of fatwa (legal opinion) as an endorsement for 
their own rulings, especially whenever delicate or controversial 
issues were at stake. 
The dominance of the ulama over religious affairs (and the 
importance of religious affairs in daily life) does not imply that 
they encourage conservatism or radical tendencies. Occasionally 
the opposite has been the case. Since the discovery of oil and 
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particularly since tJie beginning of its commercial production at 
the Second World War, one of the state's major challenges has 
been the problem of defining, articulating and promoting Islamic 
ideas in such a way that they are also compatible with solving 
the practical needs of the population. In other words, the 
government had to build a bridge between traditional religious 
values and the reality of a modem developing nation-state. The 
ulama, being a tool of government, were to constitute this bridge. 
In late 1970s an external observer claimed that the Saudis had 
found the golden path and that Saudi Arabia demonstrates that 
a very broad commitment to revivalist ideas can be maintained 
even among a modernizing technocratic elite. On the other hand, 
family members of well-known ulama acquired secular higher-
education in the West, and persons of religious background were 
in charge of ministries outside the ulama's traditional domains. 
'Religio-secular powers', as a Saudi scholar put it, 'have always 
had interplaying roles in the building of the Kingdom.' Tension, 
nevertheless, between traditional and modem forces within the 
state bureaucracy seem unavoidable. 
The 'ulama have been a part of a mechanism, working inter 
alia, to defuse fanaticism and to check religious radicalism. One 
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of the vehicles used by the state to negotiate such problems is 
judicial reform. The reform initiated by the ruling dynasty was 
designed to adapt the normative and institutional system of a 
puritanical theocracy to the conditions of a state and society 
coping with the challenges of the modem era. In other words, 
Wahhabism has been moderated and tempered, apparently in a 
legitimate way, by its own authorized representatives. 
The state has diminished the ability of the 'ulama to 
supervise effectively the implementation of the shari'a, public 
morality, and religious indoctrination. The developments of the 
oil economy and the intensive goverimiental activity have 
extended the state's jurisdiction to many areas hitherto regulate 
and directed by the religious establishment. The administration, 
as indicated, has become more Westernized, and the number of 
graduates of British and American universities (including many 
PhDs) has risen greatly at all levels, from cabinet members to 
rank-and-file civil servants. The state has practically deprived 
the ulama of their exclusive position in the judicial system and 
the legal interpretation through modernization of the system and 
the induction of decrees and regulation extraneous to the 
Shari'a. As early as the 1950s, the 'ulama's role was confined to 
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the interpretation of the civil and criminal aspects of the shari'a 
laws. Moreover, courts other than skar'i tribunals have also been 
established. 
In the 1970s, the Ministry of Justice was formed, and in 
1971, a Supreme Judicial Council (sometimes called, the 
Council of the Senior Ulama). The Minister of Justice inherited 
the authority of the Grand Mufti and Chief Justice, who had died 
in 1969. While the latter, a member of the Al Sheikh family, was 
not accountable to anybody and his religious rulings as a mufti 
were final, the Minister, even being a sJiar'i qadi, was subject to 
the government and the king. The formation of the Council of the 
Senior Ulama still signifies the state's control of its religious 
establishment. Formerly, this council, a part of the state 
bureaucracy, was in charge of interpretations of the shari'a and 
of the provision of religious sanction for the executive's rulings. 
The trend of containing and even weakening the 
institutional power of the ulama intensified in the 1990s (in a 
wave of anti-government criticism) with the reorganization of the 
Council of the Senior Ulama in 1992, its major reshuffle in 1995, 
and the formation of the new Consultative Assembly [majlis al 
shura) in 1992-3. 
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Saudi sources maintained that these moves were designed 
to introduce into the system younger scholars,' with a more 
progressive outlook on relations between religion and 
modernization of the nation, replacing older ulama with 
uncompromisingly conservative views. 
The House of Saud has often argued for the loyalty of its 
subjects, citing its prestige among the Bedouin tribes, its 
success in pacifying much of the peninsula, and its ability (in 
recent decades) to distribute material rewards among its 
followers. Yet its capacity to command assent rests on its 
maintenance of the alliance formed by its founder with 
Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab in the 1740s. Religion still 
remains its main basis for its legitimacy together with the tribal 
dynastic factor. That the king derives his power and authority 
from those sources is reflected in his official titles: he is not 
merely the king of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, but also imam 
al-wahhabiya and skaykh al-maskayikh (Chief of the [tribal] 
chiefs). 
Since the regime in question is a ruling family, a dynasty, 
legitimacy is particularly important. It is not an ideology or a 
political system, which has to be justified, but the right of 
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certain individuals to reign, merely by virtue of their being bom 
into a certain family and by enjoying the support of certain tribal 
chieftains. As long as this right is not put to the test of 
democratic institutions such as a referendum or general 
elections, only religion can sanction it. The Saudi perception of 
the comprehensiveness of Islamic law, and the teaching that the 
shari'a governs all, including the king, has rescued the 
monarchy from charges of absolutism and theocracy. Adherence 
to Islamic laws and traditions may check demands for the 
introduction of a democratic political system, since such a 
system can be branded as bid'a. Saudi rulers have indeed 
explained that Western-style democracy or free elections 'does 
not suit us in this region' as it is 'not part of Islamic ideology.' 
The use of religious arguments to defy democratic institutions 
implies that the ruling house enjoys Islamic legitimacy 
One of the salient aspects of Saudi territorialism has been 
the dual center of the country: Najd and Hijaz. The former is the 
homeland of the royal dynasty and the area where its religious 
and political authority have been preserved, except for short 
intervals, during most of the last two and a half centuries. The 
latter is the birthplace of the Prophet, the cradle of Islam and the 
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site of its holiest shrines. Hence, the dual center principle 
reflects the two most imporiiant elements of the national identity, 
as the House of Saud perceives it. 
The promotion of religion as part of Saudi national values 
is, inter alia, the response by the regime to dangers and 
challenges of Islamic and non-Islamic factors. The recent threat 
by extra-establishment Islamic groups enhances the bond 
between the ulama (as representatives of state religion) and the 
House of Saud, as the former assist the latter in the creation of 
national common denominators. 
Nevertheless, since religious faith has been cultivated as an 
integral part of their entity and identity for more than 200 years, 
many Saudis, one may assume, will continue to adhere to their 
religious belief even without being encouraged to do so by the 
state. For their sake and for the sake of their loyalty and 
support, the status of Islam and even of Wahhabism as a state 
religion is likely to be preserved. Moreover, one of the regime's 
major challenges is how to achieve and guarantee a state 
monopoly over religious affairs and to prevent, or at least 
contain, the emergence of and public support for Islamic purist 
and other extreme anti-establishment Muslim groups. 
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In the near future, this challenge is liable to preoccupy the 
royal family more than any other internal threat to its reign. 
Islamic opposition groups not only blame the monarchy for 
religious laxity, but they are also the vemguard of reproof for 
what they call the corrupted despotic autocracy of the House of 
Saud, demanding democratization (Islamic-style) and more 
personal freedoms. The royal family has come to realize that 
Islam applied to legitimize a political system is, as Madawi al-
Rasheed has suggested, a double-edged sword. It invites 
opposition groups to debate the degree to which Islam has been 
incorporated into politics. The contemporary Islamic oppositions 
that contest the legitimacy of the monarchy are using the same 
rhetoric employed by the royal family to legitimize the monarchy. 
Shifting the focus from Islam as the source of legitimacy of the 
ruling family to Islam as the source of the uniqueness of the 
Saudi nation is the regime's line of defense against the 
aforementioned challenges. 
Contentious politics in general and social movements with 
Islamist lineages, in particular, are a significant part of the 
landscape of the contemporary West Asian region. The Saudi 
case is especially interesting because Islamist movements, even 
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under the constraints of an authoritarian political system, have 
been able to forge effective, amorphous underground networks 
throughout the country. We have only begun to debate what 
political dissent inside Saudi Arabia might mean for the future of 
the country and its ruling family, the al-Saud. A start is to 
understand the historical context's inner workings and the 
impact of the Islamist movem.ent in Saudi Arabia. 
Islamists do not work in a vacuum, but are intimately tied 
to the fabric of communal, regional, and economic networks. 
Islamists, however, have clearly been the most articulate and 
powerful of the various social forces in Saudi Arabia. They are 
better organized and more cohesive than other social forces in 
representing their interests to the state. Even though people 
disagree on strategy and the ultimate goat of opposition 
movements, they do concur on grievances and particularly on 
the call for regularity and predictability. In effect. Islamists 
express the grievances of many people. 
Contentious voices also resonate because the exclusionary 
structure of governance does not reflect the diversity of the 
population. Contrary to popular images, Saudi Arabia is not a 
homogeneous country in ethnicity, religion, or ideology. The 
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variety of Muslim practices include Wahhabi orthodoxy, 
mainstream Sunni calls for reform of the state, minority Shia 
communities, Sufi practices throughout the Hejaz, and most 
importantly, a Sunni Salafi opposition movement (the Salafi -
believers who adhere to the ways of their pious ancestors, the 
companions of the prophet, are the most powerful voice in Saudi 
Arabia today). In religious, political, social, and economic affairs, 
inclusion must be practiced. The sprawling religious 
bureaucracy must be reformed to incorporate the religious 
diversity of the country, rather than only, the muwahhidun. 
Likewise, political positions from the local to the national level 
must allow for the inclusion of diverse ethnic identities, regions, 
and ideological voices. Reform of the political and religious 
institutions would promote greater tolerance in Saudi society. 
In economic matters, the domestic economy must, as the 
ruling family well knows, be more diverse, private, and local. The 
overwhelming dependence on foreign labor creates economic and 
political problems. The private sector must be simultaneously 
nourished and confronted, that is, it must be given protection, 
particularly in the face of the World Trade Organization-
mandated direct foreign investment, but it must also hire (more 
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expensive) Saudi labor. The ruling family has long postponed a 
confrontation with the private sector because new expectations 
mus t be reciprocal: if it were to hire more expensive labor, then 
the private sector will in turn insist on transparency in the 
awarding of contracts, representation in politics, and limits on 
princely activity in the commercial realm. 
Portrayals of internal politics as contests between United 
States-allied "moderates" and puritanical Wahhabis are grossly 
oversimplified. So too is a menu that offers two stark choices: an 
absolute monarchy tiding toward the West or a revolutionary 
Islamist regime hostile to the West. Internal contests and choices 
are more complex than that. 
The depth of royal coercion has meant that other voices 
have not been allowed to flourish. Today, there is not a viable 
alternative to the ruling family that could unite the disparate 
parts of the country, perhaps enhancing bin Laden's pull 
artificially. 
What many Saudi Arabians are talking about constitutes 
neither full con,pedt.ve democracy nor absolute t^onarchy. 
r r " ' ™'^ ^ ' — - ' ^^ - e 01-W. The challenge 
before Crown Prince Abdullah is ton 
^«^-toprotnotedo„,esticrefon„that 
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incorporates the diversity of the population. His strong 
nationalist voice can be used to counter the power of the radical 
movement. The v^ dde middle ground between a revolutionary bin 
Laden and an authoritarian ruling family cries out for 
cultivation. 
The bad news is that serious structural reforms are 
necessary in Saudi Arabia. The good news, however, is that 
Abdullah has the capability and the personal legitimacy to 
initiate such change. He must protect his close relationships 
with other branches of the ruling family, particularly, the sons of 
King Faisal and of King Saud. He must preserve a working 
relationship with the seven brothers who comprise the al-Fahd 
branch, even though they contest his nile. Abdullah is, however, 
78 years old; he must work quickly and with sensitivity. It is not 
clear that other high-ranking members of the family carry the 
same weight in diverse quarters of Saudi society as does 
Abdullah. The ordinary Saudis now at least have permission to 
engage in a national conversation about their future. 
Demands for reform arose internally and were effective, 
e.g., the formation of the MAJLIS AL-SHURA in response to 
demands by the Ulama after the Gulf war of 1990. The conflict 
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between the anti-establishment younger generation and pro-
establishment older generation and among the Ulama has 
heightened political consciousness in Saudi society. The 
formation of the CDLR [Lajnath ad-Difa 'anl-Huqooq al-Shar'iah: 
Committee for the Defiance of Legitimate Rights) and its wide 
acceptance in Saudi society are an indication of this awareness. 
Unlike other countries in the Middle East, a political party has 
never come into existence in Saudi Arabia. 
Mashwara (consultation) is one of the three most 
important principles of Islam, the other two being Ijtihad (logical 
reasoning to deduce a rule where no precedent exists) and Ijma 
(consensus of th© community). The Shura is a process by which 
the major issues of the state, domestic and foreign, are examined 
and political decisions are made. It is a joint political effort on an 
impersonal and informal basis shared by the head of the state 
and distinguished leaders of the community. These notables are 
known as ahl as-Shura or ahl al-kal wal aqd (those who bind and 
loose). They are recognized as such by tlieir religious knowledge, 
personal character and social position. Their verdicts on 
problems which are not explicitly covered in the Shari'a are 
legally binding. 
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A constitution and the establishment of a consultative 
council were first proposed by King Abdul Aziz in 1932. The 
proposal was revived by his successor King Saud several times 
during his reign and most strenuously during the economic and 
political crisis of the late 1950s. King Saud considered adopting 
a constitution with a National Council; however, political 
disputes among the royal family members necessitated a 
consensus for the introduction of decisive constitutional reforms. 
In 1962, Crown Prince Faisal declared in a ten-point program, 
his intention to promulgate a fundamental law, and with the 
assumption to the throne in 1964, he designated a constitutional 
corrmiittee to draft a constitution. With no threat to his rule. 
King Faisal quickly put to rest the promises in this connection. 
King Khalid in the wake of 1979 Iranian Revolution and 
subsequent takeover of the Mecca Mosque by Islamic opponents 
of the regime, seriously broached the idea of creating a 
consultative council. An eight-man committee under the 
chairmanship of Prince Naif, the Minister of the Interior, was 
appointed. Shortly after his accession to throne in 1982, King 
Fahd promised to enact a constitution. He repeated the pledge 
several times in order to accelerate the working of the 
constitutional committee. At last, on March 1992, King Fahd 
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announced in several royal decrees, a program of political 
change through a package of constitutional and administrative 
reforms. The package consisted of three separate documents, 
and was enacted in three separate royal decrees: a Basic System 
of Rules, a statute covering the establishment of a consultative 
council, and a statute requiring administrative devolution. 
The Basic Law affirms the Shari'a as the fundamental law 
of the Kingdom, and says that the King has the final word as to 
the implementation of the Skari'a. The King is the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces, and he has the power to declare a 
state of emergency. The Basic Law gives full discretion to the 
King in times of national crisis. The King has absolute powers to 
defend the country from an external force that threatens the 
safety of the nation or its institutions. The King has also the 
power to unilaterally amend the Basic Law. The Basic Law 
confined the rule of the Kingdom to the sons of the Kingdom's 
founder, and introduced a major alteration to the system of 
succession to the throne. The Basic Law Calls for formation of an 
electoral college of princes to choose a new king. 
The Basic Law expresses some commitments to the right of 
appeal. Provisions regarding civil and human rights are not only 
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the first codification of human rights under Saudi Law, but also 
represent an attempt at integrating Western concepts of civil and 
human liberties with Islam. 
The Basic Law does not provide for freedom of religion. 
There is a no freedom of speech or expression guaranteed in the 
Basic Law, nor does it provide for the freedom of press. The 
Basic Law is silent with regard to court organization and the 
hierarchical system. 
The Basic System of Rules announced in March 1992, 
defines the scope of duties and responsibilities of the 
Consultative Council. The consultative council lays down 
regulations and motions to meet the interests of the state or 
remove what is bad in its affairs in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari'a. In the words of Article 15 of the councils constitution, 
the council's mandate is to "express opinions on the general 
policy of the state, which will be referred to it by the Council of 
Ministers." Article 23 of the council's constitution provides a 
framework in which ten members of the council have the right to 
propose a new draft law or amendment of the consultative 
council. 
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The First Majlis established specific procedures to conduct 
its business. As the Chairman of the council, Muhammad Ibn 
Zubayr functioned as the main conduit between the King and 
the Majlis. As the Majlis members were expected to refrain from 
public discussion of the proceedings, only Ibn Zubayr made 
occasional statements to the media. The Majlis was kept 
unusually busy during its 1993-1997 sessions. It held 142 
general meetings and took decisions on 133 issues brought 
before it for consideration. A large number of officials from pubic 
and private sectors were asked to attend the meetings, and 
significantly, those included some Cabinet ministers. 
Beyond its advisory role, the Majlis was permitted to 
assume a potentially important mediatory role between the 
authorities and the people. It received petition, complaints, and 
suggestions from the general population through its Committee 
of Petitions formed in 1995. In the first Majlis session, over 300 
petitions were received by this committee. Some of these 
reportedly contributed to the revision of the old laws and the 
drafting of new legislation, while others were sent to the royal 
court and were adopted. 
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In the first Majlis, tJ-ie bureaucrats had the largest number 
of seats, followed by the academicians and businessmen. There 
were also a handful of journalists, writers, Islam;ic functionaries, 
and military and police generals. Over 50 percent of members 
held doctorates, mostly from US universities. There were no royal 
family members in the Consultative Council, although the 
families of at least two members had marriage ties to the Saudi 
family. No opposition figures or women were appointed, and only 
one Shiite was given membership in the first Majlis. 
Constitutionally, the Majlis has been handicapped in a 
number, of ways. The members of the Majlis are appointed, not 
elected, and the ICing has wide discretion in selecting and 
dismissing the members. Furthermore, its terms of reference are 
simply to 'assist' the government, to 'study', the government 
plans, and to 'interpret' the regulations. Its decisions are merely 
lecorrmiendations, which can be carried out only after the 
approval of the Council of Ministers and the King. Despite these 
constitutional limitations, the first Majlis has played a 
satisfactory role in the Kingdom and has become a trendsetter 
for its successors. 
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APPENDIX -1 
The Al Sa'ud dynasty 
A.D. 
1726-65 
1765-1803 
1803-14 
1814-18 
A.H. 
1139-79 
1179-1218 
1218-29 
1229-33 
Muhammad ibn Sa'ud ibn 
Muhammad ibn Muqrin (39 
years) 
'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Muhammad 
ibn Sa'ud (38 years) 
Sa'udibn'Abdal-'Aziz(ll 
years) 
Abd Allah ibn Sa'ud (4 years) 
1818-20 1233-35 
1820 
1820-4 
1824-34 
1834 
1834-9 
1839-41 
1235 
1235-40 
1240-9 
1250 
1250-4 
1254-7 
period of occupation by the 
forces of Muhammad 'Ali 
and ibn Mu 'ammar 
Mishari ibn Sa'ud (a few 
months) 
continuation of occupation 
by muhammad Ali(4 years) 
Ttrki ibn Abd allah ibn 
Muhammad (10 years) 
Mishari ibn Abd ar-Rehman 
(40 days) 
Faisal ibn Turki (first time:5 
years) 
KJialid ibn Sa'ud (2 years) 
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1841-3 
1843-65 
1865-71 
1871-4 
1874-6 
1876-87 
1887-9 
1889-91 
1891-1902 
1902-53 
1953-64 
1964-75 
1975-82 
1982-
1257-9 
1259-82 
1282-8 
1288-91 
1291-3 
1293-1305 
1305-7 
1307-9 
1309-19 
1319-73 
1373-84 
1384-95 
1395-1402 
1402-
'Abd Allah ibn Thunaiyan 
(2 years) 
Fisal ibn Turki (second time: 
22years) 
"Abd Allah ibn Faisal (first time: 
6 years) 
Sa'ud ibn Faisal (3 years) 
'Abd ar-Rahman ibn Faisal (first 
time: 2 years) 
Abd Allah ibn Faisal (second 
time: 11 years) 
Period of Al ar-Rashid (2years) 
'Abd ar-Rahman ibn Faisal 
(second time: 2years) 
Continuation of Al ar-Rashid 
rule (11 years) 
King 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'ud 
{51 years) 
King Sa'ud (11 years) 
KingFaisil(ll years) 
King Khalid (7 years) 
KingFahd 
\ppe>i(hx-2 
APPENDIX - 2 
Saudi Arabia - Constitution 
Chapter 1 General Principles 
Article 1 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with 
Islam a s i ts religion; God's Book and the S u n n a h of His Prophet, 
God's prayers and peace be upon him, are i ts consti tution, Arabic 
is i ts language and Riyadh is its capital. 
Article 2 
The s ta te ' s public hoKdays are Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha. Its 
calendar is the Hegira calendar. 
Article 3 
The state 's flag shall be as follows: 
(a) It shall be green. 
(b) Its width shall be equal to two-thirds of it 's length. 
(c) The words "There is but one God and Mohammed is His Prophet 
shall be inscribed in the center witii a drawn sword unde r it. The 
s ta tu te shall define the rules pertaining to it. 
Article 4 
The s tate 's emblem shall consist of two crossed swords with a palm 
tree in the upper space between them. The'Statute shall define the 
state 's an them and its medals. 
Chapter 2 [Monarchy] 
Article 5 
(a) The system of government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is 
t ha t of a monarchy. 
(b) Rule passes to the sons of the founding King, Abd al-Aziz Bin 
Abd al-Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa'ud, and to their children's children. 
The most upright among them is to receive allegiance in accordance 
with the principles of the Holy Koran and the Tradition of the 
Venerable Prophet. 
(c) The King chooses the Heir Apparent and relieves him of his 
dut ies by Royal order. 
(d) The Heir Apparent is to devote h is time to h i s dut ies a s an Heir 
Apparent and to whatever missions the King en t ru s t s him with. 
(e) The Hek Apparent takes over the powers of the King on the 
lat ter 's death until the act of allegiance h a s been carried out. 
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Article 6 
Citizens are to pay allegiance to the King in accordance with the 
holy Koran and the tradition of the Prophet, in submission and 
obedience, in times of ease and difficulty, fortune and adversity. 
Article 7 
Government in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Koran 
and the Prophet's tradition. 
Article 8 [Government Principles] 
Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is based on the 
premise of justice, consultation, and equality in accordance with 
the Islamic Shari'ah. 
Chapter 3 Features of the Saudi Family 
Article 9 
The family is the kernel of Saudi society, and its members shall be 
brought up on the basis of the Islamic faith, and loyalty and 
obedience to God, His Messenger, and to guardians; respect for 
and implementation of the law, and love of and pride in the 
homeland and its glorious history as the Islamic faith stipulates. 
Article 10 
The state wiU aspire to strengthen family ties, maintain its Arab 
and Islamic values and care for all its members, and to provide the 
right conditions for the growth of their resources and capabilities. 
Article 11 
Saudi society will be based on the principle of adherence to God's 
command, on mutual cooperation in good deeds and piety and 
mutual support and inseparability. 
Article 12 
The consolidation of national unity is a duty, and the state will 
prevent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition and 
separation. 
Article 13 
education will aim at instilling the Islamic faith in the younger 
generation, providing its members with knowledge and skills and 
preparing them to become useful members in the building of theii' 
society, members who love their homeland and are proud of its 
history. 
Chapter 4 Economic Principles 
Article 14 
AH God's bestowed wealth, be it under the ground, on the surface 
or in. national territorial waters, in the land or maritime domains 
under the state's control, are the property of the state as defined by 
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law. The law defines means of exploiting, protecting, and developing 
such wealth in the interests of the state, its security and economy. 
Article 15 
No privilege is to be granted and no public resource is to be 
exploited without a law. 
Article 16 
Public money is sacrosanct. The state has an obligation to protect it 
and both citizens and residents are to safeguard it. 
Article 17 
Property, capital, and labor are essential elements in the Kingdom's 
economic and social being. They are personal rights which perform 
a social function in accordance with Islamic Shari'ah. 
Article 18 
The state protects freedom of private property and its sanctity. No 
one is to be stripped of his property except when it serves the 
public interest, in which case fair compensation is due. 
Article 19 
Public confiscation of money is prohibited and the penalty of 
private confiscation is to be imposed only by a legal order. 
Article 20 
Taxes and fees are to be imposed on a basis of justice and only 
when the need for them arises. Imposition, amendment, revocation 
and exemption is only permitted by law. 
Article 21 
Alms tax is to be levied and paid to legitimate recipients. 
Article 22 
Economic and social development is to be achieved according to a 
just and scientific plan. 
Chapter 5 Rights and Duties 
Article 23 [Islam] 
The state protects Islam; it implements its Shari'ah; it orders 
people to do right and shun evil; it fulfills the duty regarding God's 
call. 
Article 24 [Holy Places] 
The state works to construct and serve the Holy Places; it provides 
security and care for those who come to perform the pilgrimage and 
minor pilgrimage in them through the provision of facilities and 
peace. 
Article 25 [World Peace] 
The state strives for tlie achievement of the hopes of the Arab and 
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Islamic nation for solidarity and uni ty of word, and to consolidate 
i ts relat ions with friendly states. 
Article 2 6 [Human Rights] 
The s ta te protects h u m a n rights in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari 'ah. 
Article 2 7 [Welfare Rights] 
The state guarantees the r ights of the citizen and h i s family in 
cases of emergency, illness and disability, and in old age; it 
suppor ts the system of social security and encourages inst i tut ions 
and individuals to contribute in ac t s of charity. 
Article 2 8 [Work] 
The s ta te provides job opportunities for who-ever is capable of 
working; it enacts laws that protect the employee and employer. 
Article 2 9 [Science, Culture] 
The state safeguards science, l i terature and culture; it encourages 
scientific research; it protects the Islamic and Arab heritage and 
contr ibutes toward the Arab, Islamic and h u m a n civilization. 
Article 3 0 [Education] 
The state provides public education and pledges to combat 
illiteracy. 
Article 3 1 [Health Care] 
The state takes care of health i ssues and provides heal th care for 
each citizen. 
Article 3 2 [Environment, Nature] 
The state works for the preservation, protection, and improvement 
of tlie environment, and for the prevention of pollution. 
Article 3 3 [Armed Forces] 
The state establishes and equips the Armed Forces for the defence 
of the Islamic religion, the Two Holy Places, society, and the citizen. 
Article 3 4 [Military Service] 
The defence of the Islamic religion, society, and country is a duty 
for each citizen. The regime establishes the provisions of military 
service. 
Article 3 5 [Citizenship] 
The s ta tu tes define the Regulations governing Saudi Arabian 
nationality. 
Article 3 6 [Arrest] 
The state provides security for all i ts citizens and all res idents 
within its territory and no one shall be arrested, imprisoned, or 
have their actions restricted except in cases specified by s ta tutes . 
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Article 37 [Home] 
The home is sacrosanct and shall not be entered without the 
permission of the owner or be searched except in cases speciiied by 
statutes. 
Article 38 [Punishment, nulla poend\ 
Penalties shall be personal and there shall be no crime or penalty 
except in accordance with the Shari'ah or organizational law. There 
shall be no punishment except for acts committed subsequent to 
the coming into force of the organizational law. 
Article 39 [Expression] 
Information, publication, and all other media shall employ 
courteous language and the state's regulations, and they shall 
contribute to the education of the nation and the bolstering of its 
unity. All acts that foster sedition or division or harm the state's 
security and its public relations or detract from man's dignity and 
rights shall be prohibited. The statutes shall define all that. 
Article 40 [Communication] 
Telegraphic, postal, telephone, and other means of communications 
shall be safeguarded. They cannot be confiscated, delayed, read or 
listened to except in cases defined by statutes. 
Article 41 [Residents' Duties] 
Residents of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall abide by its laws 
and shall observe the values of Saudi society and respect its 
traditions and feelings. 
Article 42 [Asylum, Extradition] 
The state shall grant the right to political asylum when the public 
interest demands this. Statutes and international agreements shall 
define the rules and procedures governing the extradition of 
common criminals. 
Article 43 [Royal Courts] 
The King's Court and that of the Crown Prince shall be open to all 
citizens and to anyone who has a complaint or a plea against an 
injustice. Every individual shall have a right to address the pubfic 
authorities in all matters affecting him. 
Chapter 6 The Authorities of the State 
Article 44 
The authorities of the state consist of the following: the judicial 
authority; 
the executive authority; 
the regulatory authority. 
These authorities cooperate with each other in the performance of 
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their duties, in accordance witii this and other laws. The King shall 
be the point of reference for all these authorities. 
Article 45 
The source of the deliverance of fatwa in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia are God's Book and the Sunnah of His Messenger. The law 
will define the composition of the senior ulema body, the 
administiation of scientific research, defiverance of fatwa and it's 
(the body of senior ulema's) functions. 
Article 46 
The judiciary is an independent authority. There is no contiol over 
judges in the dispensation of their judgements except in the case of 
the Islamic Shari'ah. 
Article 47 
The right to litigation is guaranteed to citizens and residents of the 
Kingdom on an equal basis. The law defines the required 
procedures for this. 
Article 48 
The courts will apply the rules of the Islamic Shari'ah in the cases 
that are brought before them, in accordance with what is indicated 
in the Book and the Sunnah, and statutes decreed by the Ruler 
which do not contradict the Book or the Sunnah. 
Article 49 
Observing what is stated in Article 53, the courts shall arbitrate in 
all disputes and crimes. 
Article 50 
The King, or whoever deputizes for him, is responsible for the 
implementation of judicial rulings. 
Article 51 
The authorities establish the formation of the Higher Council of 
Justice and its prerogatives; they also establish the seniority of the 
courts and their prerogatives. 
Article 52 
The appointment of judges and the termination of their duties is 
carried out by Royal decree by a proposal fi-om the Higher Council 
of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the law. 
Article 53 
The law establishes the seniority of the tribunal of complaints and 
its prerogatives. 
Article 54 
The law establishes tjie relationship between the investigative body 
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and the Prosecutor-general, and their organization and 
prerogatives. 
Article 55 
The King carries out the policy of the nation, a legitimate policy in 
accordance with the provisions of Islam; the King oversees the 
implementation of the Islamic Shari'ali, the system of government, 
the state's general policies; and the protection and defence of the 
country. 
Article 56 
The King is the head of the Council of Ministers; he is assisted in 
carrying out his duties by members of the Council of Ministers, in 
accordance with the provisions of this and other laws. The Council 
of Ministers establishes the prerogatives of the Council regarding 
internal and external affairs, the organization of and co-ordination 
between government bodies. It also establishes requirements to be 
fulfilled by ministers, their prerogatives, the manner of their 
questioning and all issues concerning ihem. The law on the Council 
of Ministers and its prerogatives is to be amended in accordance 
with this law. 
Article 57 
(a) The King appoints and relieves deputies of the prime minister 
and ministers and members of tlie Council of Ministers by Royal 
decree. 
(b) The deputies of the prime minister and ministers of the Council 
of Ministers are responsible, by expressing solidarity before the 
King, for implementing the Islamic Shari'ah and the state's general 
poKcy. 
(c) The King has the right to dissolve and reorganize the Council of 
Ministers. 
Article 58 
The King appoints those who enjoy the rank of ministers, deputy 
ministers and those of higher rank, and relieves them of their posts 
by Royal decree in accordance with the explanations included in 
the law. Ministers and heads of independent departments are 
responsible before the prime minister for the ministries and 
departments which they supervise. 
Article 59 
The law defines the rules of the civil service, including salaries, 
awards, compensations, favors and pensions. 
Article 60 
The King is the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces. He 
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appoints officers and puts an, end to their duties in accordance with 
the law. 
Article 61 
The King declares a state of emergency, general mobilization and 
war, and the law defines the rules for this. 
Article 62 
If there is a danger threatening the safety of the Kingdom or its 
territorial integrity, or the security of its people and its interests, or 
which impedes the functioning of the state institutions, the King 
may take urgent measures in order to deal with this danger And if 
the King considers that these measures should continue, he may 
then implement tlie necessary regulations to this end. 
Article 63 
The King receives Kings and Heads of State. He appoints his 
representatives to states, and he receives the credentials of state 
representatives accredited to hun. 
Article 64 
The King awards medals, as defined by regulations. 
Article 65 
The King may delegate prerogatives to the Crown Prince by Royal 
decree. 
Article 66 
In the event of his travelling abroad, the King issues a Royal decree 
delegating to the Crown Prince the management of the affairs of 
state and looking after the interests of the people, as defined by the 
Royal decree. 
Article 67 
The regulatory authority lays down regulations and motions to 
meet the iaterests of the state or remove what is bad m. its affairs, 
in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah. This authority exercises its 
functions in accordance witli this law and the laws pertaining to 
the Council of Ministers and the Consultative Council. 
Article 68 [Consultative Council] 
A Consultative Council is to be created. Its statute will specify how 
it is formed, how it exercises its powers and how its members are 
selected. 
Article 69 
The King has the right to convene the Consultative Council and the 
Council of Ministers for a joint meeting and to invite whoever he 
wishes to attend that meetiag to discuss whatever matters he 
wishes. 
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Article 7 0 
International treaties, agreements, regulations and concessions are 
approved and amended by Royal decree. 
Article 7 1 
Sta tu tes are to be published in tlie Official Gazette and take effect 
from the date of publication unless another date is specified. 
Chapter 7 Financial Affairs 
Article 7 2 
(a) The s ta tu te explains the provisions concerning the s tate 's 
revenue and i ts entry in the state 's general budget. 
(b) revenue is entered and spent in accordance with the rules 
specified in the s ta tute . 
Article 7 3 
Any under taking to pay a sum of money from the general budget 
mus t be made in accordance with the provisions of the budget. If it 
is not possible to do so in accordance with the provisions of the 
budget, then it m u s t be done in accordance with Royal decree. 
Article 7 4 
The sale, renting or use of state asse ts is not permitted except in 
accordance witli the s ta tute . 
Article 7 5 
The s ta tu tes will define the monetary and banking provisions, the 
s tandards , weights and measures . 
Article 7 6 
The law will fix the state 's financial year and wiH announce the 
budget by way of a Royal decree. It wiU also assess the revenues 
and expenditure of tha t year a t least one month before the start of 
the financial year. If, for essential reasons, the budget is not 
announced and the new financial year s tar ts , the budget of the 
previous year will remain in force unti l the new budget is 
announced. 
Article 7 7 
The competent body wiU prepare the state 's final s ta tement of 
account for the passing year and will submit it to the head of the 
council of ministers . 
Article 7 8 
The same provisions wiU apply both to the budgets of the corporate 
bodies and their final s ta tements of account and to the state 's 
budget and i ts Tmal s ta tement of account. 
Chapter 8 Control Bodies 
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Article 79 
All t±ie state 's revenues and expenditures will come unde r 
subsequent control and all the state 's movable and immovable 
funds will be controlled in order to confirtn t h e good u s e of these 
funds and their prcvservation. An annua l report will be submit ted 
on this matter to the head of the Council of Ministers. The law wiU 
dcfme the competent control body and its obligations a n d 
prerogatives. 
Article 8 0 
government bodies will come under control in order to confirm the 
good performance of the administration and the implementation oi 
the s ta tutes . Financial and administrative offenses will be 
investigated and an annua l report wiU be submit ted on th i s mattei 
to the head of the Council of Ministers. The law will define the 
competent body in charge of this and it 's obligations and 
prerogatives. 
Chapter 9 General Provisions 
Article 81 
The implementation of this law will not prejudice the treat ies and 
agreements signed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with 
international bodies and organizations. 
Article 8 2 
V/ithout violating the content of Article 7, no provision of th is law 
whatsoever may be suspended unlCvSS it is temporary such as in a 
time of war or during the declaration of a state of emergency. This 
temporary suspension will be m. accordance with the t e rms of the 
law. 
Article 8 3 
This law may only be amended in the same way a s it was 
promulgated. 
295 
J - : r l '-.i.d 
K.•.•;t^' •! Ak'rwdat 
Lfhiopia 
#1997 MAiaELLAM Geographlr-
59||®5.-3100 W(?.v-.iTiaps.com 
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA BY THE 
SA'UD FAMILY 
\ 
% 
W IMMWt • JEW ^' 
, Burafdafi ^\ 
Medina „. /"O^mms/ 
Mecca '-^^^^^ 
'I 
'AifiiiM 
B ™ . 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
